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The focus of this dissertation is the evolution of BRICS in Russian foreign policy. It tells 
this overarching story through the lens of three overlapping narratives. The first is the 
evolution of Russian elite rhetoric about the West, and the increasing antagonism of that 
rhetoric, since the turn of the millennium. The second is how Russian leaders have 
framed the idea of the BRICS group in the narrative they created about Russian relations 
with the West and Russia’s role in the international system. The third is the story of 
BRICS itself: its development as a group in the international arena, its past achievements 
and future prospects, and its broader impact on global governance.  
 
The main argument is as follows: BRICS has become more important to Russia as a 
result of the rupture in relations with the West following the onset of the crisis in Ukraine 
in February 2014. Simultaneously, BRICS itself has begun to constitute an important part 
of a changing world order, primarily because the imbalances in global economic 
governance it originally sought to address remain unresolved. These two phenomena, 
combined with the silence of the BRICS countries in the face of Russian violations of 
international norms during the Ukraine crisis, are evidence of an accelerating 
fragmentation of the current international order. 
 
The dissertation uses rhetorical analysis as the primary methodology. Political rhetoric is 
an indication of what leaders would have the public understand to be true, even if it is 
not. When the rhetoric changes, it gives insight into a shift in how leaders wish their 
 iii 
positions to be perceived. When that shift is precipitated by dramatic changes in a 
country’s internal or external environment, an adjustment in rhetoric can be indication of 
where policy may be headed even before those concrete changes are visible. Rhetoric, 
therefore, is an integral part of the policy process. In focusing on this area of policy 
creation, this dissertation provides a window into the role of rhetoric in the 
conceptualization of Russian foreign policy, and the extent to which that rhetoric 
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A Note on Transliteration and Sources 
 
I use the Library of Congress system of transliteration without diacritics, and except in 
instances of proper names with English equivalents, such as Alexander, or where there is 
an accepted English spelling of a name, such as Yeltsin. “Ы” is rendered as “y.” Both 
“Й” and “И” are written as “i.” “Я” is “ia.” 
 
 
The Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs often provide English 
translations of speeches and documents. If these were available, I cite the English 
version, since it is the translation of record. In places where the English translation may 
have missed some of the nuance in the Russian original or need clarification, I provide 
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Introduction: Russia, the West, and the BRICS 
 
This dissertation tells three overlapping and intersecting stories. The first is the evolution 
of Russian elite rhetoric about the West, and the increasing antagonism of that rhetoric, 
since the turn of the millennium. The second is how Russian leaders have framed the idea 
of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in the narrative they 
created about Russian relations with the West and Russia’s role in the international 
system. The third is the story of BRICS itself: its development as a group in the 
international arena, its past achievements and future prospects, and its broader impact on 
global governance.  
 
These stories are not only overlapping and intersecting, but also mutually reinforcing. 
Increasing strain between Russia and its Western partners since 2004 has dramatically 
influenced how Russian leaders speak publicly about Russia’s national identity and 
international relationships. BRICS, with its membership of fast-growing, non-Western 
economies, provided a useful rhetorical counterpoint for Russian leaders to emphasize 
over continuing to cooperate within Western-dominated institutions. The development of 
BRICS from an investment strategy to an informal political grouping to an association 
building its own international institutions has lent credence to Russia’s claim that BRICS 
constitutes an alternative institutional option to those led by the West.  
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An interrogation of how Russian leaders conceptualize their relations with the West and 
the non-West is especially important in the wake of the biggest rupture in relations 
between Russia and the rest of the Euro-Atlantic community since the end of the Cold 
War. There is no shortage of analysis about how the outbreak of the crisis in Eastern 
Ukraine in February 2014 has altered Russia’s relationship with Europe and the United 
States.
1
 Authors have also examined how the crisis changes the balance in Russia’s 
relations with countries in the non-West, especially China.
2
 Less studied, however, is the 
impact of the crisis on how Russia conceives of its global institutional alignments. Chief 
among these is BRICS. This study fills that gap. Taking a long-term perspective, this 
dissertation answers the question of how the Russian foreign policy elite has framed 
Russia’s approach to BRICS over time, and how that framing has been altered as a 
consequence of the Ukrainian crisis. 
 
                                                 
1
 See for example: Robert Hunter, “The West Has Failed to Find a Constructive Role for Moscow,” 
Financial Times, February 17, 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/528d1dcc-b6a3-11e4-95dc-
00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3S7209TAg; Rajan Menon and Eugene B. Rumer, Conflict in 
Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post--Cold War Order, First Edition edition (The MIT Press, 2015); 
Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, “A New European Security Order: The Ukraine Crisis and the Missing 
Post-Cold War Bargain” (Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, December 8, 2014). 
2
 See for example: Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: Navigating through the Ukraine Storm,” Comparative 
Connections 16, no. 2 (September 2014): 131–41,174, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1580561624/abstract/339FD1F2AB144E64PQ/1; Joy Mitra, “Russia, 
China and Pakistan: An Emerging New Axis?,” The Diplomat, August 18, 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/russia-china-and-pakistan-an-emerging-new-axis/; Anita Inder Singh, 
“Unequal Partners: China and Russia in Eurasia,” The Diplomat, June 3, 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/unequal-partners-china-and-russia-in-eurasia/; M. Titarenko and V. 
Petrovsky, “Russia, China and the New World Order,” International Affairs 61, no. 3 (2015): 13, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1699516751/339FD1F2AB144E64PQ/12; Dmitri Trenin, “From 
Greater Europe to Greater Asia? The Sino-Russian Entente,” Carnegie Moscow Center, April 9, 2015, 
http://carnegie.ru/2015/04/09/from-greater-europe-to-greater-asia-sino-russian-entente/i64a#; Dmitri 
Trenin, “Russia’s Breakout From the Post–Cold War System: The Drivers of Putin’s Course” (Moscow, 
Russia: Carnegie Moscow Center, December 2014), http://carnegie.ru/2014/12/22/russia-s-breakout-from-
post-cold-war-system-drivers-of-putin-s-course/hxsm. These studies sometimes edge into questions of 
global order, but are not in-depth analyses of specific institutions. 
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It must be stated explicitly that this is a story about words more than deeds.
3
 It is an 
investigation of what Russian leaders have said more than an analysis of what they have 
done. In part, this is because the stories this study tells are so new that declarations have 
not always had time to translate into actions. More importantly, however, I focus on 
rhetoric because it is significant in its own right. Words are themselves political choices. 
They have meaning apart from whether or not what is said comes to pass. Words shape 
policy choices, and they can be used to lead and mislead the audience. Political rhetoric is 
an indication of what leaders would have the public understand to be true, even if it is 
not. When the rhetoric changes, it gives insight into a shift in how leaders wish their 
positions to be perceived. When that shift is precipitated by dramatic changes in a 
country’s internal or external environment, an adjustment in rhetoric can be indication of 
where policy may be headed even before those concrete changes are visible. Rhetoric, 
therefore, is an integral part of the policy process. It must be taken seriously as such. 
 
At the same time, this is not a story of words without connections to reality. Changes in 
how Russia has talked about BRICS have taken place in the context of very real shifts in 
both the relationship with the West and the international environment. Repeated cycles of 
deterioration and renewal in the U.S.-Russian relationship have been caused by a 
mutually reinforcing cycle of concrete policies and changes in rhetoric.
4
 For example, the 
period between the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 witnessed both productive cooperation and conciliatory framing of the 
                                                 
3
 On words versus deeds in foreign policy, see Coral Bell, The Reagan Paradox: American Foreign Policy 
in the 1980s (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1989), chap. 1. 
4
 On the cyclical nature of U.S.-Russian relations, see Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-
Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). 
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relationship on the part of the Russian leadership. By contrast, the negative impact of 
U.S. unilateralism in the Iraq war on U.S.-Russian relations was exacerbated by shifts in 
Russia’s domestic politics that necessitated a more pessimistic description of Russia’s 
place in the Euro-Atlantic order. 
 
Similarly, BRICS did not come together simply because Russia willed it so. There is a 
strong political economy rationale for BRICS in addition to the equally noteworthy 
rhetorical constructions about it. Changes in the distribution of global economic power 
and mistrust of U.S. leadership of international institutions laid the foundation for 
cooperation among these unlikely partners. This cooperation has proved durable through 
changes in leadership as well as economic downturns across the group.
5
 While 
coordination in the BRICS group is only just beginning to bear tangible fruit, in the form 
of a development bank and contingency currency pool, it has advanced sufficiently to 
constitute an association worthy of attention.  
 
Although the three stories are ultimately connected, they begin in different ways and at 
different times. Anti-Westernism in Russian political rhetoric traces both to centuries-old 
debates over national identity and to related but more recent conflicts over how post-
Soviet Russia should engage with the international system. The origins of BRICS lie the 
economic rise of the non-West and growing anger at U.S. foreign policy that occurred 
over the course of the late 1990s and early- to mid-2000s. These stories are the topic of 
the first chapter, which lays the foundation for understanding my overarching argument 
that BRICS has become more important to Russia because of Russia’s split with the 
                                                 
5
 South Africa is the only member country not to have gone through a leadership transition. 
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West, while simultaneously, BRICS itself has begun to constitute an important part of a 
new world order.  
 
The second chapter situates this study within the broader literature on BRICS. BRICS as 
a political grouping is a fairly new object of academic study. In addition, there are no 
book-length academic studies in either English or Russian dedicated to the analysis of the 
role of BRICS in Russian foreign policy and political rhetoric. This chapter draws out the 
main themes of academic thought on BRICS and Russia’s place in the group. Identifying 
why the topic of BRICS has often been met with skepticism and how authors understand 
Russia’s approach of the group reveals the gaps in the existing literature and makes plain 
the contributions of this study.  
 
The third and fourth chapters address separately the questions of how BRICS developed 
and how Russian leaders made space for the concept in Russian foreign policy. The third 
chapter presents an institutional and intellectual history of the development of BRICS on 
the international stage. The chapter details the main milestones of cooperation, beginning 
with the first informal meeting in 2005 and running through the creation of the BRICS 
Development Bank and Contingency Reserve Arrangement at the 2014 summit in 
Fortaleza. It also includes a short quantitative examination of the development of trade 
and investment relationships among the BRICS, tracked against the group’s political 
institutional development. The primary conclusion of chapter three is that BRICS has 
progressed from being a private sector catchphrase to a self-sustaining group with 
prospects for deeper cooperation.  




Just like the third chapter, the fourth chapter also provides a more unified intellectual 
history of a single narrative. Looking primarily at presidential speeches and foreign 
policy concepts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it traces how the meanings of the 
ideas of sovereignty and national identity evolved during Vladimir Putin’s first two 
presidential terms. The chapter traces how, between 2000 and 2007, Putin relied on 
increasingly exclusionary definitions of these terms. The goal of the redefinition was to 
separate Russia rhetorically from the West and establish Russia as an independent pole in 
international affairs. The primary argument of the fourth chapter is that the rhetorical 
separation of Russia from the political West was a key inflection point that allowed for 
the incorporation of BRICS into Russian political rhetoric when the group burst forth in 
2008. 
 
The three narratives come together with the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis. This 
is the topic of the fifth chapter. 2008 witnessed the simultaneous emergence of BRICS in 
the international arena and the beginning of a volatile period in Russian-Western 
relations, marked by the low of the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia and the high of 
the Reset. The chapter considers the impact of these developments from two angles: the 
official and the unofficial. On the official level, I analyze Russian government policy and 
rhetoric on BRICS in the context of improving relations with the West and President 
Medvedev’s emphasis on economic modernization as opposed to political status. On the 
unofficial level, I consider the proliferation of analyses of BRICS between 2008 and 2013 
in Russian state universities and research institutions. This two-level analytical approach 
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reveals the chasm between the potential BRICS held for Russia and the role it actually 
played: while BRICS cooperation was increasing, the Russian leadership continued to 
conceive of the group as strictly a rhetorical balance against the West. This further 
underscores the extent to which relations with the West have determined how Russian 
leaders conceive of BRICS.  
 
The connection between relations with the West and Russia’s approach to BRICS was 
brought out in sharp relief with the onset of the crisis in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 
February 2014. The Ukrainian crisis and its after effects are the subject of the sixth and 
final chapter. This section analyzes how the crisis and the economic and political rupture 
with the West affected Russia’s attitude towards BRICS. It looks in particular at the 
change in political rhetoric following the March 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the role 
of anti-Western sentiment in Russia’s BRICS policy and in the BRICS group as a whole. 
The chapter also explores Russian efforts to increase economic ties with the BRICS 
countries after the imposition of both Western sanctions and Russian “anti-sanctions” 
(self-imposed bans on agricultural imports from the EU and several other countries). The 
main argument of this chapter is that BRICS after Crimea serves important political and 
economic functions for Russia. As a result, the crisis has forced Russian leaders to think 
more seriously about BRICS within Russian foreign policy as more than just a theoretical 
alternative to current partnerships. Simultaneously, the ongoing institutionalization of 
BRICS, which began to intensify following agreements at the 2014 Summit in Fortaleza, 
has made it much more rational for Russia to begin taking BRICS more seriously. 
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All three stories in this dissertation are still ongoing. Their short- to medium-term 
implications, however, are already evident. Although the crisis in Ukraine remains 
unresolved, it is clear that it has fundamentally altered the relationship between Russia 
and the West and caused Russian leaders to define a Russia that stands in opposition to 
the West. Even though BRICS remains more in the realm of oratory than action in 
Russian foreign policy, the BRICS group has helped Russia stand up to Western censure 
and sanctions. Finally, the BRICS institutions have not yet begun to operate, but they 
have been ratified by the member states and have begun the process of opening their 
doors and offering concrete alternative institutional options. Each of these developments 
individually has changed the landscape of international relations and Russia’s place in the 
international system. Taken together, they represent the accelerating fragmentation of 







   
 
 9 
1. Status Quo Revisionism: Post-Soviet Russia and the 
International System 
 
[Russia] is ready to take a part in international relations, but she prefers other countries 
to abstain from taking interest in her affairs: that is to say, to insulate herself from the 






Over the next 10 years, the weight of the BRICs…in world GDP will grow….In line with 
these prospects, world policymaking forums should be re-organised an in particular, the 
G7 should be adjusted to incorporate BRIC representatives….It is time for the world to 
build better global economic BRICs. 
 




Ever since Peter the Great took his Grand Embassy through Europe in 1697-1698 and 
began to open Russia up to outside influences, Russia’s place vis-à-vis the West, and 
indeed with regard to the international system, has been somewhat unsettled. The 
discomfort has come from an ongoing internal struggle between a desire to engage with 
the international system – that is, play a leading role in its formation and administration – 
while still maintaining complete control over domestic development and national 
identity.
3
 National identity, further, has been divided between identification with Europe 
and the (ideological) West and the idea of Russia as a civilization apart. The latter 
                                                 
1
 Isaiah Berlin, The Soviet Mind: Russian Culture under Communism (Washington, D.C: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2004), 90. 
2
 Jim O’Neill, “Building Better Global Economic BRICs” (Goldman Sachs, 2001), S.01–S.03, 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf. 
3
 Richard Sakwa, “The Problem of ‘the International’ in Russian Identity Formation,” International Politics 
49, no. 4 (July 2012): 451, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ip.2012.10. 
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conception dictates that Russia is required by virtue of geography and culture to follow 




This divide has produced a foreign policy approach that sometimes attempts to position 
Russia as an alternative center of power and undermine the legitimacy of the reigning 
system. An alternate tactic is to present Russia as a bridge between old and new 
structures. The result is a country that is at once both a status quo and a revisionist power: 
post-Soviet Russia has attempted to maintain the status quo where its power is magnified. 
However, when efforts to join established organization have proven unsuccessful or the 
requirements for entry were unacceptable, the government has retreated and created 
alternative organizations. This institutional creation has been accompanied by efforts to 
undermine rhetorically the legitimacy of the organizations from which Russia is 
excluded. 
 
The role of this chapter is to establish a framework within which to understand Russia’s 
BRICS diplomacy. It therefore has two tasks. The first is to trace how Russia has 
interacted with leading global institutions, and the international order more generally, 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The second is a discussion of the changes 
the international system has undergone during that era, with particular emphasis on the 
                                                 
4
 Boris Dubin, “The Myth of the ‘Special Path’ in Contemporary Russian Public Opinion,” Russian Politics 
& Law 50, no. 5 (October 9, 2012): 35–51, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=83403922&site=ehost-live&scope=site; 
Sergei Magaril, “The Mythology of the ‘Third Rome’ in Russian Educated Society,” Russian Politics & 
Law 50, no. 5 (October 9, 2012): 7–34, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=83403923&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
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period until 2008. This sets the backdrop for understanding why BRICS was so appealing 
to Russia and locates BRICS within the evolving international system. 
 
The chapter begins with definitions of the main terms at play throughout this dissertation, 
such as international order and national identity. This is followed by a discussion of 
methodology. The chapter then moves to a review of the main foreign policy perspectives 
that have predominated among the post-Soviet Russian elite. That overview is followed 
by a two-part examination of Russia’s relationship with the West. First, why the 
relationship has remained strained since the end of the Cold War; second, how Russia has 
responded to that strain.  Finally, the discussion broadens to an evaluation of seminal 
global changes in the past twenty-five years that have markedly affected the international 
order. This broader discussion contextualizes Russia’s debates and actions within broader 
international trends.  
 
Terms and Definitions 
 
Ideas such as “international system,” “international legitimacy,” “revisionist” and “status 
quo” are inherently subjective and therefore often ill-defined. Following Henry Kissinger, 
I define international order as “an international agreement about the nature of workable 
arrangements and about the aims and methods of foreign policy.”
5
 Legitimacy “implies 
the acceptance of the framework by all major powers,” at least to the extent than none 
                                                 
5
 Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), 1. 
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feels compelled to fundamentally undermine that framework.
6
 Therefore, a legitimate 
international system is one in which the most powerful countries are in general agreement 
about which countries, institutions and norms should manage international affairs and 
conflict, and no major power wishes to overturn that agreement.  
 
Kissinger defines a power that is unsatisfied with the existing framework as 
“revolutionary.”
7
 I prefer the term “revisionist,” because it allows for a continuum of the 
change the power wishes to implement. For example, Steven Ward argues that there is a 
substantive difference between pushing to change the allocation of resources (power, 
prestige, wealth) within a given system, and advocating for a change of the system itself.
8
 
However, the two goals are linked, because the perceived legitimacy of how goods are 
distributed within a system is tied to norms about who constitutes a legitimate actor.
9
 For 
example, the emphasis on human rights and good governance in the current world order 
undermines Russia’s image as a legitimate actor, and therefore its ability to push for a 
reallocation of power in its direction.  
 
The question of whether a country is revisionist or status quo is a question about its 
strategic orientation towards the system. Following both Ward and Legro, I define 
strategic orientation as “national ideas about the desirability of joining and sustaining the 
                                                 
6




 Steven Michael Ward, “Status Immobility and Systemic Revisionism in Rising Great Powers” (Ph.D., 




 Ibid., 12. 





 A status quo power is one that is pleased with the allocation 
of resources and the legitimizing norms of the system. A revisionist power is one that is 
dissatisfied and wishes to make adjustments. Russia is a problematic case because it 
wishes to maintain some elements of the current institutional and distributive order while 
at the same time it spearheads institutional formation whose goal is to undermine other 
elements of this same order. At a normative level, Russia seeks to change how the 
legitimizing norms of the current system are applied, but it is not clear that it wishes to 
substitute alternative norms.
11
 Richard Sakwa terms this approach “neo-revisionist,” but I 
prefer to keep both “status quo” and “revisionist” in play because doing so better captures 




“National interest” is as slippery a term as “international order” or “revisionist.” At its 
most basic, the national interest can be defined as “the interest of a state, usually as 
defined by the government.”
13
 In international relations theory, realists often use the term 
to denote not only how a state should behave in relation to other states, but also the idea 
that states are constrained by a variety of factors, including geography and the relative 
power of other states.
14
 States have to conduct foreign policy in a way that maximizes 
their own position while maneuvering around set limitations over which they have no 
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 This definition suggests that there exist some “permanent” national interests, 
devoid of ideological or moral intent, to which all in the state would agree.
16
   
 
The problem with this definition, however, is that it gives little information as to what 
interests actually are in concrete terms. More importantly, it ignores or discounts the role 
of the leader in defining how national interest will be reflected in state policy. Once the 
leader is included in the equation, it becomes clear that antecedent to the definition of 
interests is the question of how the individual leader understands those interests. Indeed, 
as Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane argue, “Perceptions define interests.”
17
 Building 
on that observation, John Spanier and Robert Wendzel argue that, “different individuals 
and groups will have varying ideas about what their nations should seek to achieve or 
protest.”
18
 Put differently, the national interest does not exist as such, except to the extent 
that it is defined by those in power based on their own understanding of a given 
environment. 
 
The importance of leaders in defining national interest is crucial. As Anne Clunan argues, 
“getting to the root of a state’s national interests means unearthing what its elites identify 
as the country’s political purpose and international status.”
19
 Within certain limits, those 
in power both set the boundaries of the conversation and execute policy. Their words and 




 Francis Fukuyama, “The Ambiguity of ‘National Interest,’” in Rethinking Russia’s National Interests, ed. 
Stephen Sestanovich (Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 12. 
17
 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy,” in Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), 88. 
18
 John W. Spanier and Robert L. Wendzel, Games Nations Play, 9th ed (Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 
1996), 284. 
19
 Anne L. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security 
Interests (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 3. 
   
 
 15 
actions, therefore, matter most in understanding how a country perceives its national 
interests, and why the leadership may be pursuing a given policy. Relatedly, analyzing 
changes in how the leadership talks about national interests and national identity can 
yield insights about coming policy shifts. 
 
Three additional items bear mention. First, national interests change over time and as a 
consequence of both changing elites and shifting elite identities. These changes within 
the elite impact the conceptualization of national identity. Second, individual elite 
identities and definitions of national interest also change over time. This is particularly 
important in the Russian case, where the ruling elite has been largely stable in the period 
under discussion, but the definition of Russian national identity has evolved in large part 
because of how the leadership has altered its rhetorical construction. As the national 
identity has evolved, so too has the consensus about the most appropriate foreign policy. 
Finally, I follow Clunan in defining national identity as “sets of ideas about the country’s 
political purpose and international status.”
20
 
Methodology: The Meaning of Political Rhetoric  
 
Much of this dissertation rests on the analysis of elite political rhetoric. 
Methodologically, these are tricky waters. As Stacie Godard and Ronald Krebs argue in a 
special issue of Security Studies devoted to the study of political rhetoric, “scholars of 
international relations often dismiss rhetorical contestation as meaningless posturing, 
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unworthy of serious analysis.”
21
 It is not hard to see why. Politicians say so much to so 
many different audiences that it seems logical to focus more on what gets done than on 
what gets said. 
 
That approach, however, misses a critical piece of the creation of foreign policy. As 
Goddard and Krebs argue, “public talk is essential to the process of how states coalesce 
around collective intention and how institutions shape their members’ subsequent 
behavior.”
22
 Put differently, the process of rhetorical contestation – of politicians talking 
and shaping the debate – is a fundamental piece of how a government arrives at a foreign 
policy that has public support.  
 
This is not a new consideration. Vibeke Tjalve and Michael Williams note that the post-
World War II generation of realists understood that rhetoric is an important component of 
foreign policy action both domestically and internationally.
23
 They saw rhetoric as 
fundamental to responsible and responsive policy creation.
24
 These scholars were not 
blind to the potential abuses of rhetoric. Indeed, concern that “American grand strategy… 
had become dependent on rhetoric of fear or destiny” was part of what motivated them to 
consider the role of rhetoric in policy, and search for alternative sources for rhetorical 
flourishes.
25
 They saw danger in rhetoric based in fear. 
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Indeed, these scholars were concerned about the practical implications of reckless words. 
As Hans Morgenthau wrote in an indictment of the Truman Administration’s foreign 
policy: 
You have deceived once: now you must deceive again, for to tell the truth 
would be to admit having deceived. If your better judgment leads you near 
the road of rational policy, your critics will raise the ghost of your own 
deception, convict you out of your own mouth as appeaser and traitor, and 
stop you in your tracks. 
 
You have falsified the real issue between the United States and the Soviet 
Union into a holy crusade to stamp out Bolshevism everywhere on earth, 
for this seemed a good way of arousing the public: now you must act as 
though you mean it…you have told the people that American power has 
no limits, for flattery of the people is “good politics”: now you must act as 




This is almost a causal argument. Morgenthau does not see speeches and doctrines that 
appealed to the national ego and national morality as window dressing on concrete 
national interests. Instead, he and his contemporaries saw political rhetoric as having 




Morganthau was not simply fear-mongering about the dangers of fear-mongering. As 
Charles Gati argues in his book on the 1956 uprising against the Soviets in Hungary, U.S. 
promises had real impact in the field. Gati writes: 
 
Combining the best techniques of Hollywood with those of Madison 
Avenue, the United States was offering a product – liberation – it could 
not deliver. The advertising was misleading, but it convinced the 
oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe that their cause was America’s 
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cause, and it reinforced the Soviet oppressors’ belief that in America they 




In Gati’s estimation, U.S. rhetoric about intentions to liberate Eastern Europe inculcated 
in its audience false beliefs that spurred tangible outcomes. On U.S. government 
directive, Radio Free Europe did not use its platform to press for any moderation among 
the Hungarian audience, and it even offered advice on how to manufacture weapons.
29
 
Hungarians took up arms in Budapest at least in part because U.S. rhetoric made them 
believe that they would be supported in their struggle.
30
 The U.S. government, moreover, 
believed that those words were sufficient support. Documents indicate that while material 
support was never meant to be forthcoming, U.S. officials seem to have “had an 




As Gati rightly notes, however, there was a domestic context to what he terms the U.S. 
“huffing and puffing” about rolling back the Soviet armies.
32
 Democrats and Republicans 
were as concerned about demonstrating their superior fitness to rule as they were about 
the national security threat that the USSR posed to the United States and its allies.
33
 
Another way of understanding the role of the domestic context in shaping U.S. Cold War 
rhetoric is to posit that as much as rhetoric can have a determinant influence on policy, it 
does not work free of constraints.  
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This links the discussion to the analysis in the previous section about the role of national 
identity in determining national interests. In answer to the question of why some identity 
narratives catch on while others do not, Ann Clunan proposes that,  
[W]hether…national self-images and their behavioral orientations 
towards the outside world come to be epistemically dominant rests on 




National identity cannot be derived de novo; it is bound by what the political elite 
understands as a “legitimate” interpretation. What this means in practical terms is that the 
debate over national identity and by extension national interest is bounded by what the 
audience is willing to hear. Goddard and Krebs make a similar point. They argue that 
certain strategic options, regardless of their technical merits, will never come up for 




The preceding argument demonstrates that rhetoric has practical influences on policy 
adoption and operates within understood and bounded constraints. Rhetorical analysis, 
therefore, is methodologically sound and potentially quite revealing. This is not an 
argument that rhetoric is the same as policy. Indeed, it is a softer claim than that made by 
Morgenthau, wherein rhetoric has discernable concrete effects. My argument is that if 
rhetoric helps shape policy, then analysis of the rhetorical roots of policy must be part of 
analyzing policy. Tracing how the framing of ideas and arguments evolves over time 
offers new depth and nuance in understanding foreign policy actions.  
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This is not the same as the literature on the influence of ideas on policy, although that 
literature is related. From a general perspective, ideational approaches have been gaining 
ground across the social sciences, and especially in political economy, for several years.
36
 
On Russia specifically, scholars such as Jeffrey Checkel and Sarah Mendelson have 
studied how ideas came to affect and effect political change in the late Soviet and early 
post-Soviet eras.
37
 The difference between these scholars’ arguments and the work 
presented here is that ideational analysis is fundamentally concerned in one way or 
another with ideas as causal variables. As Daniel Béland and Robert Henry Cox write, 
“ideas are causal beliefs.”
38
 Though they group under this umbrella the process of the 
dissemination of ideas and political discourse, their ultimate concern is with how ideas 
effect change. My concern is how the framing of fluid concepts moves the bounds of 
acceptable policy options and creates space for policy changes.
39
 Put differently, my 
interest is more in how rhetoric changes ideas than how ideas change policy. The final 
chapter delves somewhat more deeply into policy adjustment, but that is as a 
consequence of an external shock (Ukraine) rather than the impact of ideas.  
 
Russia offers particularly fertile ground for this analytical approach. Speeches and 
foreign policy concepts play an unusually large role in the Russian foreign policy 
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process. Most Western states, for example, do not define a specific, codified foreign 
policy concept.
40
 The USSR relied heavily on programmatic policy documents, but 
Andrei Kozyrev was initially reluctant for post-Soviet Russia to follow that tradition.
41
 
However, as the debate over whether or how much to orient Westward became more 
heated, foreign policy elites (governmental and otherwise) argued that the government 
needed “to provide a framework for its foreign policy.”
42
 The first post-Soviet foreign 
policy concept was published in January 1993.
43
 Since then, the government has 
approved new official concepts in 2000, 2008, and 2013. While these concepts are not the 
definitive statement on the foreign policy that a given leader will conduct, they can be 
seen as setting the bounds of the debate. As Jeffrey Mankoff argues, foreign policy 
documents and their ilk (e.g. the National Security Concept) “define the mental universe 
in which policy decisions are made.”
44
 Changes in the documents over time, therefore, 
indicate shifts in the acceptable parameters of foreign policy.  
 
Similarly, presidential speeches indicate intentions and agenda setting. As Gordon Hahn 
argues: 
In Russia, the words of a country’s leader mean something: they are taken 
as important signals throughout the bureaucracy and cannot be used to 
promise important plans that the leadership has no intention of fulfilling. 
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Often cryptic and cautious, they nevertheless provide political orientation 




As with the foreign policy concepts, most speeches are not direct indications of coming 
policy actions. Instead, they reflect how a leader conceptualizes current challenges, and 
how he would have Russia react to those challenges. Taken together, therefore, official 
policy documents and presidential speeches show how the government wishes to see 
foreign policy evolve. 
 
A Review of Russian Foreign Policy Orientations 
 
Although Russian politicians now frequently speak of protecting Russian interests, the 
idea of “national interest” did not really enter the Russian foreign policy discourse until 
the mid-1990s.
46
 During the Stalin era, foreign policy choices were couched in talk of 
state security, capitalist encirclement, and the mutual incompatibility of the capitalist and 
socialist systems.
47
 Even as actual policy drifted more towards pragmatism under 
Brezhnev, it was still governed (officially) by ideology.
48
 The turn to “New Thinking” 
under Gorbachev, meanwhile, appealed to universalism and international law, rather than 
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framing policies in terms of the Soviet national interest.
49
 It was only in the wake of the 
backlash against Yeltsin and Kozyrev’s Western-oriented policy over the course of 1992 
that the language of foreign policy “in defence of Russia’s interests” emerged.
50
 The 
emergence of this terminology at a time of fierce domestic debate about Russia’s role in 
the world and its post-Soviet identity was no accident.  
 
Indeed, how different sections of the Russian elite chose to define the national interest 
was intertwined with the broader competing foreign policy orientations under discussion 
in the early 1990s. The most traditional divide is that between Westernizers and 
Slavophiles. Dating back to the debates among the members of the proto-intelligentsia of 
the 1840s, the two groups agreed that Russia needed to modernize and develop 
economically. They disagreed on the correct method for doing so. Westernizers 
advocated development according to European principles and pathways. Slavophiles, by 
contrast, argued that Russia has a special historical and cultural mission, and could only 
develop in accordance with native-born traditions. Since the end of the Cold War, this 
debate has been reframed as a debate between Atlanticists and Eurasianists, where the 
core question is whether (or how much) to orient towards the institutional and ideological 
West.
51
 Like the original Westernizer/Slavophile debate, the Atlanticist/Eurasianist divide 
also encompasses debates about whether Russian economic and political development 
                                                 
49
 R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991 (Ithaca, N.Y: 
Cornell University Press, 1992), 296. Part of the problem, of course, was that the Soviet Union was 
comprised of more than just Russia. Defining Soviet interests was not the same task as the post-Soviet 
problem of defining Russian interests. 
50
 Adomeit, “Russia as a ‘Great Power’ in World Affairs,” 52–54. 
51
 Angela Stent, “Reluctant Europeans,” in Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the 
Shadow of the Past, ed. Robert Legvold (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 418; On the idea of 
an ideological West, see Strobe Talbott, “Dangerous Leviathans,” Foreign Policy, April 15, 2009, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/04/15/dangerous_leviathans. 
   
 
 24 
should directly emulate the Western model, or if it should instead follow a unique 
Russian path.
52
 While Atlanticism reigned in the very early post-Cold War years, by 




Not everyone believes that this simple dichotomy is sufficient. Karen Dawisha and Bruce 
Parrott identify five main schools of thought in Russian foreign policy, particularly with 
respect to relations with the former Soviet republics. These are: those who advocate an 
activist but non-expansionist policy; those who view Russia as a multiethnic great power; 
those who think of Russia as a great power with an ethnically defined base; those who see 
post-Soviet Russia as undergoing spiritual rebirth following the disasters of communism; 
and the extreme far right.
54
 The first and fourth schools match with the Atlanticist and 
Eurasianist views, but this breakdown injects helpful nuance into the stark dichotomy of 
the Atlanticist/Eurasianist schema.   
 
Whereas Dawisha and Parrott focus in particular on Russian foreign policy orientations 
towards the former Soviet republics, Andrew Kuchins and Igor Zevelev turn their 
attention to Russian attitudes toward the wider world. Kuchins and Zevelev define three 
basic orientations (each with several subgroups) in Russian foreign policy discourse: pro-
Western liberals, Great Power Balancers, and Nationalists.
55
 Pro-Western liberals, 
notably Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev, are satisfied with integration into the 
                                                 
52
 Dubin, “The Myth of the ‘Special Path’ in Contemporary Russian Public Opinion,” 36. 
53
 Light, “Foreign Policy Thinking,” 35. 
54
 Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval 
(Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 199–202. 
55
 Andrew Kuchins and Igor Zevelev, “"Russia’s Contested National Identity and Foreign Policy,” in 
Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and 
Russia, ed. Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 183. 
   
 
 25 
institutional West on Western terms.
56
 Great Power Balancers, notably Evgenii 
Primakov, Igor Surkov, and Vladimir Putin, take a roughly realist approach to foreign 
policy and stress the primacy of the state and the importance of national interests. They 
do not oppose cooperation with the West, but they are unwilling to cooperate at the 
perceived expense of Russian national interests.
57
 Finally, nationalists are largely averse 
to working with the West.
58
 Kuchins and Zevelev argue that a coalition of liberals and 
balancers dominated the scene from 1993 through 2002, while from 2002 to 2008 it 
became a coalition of balancers and nationalists.
59
 Following the global economic crisis 
and the inauguration of Dmitri Medvedev, the modernizers seemed to regain some 




Those Kuchins and Zevelev identify as Great Power Balancers, Margot Light classifies as 
“Pragmatic Nationalists.” The advantage of her analysis and classification scheme, taken 
together with that of Kuchins and Zevelev, is that it traces the path through which this 
group came to power in the early post-Soviet era.
61
 Perhaps most important is her insight 




This is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that the ongoing prevalence of 
Pragmatic Nationalists in positions of power is not just a story of loss of power by 
Atlanticists (in Light’s formulation, Liberal Westernizers). Instead, it is demonstrative of 
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an overall shift in views among the Russian foreign policy elite toward a more 
nationalistic conception of Russian identity and national interests.
63
 This has serious 
implications for analysis: if the Pragmatic Nationalists had grown primarily from an 
opposition group, then it might be fair to conclude that there remained a strong basis of 
Atlanticist elites. Since the Atlanticists themselves became Pragmatic Nationalists, it 
suggests that the views they espouse – moderate Eurasianism, cordial but not subordinate 
relations with the West, and the pursuit of great power status – represents a broad swath 
of the Russian foreign policy establishment. That the Pragmatic Nationalist group has 
persisted in power since 1993, but now allies more closely with nationalists, indicates 
that the shift away from the Atlanticist view has continued and intensified. 
 
It is also significant that it is precisely the Liberal Westernizers who changed their minds. 
The shift away from the Atlanticist view has strong elements of political disillusionment. 
Indeed, one reason Kozyrev and his coterie lost ideological control was public and 
official disappointment with the level of assistance (monetary and otherwise) that Russia 
received from the West, and especially the United States, in managing the detritus of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.
64
 The sense that Russia was held to different standards 
than, for example, Estonia, and that the West had no sympathy for Russian security 
concerns in its border regions left a bad taste in the collective mouth of the Russian 
elite.
65
 Whether or not this was a fair perception of the realities on the ground (the next 
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section takes up this question), Russian disappointment with the West is a fundamental 
variable for understanding Russian foreign policy rhetoric and behavior. 
 
All the authors discussed above wrote at different times and offer different classification 
schemes and names. Nevertheless, there is little substantive difference in where they 
draw the lines between groups, or what they believe to be the basic orientation of each 
group. Nearly twenty-five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the core debate 
within the Russian foreign policy establishment remains the extent to which Russia 
should engage with the existing (Western-led) international system, and what policy 
orientation best supports Russian development. Indeed, even the simple 
Westernizer/Slavophile dichotomy distills down to the same question. No matter how it is 
parsed, the foreign policy making elite is in agreement that Russia’s main task is 
development, in pursuit of becoming (or staying) a great power.
66
 The crisscrossing 
debates are over how best to accomplish this aim. 
 
Russia and the West: A Failed Experiment? 
 
As noted above, there was a brief window before the end of 1992 when those in favor of 
joining the West were politically ascendant and capable of implementing their policy 
vision without crippling domestic opposition.
67
 It is worth posing the question, therefore, 
of why the debate over Russia’s “special path” renewed itself so quickly following 
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dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is an important question because the international 
institutional choices made during this era have had long-lasting and far-reaching 




There are three basic reasons that Russia did not integrate into the Western order in the 
early 1990s. First, there was an ambiguous embrace from the West. Second, Russia was 
unwilling to join the existing order as a supplicant with no agency in how the existing 
organizations operated. Finally, domestic opposition quickly became sufficiently intense 
to preclude integration while domestic policy choices further closed off international 
opportunities.  
 
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet outer empire in 
Eastern Europe, there existed a brief opportunity to utterly remake the international 
system. Mikhail Gorbachev spoke of the need to build “a common European home,” and 
U.S. President George H.W. Bush spoke of “a Europe whole and free.”
69
 The obvious 
institutional organ to accomplish this goal was the Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later OSCE). Formed as part of 1975 Helsinki Final Act, 
the CSCE gave all the major players a seat at the table and an equal voice. The French 
were initially in favor of this approach.
70
 Alternatively, the Soviets and the West could 
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have agreed on some type of new pan-European security structure including both the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. This 
was the path that Gorbachev advocated, especially after he realized that the Soviet Union 
would have no role in a united Germany.
71
 One of these approaches to post-Cold War 
security architecture could have been taken up if the goal was a common European home 
including the Soviet Union, and then Russia as its main successor state. 
 
As Mary Sarotte argues, however, this goal was not shared on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Instead, President Bush was more concerned about maintaining U.S. influence on the 
continent. He was convinced that elevating NATO over the CSCE was the way to 
accomplish that aim.
72
 Indeed, Secretary of State James Baker even told President Bush 
that the “‘real risk to NATO is the CSCE.’”
73
 Bush and West German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl exploited the Soviet Union’s dire economic situation to convince Gorbachev to 
agree to NATO’s perpetuation and expansion into East Germany, using West German 
money as an inducement.
74
 Sarotte’s research further suggests that even as Bush and 
Kohl were working on convincing Gorbachev to assent to membership of a unified 
Germany in NATO, they were already planning for longer-term NATO expansion into 
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The question of who said what and when about NATO enlargement during the 
discussions about German unification remains bitterly divisive. American scholars 
generally agree that neither Bush nor Kohl, nor any of their representatives, ever made a 
formal promise to Gorbachev that NATO would not enlarge beyond absorbing East 
Germany. Even Sarotte states quite clearly: “Put simply, there was never a formal deal, as 
Russia alleges.”
76
 The difference in U.S. scholarship arises over whether or not one was 
implied. Sarotte has argued that the Russians are not wrong to see successive rounds of 
NATO enlargement as the betrayal of a gentleman’s agreement.
77
 By contrast, Mark 
Kramer argues that the discussions between Kohl, Baker, Bush, and Gorbachev all dealt 
directly with the question of East Germany’s status within NATO. Therefore, the Russian 
interpretation of the agreement that NATO would not move eastward as promise about 
general NATO expansion is incorrect.
78
 Angela Stent concurs, and argues that 
enlargement beyond the inclusion of East Germany was not under discussion until after 
Bill Clinton was in the U.S. White House.
79
 On the Russian side, Gorbachev argued that 
a commitment was made as part of the Two Plus Four agreements that facilitated German 
unification.
80
 However, some Soviet diplomats who participated in the Two Plus Four 
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Who is right in this debate is ultimately much less important than what the debate 
signifies. At root, the disagreement reveals a larger truth that is essential to understanding 
Russian foreign policy thinking and behavior. From the very beginning there existed 
profound misunderstandings between the two former Cold War enemies about the future 
of the European security order and Russia’s place in it. From the Russian perspective, 
these misunderstandings have never been sufficiently addressed. The result has been a 
Russia that is on the margins of the European order, and, more importantly, a Russia that 
feels itself to be marginalized by the European order.  
 
Samuel Charap terms this stalemate an “integration dilemma.”
82
 In international relations 
theory, a security dilemma occurs when states arm themselves for defensive purposes, but 
in doing so they scare other states into arming as well.
83
 As a result, states become less 
secure than they would have been had they not pursued the armament policy.
84
 Charap 
and Jeremy Shapiro apply this theory to the integration processes in post-Cold War 
Europe. They argue that Russia could never have been absorbed into either NATO or the 
European Union.
85
 As a result, “barring a realistic prospect of joining itself, Moscow 
viewed Euro-Atlantic integration for Russia’s neighbors as inherently threatening to 
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 In the language of the security dilemma, the West’s effort to secure 
Europe – which was remarkably successful– made Russia feel less secure. 
 
Charap and Shapiro do not argue that the integration dilemma is the result of malign 
intentions on the part of the United States and Europe.
87
 As Stephen Sestanovich has 
written, the main goal of immediate post-Cold War decision-making was to stabilize an 
unstable situation. To attempt to do so by creating an entirely new institutional 
architecture would have been incredibly risky, and even cavalier, given the difficulty of 
creating strong institutions and the consequences of failure.
88
 Charap does not disagree 
with that assessment.
89
 Here these authors disagree with Sarotte. She argues that the 
“international order was up for grabs” during the negotiations over German 
reunification.
90
 Sestanovich and Charap and Shapiro, while not debating the point that 
decisions made in that era have had lasting consequences, are less convinced of the 
viability of alternative paths.
91
   
 
Whether or not the right decisions were made in the early 1990s, those decisions cast a 
long shadow. The extent to which the Russian elite feels that Russian interests have been 
encroached upon in the post-Cold War institutional settlement, particularly but not 
exclusively in Europe, remains a key driver of how its leaders have conceived of and 
executed foreign policy. It is important to remember, however, that the Russian 
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leadership has also found it useful to heighten that threat perception for domestic political 
aims.
92
 This leads to the second and third parts of the story: Russian unwillingness to join 
international organizations as a supplicant, and the domestic drivers of that 
unwillingness.  
 
The basis of Charap and Shapiro’s argument that Russia could never have joined either 
NATO or the EU is that Russia could not agree to a non-negotiable accession process.
93
 
This is not a problem only in the Euro-Atlantic context, but globally as well. Post-Soviet 
Russia’s circuitous path to membership in organs of global economic governance 
provides a case in point. 
 
Russia applied for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
in 1993, shortly before GATT became the World Trade Organization (WTO) following 
the 1994 Uruguay Round.
94
 However, Russia’s early enthusiasm for membership soon 
dwindled, and meetings during the 1990s were more about show than substance.
95
 
Russian negotiators refused to meet their negotiating partners’ demands about lowering 
tariffs, and were unwilling to make other concessions required for WTO membership.
96
 
Russia ultimately would not join the WTO until August 2012.
97
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In his book Economic Liberalism and Its Rivals, Keith Darden argues that a main reason 
for the reluctance of successive Russian governments (other than the early years Vladimir 
Putin’s first term) to pursue WTO membership aggressively is that Russian elites tend to 
hold economic ideas that run counter to the liberalism engrained in the WTO.
98
 This is 
part of the explanation, but it is not the whole story. Instead, the unwillingness to join the 
WTO is an example of a broader phenomenon in the Russian approach to the 
international system.  
 
As Darden himself notes, aspirant countries have very little bargaining power with 
respect to WTO membership terms: accession “primarily involves unilateral tariff or 
market-access concessions by the prospective member in order to secure support for 
entry.”
99
 Essentially, joining the WTO means acceding to the demands of other countries, 
with no ability to change how negotiations are conducted. This is not just a feature of 
WTO accession. As Russia realized to its dismay throughout the 1990s, aspirants to 
reigning international institutions have no agency; they must either accept the rules as 
written or stay outside the club.
100
 All post-Soviet Russian leaders, however, have been 




The story of Russia’s integration into the International Monetary Fund (IMF) offers an 
interesting counterpoint to the WTO accession story. It is further indication of how and 
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when Russia is willing to be incorporated into an existing order. Immediately after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia applied for and was granted membership in the IMF. 





According to senior IMF officials, it was made clear from the beginning that Russia 
should get special treatment in its dealings with the IMF.
103
 In this case, it was 
coordinated pressure from G7 countries (in part as a way of redirecting aid to Russia 
through the IMF) rather than Russian expectations of special treatment that produced the 
final outcome.
104
 Indeed, Russia had very complicated feelings towards the institution, 
since Soviet leaders had long portrayed it “as a tool of Western capitalism and especially 
U.S. foreign policy.”
105
 Nevertheless, once G7 leaders decided that aid to Russia should 
be channeled through the IMF, the country benefited from special treatment in its 
accession, and received preferential membership terms that its economic performance did 
not necessarily justify.
106
 In addition, this was not all due to coordinated pressure from 
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The reason for Russia’s preference for not joining international institutions where its 
special status is not recognized leads to the third main reason for its failure to integrate 
fully into the Western order following the collapse of the Soviet Union. By the middle of 
1992, domestic political pressures in Russia had reached a point where the Yeltsin 
government could no longer pursue an explicitly pro-Western policy without fear of 
reprisal at home.
108
 Part of the problem was a sense, not entirely unfounded, that the post-
Cold War order looked very much like the Cold War order, most notably in the 
persistence of NATO.
109
 Economic reform also proved disastrous for the majority of the 
Russian population, with real wages falling by over one third and personal consumption 
dropping by 40 percent.
110
 These reforms were associated in the popular mind with 
Western economic advisors.
111
 Combined with the rampant corruption during the course 
of privatization, the process destroyed much public support for the Yeltsin government’s 
perceived deference to Western interests.
112
 Simultaneous, Western states had a fiercely 
negative reaction to Russia’s activities during the first Chechen War in 1994. Taken 
together, these factors opened up space for a renewal of the longstanding debate about 
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There was also an ideational aspect to the rise in domestic opposition to the Yeltsin-
Kozyrev program: agreement that Russia is a Great Power and should be treated as such 
in international affairs.
114
 As noted above, there is a consensus among the Russian elite 
that the goal of Russian foreign policy should be to return the state to its historic position 
as a Great Power with independence of maneuver on the international stage.
115
 While the 
wisdom of this approach remained a subject of public debate throughout the 1990s, the 
consensus has gone largely unchallenged since 1999.
116
 The result of this foreign policy 
consensus has been a Russia unwilling to embrace the institutional order that emerged 
after the Cold War because of a sense that to do so would run counter to the core of 
Russian national identity.  
 
There are several factors in the explanation above that raise questions about whether 
opportunities were missed or different outcomes might have been achieved with different 
choices. For example, had NATO not persisted, would Russia have felt so alienated so 
early? Alternatively, had economic reform been administered better and with less 
corruption on the part of the Yeltsin government, would there have been such 
susceptibility to the renewal of the distinctiveness narrative? Ultimately, however, these 
counterfactuals are useful for interrogation of what went wrong in 1990s, but they do not 
change the ending. As a result of Western choices, Russian’s unwillingness to accept its 
newly weakened international position, and the resurgence of domestic opposition, 
Russian integration with Western institutional structures was essentially off the table (at 
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least in the short and medium term) by the middle of the 1990s. The logical next 
question, then, is what Russia did instead. 
 
Russian Responses to the Post-Cold War Order 
 
One of Russia’s primary objectives following the collapse of the Soviet Union was to 
maintain those elements of the previous world order in which Russia, as the largest 
Soviet successor state, would play a leading role. This meant first and foremost the 
United Nations (UN), because of Russia’s permanent seat and veto power in the Security 
Council (UNSC).
117
 Indeed, Russian preference for maintaining the primacy of the 
UNSC as the main arbiter of international legitimacy has been a hallmark of the post-
Cold War era.
118
 That Russia has not hesitated to act counter to UN directives, or refused 
to allow issues to come before the UNSC when it suited the national interest, has not 




Russia also continued its advocacy for the CSCE into the 1990s, even after it was clear 
that NATO would persist and predominate as the prime organ of Euro-Atlantic security. 
That support declined, however, as Russia perceived that the main focus of what was now 
the OSCE had shifted to human rights and elections in the former Soviet Republics, while 
NATO and the European Union took over the competencies of security and economics on 
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 As Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explained during the 2010 Munich 
Security Conference: 
 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization a real opportunity emerged to make the OSCE a full-fledged 
organization providing equal security for all states of the Euro-Atlantic 
area. However, this opportunity was missed, because the choice was made 
in favor of NATO expansion, which meant not only preserving the line 
that separated Europe during the cold war into zones with different levels 
of security, but also moving those lines eastward. The role of the OSCE 
was, in fact, reduced to servicing this policy by means of supervision over 




It is unlikely that further Russian action would have reversed the preeminence of NATO 
over the OSCE. It is worth recognizing, however, that Russian support for the institution 
diminished when it became apparent that the OSCE would no longer serve to maintain or 
magnify Russian influence.  
 
Parallel to the status quo approach to the UN and the OSCE, Russia also pursued a policy 
of new institutional creation designed to amplify its dominance of the post-Soviet space. 
First but weakest among these was the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
which was established as part of the agreement that dissolved the Soviet Union.
122
 
However, since the original purpose of the CIS was to facilitate Russian independence 
from the former Soviet republics, it proved an ineffective mechanism for reviving 
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Russian power once foreign policy objectives shifted in that direction.
123
 The CIS did 




In the 1990s, attention shifted initially to furthering economic integration among the New 
Independent States. In 1995, at Kazakhstan’s initiative, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan 
agreed to form a Customs Union.
125
 The agreement was implemented fairly well initially, 
but backsliding began in 1996, in part because of disagreements over the common 
external tariff.
126
 Economic cooperation continued, however, and in 2000 the initial trade 
agreement morphed into the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), which included 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
127
 In 2003, Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, and Belarus also signed an agreement on creating a Common Economic 
Space.
128
 The Customs Union implemented common customs duties in July 2010, and 




In addition to economic organizations, Russia has also attempted to coordinate regional 
security cooperation through the creation in 2002 of the Cooperative Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO).
130
 CSTO member states include Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
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Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and (since 2006) Uzbekistan.
131
 Putin has consistently attempted 
to use the CSTO as a basis for cooperation with NATO (especially in Afghanistan), an 
approach that recalls Gorbachev’s argument for cooperation between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact.
132
 NATO has been unwilling to cooperate with the CSTO, however, and 
many in the West assume that the CSTO is a mechanism for projecting Russian power 
among former Soviet republics, rather than a legitimate security organization.
133
 Whether 
or not this is the case, and regardless of how effectively the agreements of both the CSTO 
and the Customs Union are implemented among their members, both organizations have 





Alternative institutional formation has extended beyond the states of the former Soviet 
Union.  Most notable among these is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The 
SCO was established in 2001 out of the grouping formerly known as the “Shanghai Five” 
(Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan).
135
 The SCO has been a useful 
mechanism for managing the relationship between Russia and China, and has been 
effective at promoting regional economic cooperation.
136
 The organization has also 
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attracted interest from other regional powers, notably Iran, India, and Pakistan.
137
 During 
the 2015 SCO Summit in Ufa (held in conjunction with the BRICS summit), India and 
Pakistan were accepted as full members in the organization.
138
 There remains some 
potential for institutional conflict between the SCO and the CSTO.
139
 However, the SCO 
remains the best example of Russia’s larger institutional approach to its perceived 
alienation from the order that emerged in Europe at the end of the Cold War. The SCO 
has attracted not just former Soviet republics but, with the inclusion of India and the 
participation of Iran and Turkey, other major regional and global powers.
140
   
 
This institutional approach is nested in a larger strategic approach: working towards the 
creation of a multipolar world. Evgenii Primakov was the first to articulate multipolarity 
as a grand strategy for Russia during his time as Foreign Minister in the mid-1990s.
141
 
Primakov put a great deal of emphasis on the importance of building ties with non-
Western powers, particularly China and India.
142
 The aims of this strategy were to 
maintain Russian influence in the former Soviet region and to contain U.S. hegemony.
143
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The goal of multipolarity has been official Russian doctrine since 1997, and was formally 





Multipolarity in its most basic meaning is “the ability of sovereign powers to take 
political decisions of their own.”
145
 Implicit in this definition is the idea of balance of 
power: in a multipolar world, the poles balance against one another to prevent hegemony. 
In Kremlin usage, multipolarity is specifically a counterbalance to Western “collective 
unilateralism” and, more broadly, an alternative to globalization.
146
 Essentially, Kremlin 
leaders use the idea of multipolarity to lobby against Western dominance of the 
international system and for a system where sovereign states remain the principle actors. 
Its closest analogue is a concert of great powers along the lines of that established by the 
Congress of Vienna.
147
 In the Kremlin’s conception, a multipolar world would also 
provide for the competitive coexistence of different value systems, rather than the value 
homogenization that Western discourse envisions.
148
 This is a core feature of the 
civilizational approach that emerged in Russian rhetoric in the later years of President 
Putin’s second presidential term (discussed in more depth in chapter four).
149
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The idea of multipolarity as a system based on the actions of sovereign states is critical 
for understanding one of the primary links between Russia’s foreign policy and its 
domestic context. The domestic twin of multipolarity is sovereign democracy. As Andrei 
Zagorski argues, “the concept of sovereign democracy…does not stipulate the peculiar 
Russian understanding of democracy, but, rather, the principle of state sovereignty.”
150
 In 
the Russian view, few states are fully sovereign, meaning few states are able to conduct 
the foreign policy they wish without fear of repercussions from other global actors.
151
 
Sovereign states are the leading nations, those that are able to pursue their own national 
interests and that play a role in shaping and coordinating global governance.
152
 In 
addition, Russia understands sovereignty as the right to control territory, not 
responsibility to the population.
153
 Therefore, sovereign democracy is about the Russian 
government’s right to administer its domestic affairs as it sees fit, without interference, 
while maintaining the rights of an independent sovereign actor on the international stage. 
 
A corollary to the preference for unfettered freedom of action on the international stage is 
a preference for informal as opposed to formal alliances. Russian leaders often appeal 
rhetorically to the primacy of international law and show a preference for legally binding 
agreements on some specific issues (notably on U.S. plans for ballistic missile defense in 
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 In terms of coalitions and long-term partnership agreements, however, 
Russia’s preference is clearly in favor of informality and flexibility.
155
 Indeed, none of 
the new organizations whose creation Russia has spearheaded include binding action 
clauses analogous to Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.
156
 While there are benefits to 
retaining freedom of action, the penchant for flexibility also creates a situation where 
Russia has no guaranteed partners in times of need. 
 
In contrast to the Soviet era, post-Soviet Russia, especially since 2000, has also integrated 
the need for a strong economy into its conception of power.
157
  There is no question that 
military strength remains a big part of how Russia conceives of power on the 
international stage. However, by the time Dmitry Medvedev was in power, Russians 
increasing associated being a great power with economic development rather than 
military might.
158
 That shift in appreciation of economic power was also evident in 
government policy. By the end of Putin’s second term in office, Russia used economic 
might more than military prowess to project power.
159
 Both the August 2008 war with 
Georgia and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine are ample evidence that military power 
remains important. However, economic and political concerns in Russia are very 
intertwined, and economics, whether through energy or otherwise, plays a central role in 
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how Russia engages with the international system. In addition, especially since the 2008 
financial crisis, imbalances in the global economic order have taken a more central place 
in the overall Russian narrative about general imbalance in global governance.
160
 
Anti-Westernism in Russia 
 
The preceding sections have detailed the relationship between Russia and the West since 
the end of the Cold War. An important corollary to that discussion is the question of anti-
Americanism, and anti-Westernism more broadly, in Russian foreign and domestic 
policy. These are related but not identical phenomena. At root, anti-Americanism might 
be considered a sub-set of anti-Westernism, where the former is anger at specific U.S. 
policies and attributes, and the latter is a more cultural dissociation from what the 




Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok identify three basic types of anti-Americanism 
worldwide: violent (e.g. terrorism); non-violent but with policy impact, such as the 
boycott of American products or rejection of treaties; and societal and cultural, which 
includes public criticism and denunciation of U.S. government policies.
162
 The first two 
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variants are mostly irrelevant to the Russian case.
163
 During the 1990s, a version of the 
third type appeared in Russia: public opinion was fairly anti-American, but the 
government actively pursued close cooperation with the United States.
164
 Since Putin has 
been in power, the level of specific denunciation of U.S. policies and actions has 
increased in official rhetoric, though not on a linear trajectory. This denunciation of the 
United States encompasses not only U.S. foreign policy, but also the global policy 
approaches the United States has championed and which it carries out in concert with 
others, most importantly military intervention into sovereign nations. 
 
Anti-Americanism has also been helpful in Russia’s efforts to consolidate a post-Soviet 
national identity. As discussed above, many in Russia blame the United States and its 
advisors for the economic calamities that Russia experienced during the 1990s.
165
 
Further, there is enduring anger that the United States treated Russia like a defeated 
power during the 1990s and did not make good faith efforts to build an equal partnership 
with the Soviet Union’s successor state.
166
 The anger about that humiliation is a useful 
rallying cry for domestic nationalists.
167
 Humiliation is particularly potent because of the 
role of the idea of honor in Russian foreign policy. This manifests as a simultaneous need 
for recognition from Western states of Russia’s great-power status while resisting any 
attempts to strip Russia of the attributes that make it distinct from the West.
168
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As much as parts of the Russian population harbor real anger towards the United States 
and its allies, the leadership also manipulates that anger for its own purposes.
169
 Lilia 
Shevtsova argues the following: 
“Humiliation” is useful for Russia’s rulers. It detracts attention from 
domestic problems, from the anti-national essence of the rentier class, and 
from the fact that the country has been turned into a raw materials state. 
The public becomes too preoccupied with suspicion and feelings of 
hostility toward the outside world. No détente in relations with the West 
will convince the political class to give up this advantage. Doing so would 




Shevtsova gives a fatalistic interpretation of the role anti-Westernism plays in Russian 
domestic politics. Her argument also assumes that Russian political rhetoric about the 
West is purely manipulative and is not based in any belief on the part of the leadership. 
That seems too simplistic. Indeed, more worrying might be the idea that the government 
believes its own propaganda machine.
171
 But this too discounts the complexities of the 
historic role of anti-Westernism in Russian political thought and rhetoric. 
 
As argued above, the domestic debate over Russia’s relationship with the West is one that 
dates back centuries. It originally had to do with Russia’s relationship with the European 
great powers. In addition to cultural elements detailed in the previous section, there was 
also a profound political element to the debate. The split between Westernizers and 
Slavophiles was not simply about Russia’s cultural closeness to Germany and the United 
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Kingdom. It was also about what the European great powers represented as leaders and 
arbiters of the world order, and Russia’s place in that top echelon of states. The European 
interstate system facilitated Russia’s 19
th
 century rise as a great power, but unlike 
interactions with today’s Europe, Imperial Russia had agency over the shape of that 
system.
172
 Nevertheless, interaction with other European states was always fraught, and 
Russia (and later the Soviet Union) simultaneously sought inclusion in Europe and 




In the years since the debate over Russia’s place among European great powers began, 
America has overtaken Western Europe as first the other half of a bipolar order and, after 
the Cold War, as the global hegemon. This in turn has altered the narrative of anti-
Westernism in Russia. As Shiraev and Zubok argue: 
 
Russians have a traditionally ambivalent view about the West; throughout 
history they have been inclined to choose a particular Western country 
against which to measure themselves. In the twentieth century, it was 




There is no doubt that it grates on the collective Russian consciousness that the country’s 
erstwhile adversary has retained its global status. However, the discomfort with 
specifically American leadership is also subsumed into the historical debate about 
Russia’s relationship with the West, meaning the traditional leaders of the international 
system. 
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In practice, scholars and politicians alike often conflate the ideas of anti-Americanism 
and anti-Westernism. This is in part because since the United States is the de facto leader 
of the West, distinguishing between the two terms might be seen as a distinction without 
a difference. This work also uses the two terms roughly interchangeably, but with the 
background that anti-Americanism is a more specific variant of the larger phenomenon.  
 
Finally, anti-Westernism in Russia exists along a continuum. Efforts to balance against 
the United States and its allies represent the mildest variant. Creating a narrative of an 
“evil West” with harmful intentions towards Russia and the world is at the other end of 
the spectrum. Countless permutations exist in between. In the story of the role BRICS 
plays in Russian political rhetoric and policy, the level of anti-Westernism, and the type, 
changes over time. That change is part of the argument presented here. 
 
How Policy Gets Made: Institutions and the Power of the President 
 
Although the focus of this dissertation is foreign policy rhetoric rather than foreign policy 
action, it is worth delineating the different entities responsible for foreign policy in 
Russia. The four main organs involved with setting and implementing foreign policy are 
the Presidential Administration (PA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), the Security 
Council, and military and intelligence services.
175
 Constitutionally, the president is the 
director of foreign policy, and MID is the main implementation organ, along with the 
                                                 
175
 Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors 
(Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, 2014), 28–37; Dmitri Trenin, interview by Rachel S. Salzman, 
Personal Interview, December 2, 2014, Moscow, Russia. 
   
 
 51 
Prime Minister as the formal head of the government.
176
 In practice, the Security Council 
manages much of the coordination between the different agencies and ministries, and is 
also responsible for long-term conceptualization of strategy.
177
 MID, as in the Soviet era, 
is fairly removed from the strategic side of the equation.
178
 MID also has no formal 
responsibility for foreign economic policy. Though this is theoretically under the purview 
of the different economic ministries, in practice the Prime Minister and his deputies 
oversee it.
179
 In general, the Duma and Federation Council (collectively, the parliament) 
have very little influence over foreign policy, except to the extent that they represent a 
cross-section of the elite with particular interests.
180
 Most decision-making is 
concentrated in the PA, though while Putin was Prime Minister some power shifted with 




Since the 1993 Russian constitution vests so much power in the office of the president, it 
is important to examine just how much the president personally controls and influences 
foreign policy. Here, it is useful to look back at the scholarship about decision-making 
under the Soviet system. In the 1970s, a debate began in American Sovietology about the 
role of conflict between elites in determining Soviet policy. Writing in 1971 and taking 
on the then-dominant theory of totalitarianism, H. Gordon Skilling argued that it was 
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wrong to conceive of the Communist Party (CPSU) as monolithic.
182
 Instead, it consisted 
of different interest groups, including specialist elites and professional groups. 
Competition between these groups exerted influence over policy. Unlike the totalitarian 
model, which posited the absolute control of state influence over policy, this new conflict 




In response, critics such as William Odom argued that focus on interest groups ignored 
the critical fact of power centralization in the USSR. While factions of elites might have 
differing policy priorities, the structure of the system deprived them of an effective 
transmission mechanism for influencing policy. Therefore, while bureaucratic politics 
likely played a role in the policy process, it was wrong to conceptualize the factions 
within the USSR as formal interest groups, such as the term was understood in the study 




The Russian government has a significantly different structure from the Soviet Union’s. 
Indeed, many Russian analysts see more parallels with the Tsarist era than with the 
Soviet era.
185
 However, this Sovietology debate offers useful insights and terminology for 
analyzing the contemporary system. While there are clearly different groups within the 
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present Russian elite, Russia’s weak institutionalization makes these groups more akin to 
rival clans than political interest groups (or political parties).
186
 The president is the 
“chief arbiter” between these groups: it is his job to balance between competing interests 
and manage the competition between the clans.
187
 As such, his personal views and those 





Further, power has centralized considerably under the Putin presidency, and on top-tier 
issues (such as the crisis in Ukraine), Putin has direct control over foreign policy.
189
 On 
these issues, even the Soviet model of an inner circle of advisors is inappropriate.
190
 
Instead, the better analogy is the Tsarist model of samoderzhavie – autocracy.
191
 Lesser 
issues, and BRICS counts among these, devolve more to Putin’s staff and speechwriters, 




Given his centrality to shaping policy, this analysis depends heavily on speeches from 
Putin. This is not the result of a mistaken belief that there are no competing interests 
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among the Russian elite or that Putin is unconstrained by either domestic politics or, to 
some extent, public opinion. Instead, it is because, especially in the realm of discourse 
and rhetoric about an issue, what he says matters most. The ideas that influence what he 
says and how he balances between competing groups are beyond the purview of this 
study. Instead, the emphasis is on the speeches that are finally given and the policy 
concepts that are adopted. 
Seminal Changes in the International System Since 1991 
 
The preceding sections have reviewed how changing relations with the West, and 
especially the United States, impacted Russia’s foreign policy posture following the end 
of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Those interactions, however, took 
place in a wider context. That broader story is important for understanding why Russia’s 
efforts to bring BRICS together as a political group were ultimately successful.  
 
Immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the conservative columnist 
Charles Krauthammer famously declared the beginning of the “unipolar moment.”
193
 He 
argued that with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the only other power capable 
of countering the United States, the coming period would be one of unparalleled U.S. 
dominance in the international arena.
194
 The next year, Francis Fukuyama proclaimed 
“the end of history.”
195
 The scholar argued that democracy had proved itself the only 
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sustainable form of government, the market the only viable basis for an economy, and 
liberal democracy the victorious “ideology of potentially universal validity.”
196
 The 





In some ways, the 1990s bore out those arguments. U.S. dominance on all metrics of 
power, including military, economic, and soft power, made the United States seem 
untouchable. At the same time however, crises around the world sowed discontent with 
U.S. management of the international system. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, which 
helped fuel the Russian default in 1998, called into question the wisdom of neoliberal 
economics. They also fueled anger at the United States and the IMF for the harsh 
remedies imposed in the aftermath of the crises. The war in Kosovo in 1999, pursued 
without U.N. Security Council authorization, was perceived abroad (especially Russia) as 
the United States ignoring and breaking international law.  
 
The discontent planted by the policies of the 1990s blossomed in the 2000s, in the wake 
of the unilateral U.S. invasion of Iraq and George W. Bush’s Freedom Agenda. A Pew 
survey published in June 2007 concluded that international distrust of American 
leadership had increased overall, and that since 2002 favorable global impressions of the 
United States had declined worldwide.
198
 Those unfavorable impressions were not just 
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about U.S. military activities, but also related to a sense that U.S. policies widened the 





The Pew survey revealed that the mistrust ran deeper than discreet U.S. policies. It 
concluded that: 
In much of the world there is broad and deepening dislike of American 
values and a global backlash against the spread of American ideas and 
customs. Majorities or pluralities in most countries surveyed say they 
dislike American ideas about democracy — and this sentiment has 
increased in most regions since 2002.
200
   
 
In part, this burgeoning mistrust of American values was related to the perception that 
U.S. democracy became militarized during the Bush presidency.
201
 Regardless of the 
precise cause, the results of this poll are an important indication of the extent to which 
much of what the United States symbolizes internationally had become a matter of debate 
and distaste even before the onset of the 2008 financial crisis.
202
 This decline, combined 
with the economic rise of Brazil, Russia, India, and China opened the door to serious 
challenges to the post-Cold War system. Russia’s BRICS diplomacy, which began in 
earnest in 2005, must be understood in this context.
203
 






 Ibid. It is worth noting that though trust in the United States had declined, there was also deep 
skepticism of the challengers to U.S. global leadership, such as Venezuela, and considerable fear of the rise 
of China. 
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Anger against U.S. global leadership, however, was not the only catalyst for BRICS 
efforts to reform global economic governance. Profound changes in the distribution of 
economic power rendered the allocation of effective power in organizations such as the 
IMF obsolete. For example, in 2007, Indian gross domestic product (GDP) grew at a rate 
of 9.8 percent and comprised 5.3 percent of global GDP as measured in purchasing power 
parity (PPP). By contrast, French GDP grew at a rate of 2.4 percent, and comprised 2.9 
percent of global GDP (PPP).
204
 Nevertheless, France had its own Executive Director seat 
on the IMF executive board and 4.87 percent of total IMF votes. India, on the other hand, 
represented a constituency of four countries that received only 2.36 percent of total votes 




The underrepresentation of emerging economies was not just a problem in terms of quota 
weights; it also had deep effects on the influence of these countries on IMF governance. 
As Ngaire Woods explains: 
Executive Directors from the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and 
the United Kingdom are held directly to account by the government that 
appoints each. If a director fails to perform…he or she can be summarily 
removed and replaced. By contrast, no country in a constituency can 
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require their executive director to resign. Once elected a director stays in 




Underrepresentation, therefore, has knock-on effects. Not only do countries have less raw 
power in the form of voting weight, they also have less power over how their interests are 
represented in the Fund. The imbalance also tended to make Fund management less 
responsive to the demands of non-agenda setting countries for information or support as 
compared to the demands of G7 countries.
207
 Finally, in addition to consequences of 
numeric underrepresentation, there is a long-standing agreement that the head of the IMF 
always be European while the head of the World Bank be American.
208
 This agreement 
closes off avenues for equally qualified candidates from the developing world to take the 
helm of either organization.   
 
This dissertation balances between narratives of BRICS as an anti-hegemonic project and 
narratives of BRICS as a logical outgrowth of a changing global political economy. As 
will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters, for Russia political motivations for 
BRICS cooperation have mostly outstripped economic motivations. Nevertheless, when 
BRICS began to coalesce, Russia was one of the new global creditors that desired more 
say in global economic governance. Russia found common cause with the other BRIC 
countries because all, to a greater or lesser degree, found global economic governance 
unfair and counter to their interests. Had there not been an existing and increasing 
imbalance between economic weight and political power, the BRICS project would have 
withered before it began. The effort to bring BRICS together as a political group is 
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therefore representative of how post-Soviet Russia has engaged with the international 




Russia has long had a complicated relationship with integration into the dominant 
international system. A combination of conflicted national identity, a widely held 
consensus on the importance of the country being accepted as a great power, and a 
profound disappointment with the West following the end of the Cold War magnified 
these complications. By the middle of the 2000s, Russian policy had settled into a 
balance between cooperation and competition with Western-led institutions. Russia 
attempted to maintain the importance of those institutions where it had a full voice and 
created alternatives to those that highlighted how much stature Russia had lost on the 
international stage since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 
The Russian dialectic between cooperation and competition with the West took place 
within an international environment that was also rapidly changing. By the middle of the 
first decade of the 2000s, U.S. global leadership was increasingly unpopular. At the same 
time, rapid growth in countries underrepresented in global economic governance forced 
the question of reform of some international institutions. As a result of these twin 
processes, long-simmering discontent in the developing world began to manifest as 
outright efforts to block Western domination of international decision-making. The 
unipolar moment, if it had ever existed, was over, and history was back.  




It was not a political scientist who first grouped together the countries that would go on to 
symbolize the rise of the developing world. Instead, it was an economist at the investment 
bank Goldman Sachs. Since the 2001 release of the report Building Better Global 
Economic BRICs heralded the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, however, the term 
BRIC has spread far beyond Wall Street. The next chapter presents a review of that 









2. BRICS and Russian Foreign Policy: The State of the Field 
 
BRICS is not a very popular topic among those who study Russian foreign policy, and 
Russia is not a very popular topic among those who study BRICS.
1
 Those who study 
Russia often see BRICS as a distraction, and those who study BRICS are more concerned 
with institutional dynamics than the specifics of Russian policy. Further, BRICS itself 
remains a controversial topic. In part because of its origins on Wall Street, in part because 
of its diverse membership, and in part because of its short history, the group’s validity as 
an object of study and an agent in international politics is not universally accepted. 
 
This dissertation addresses all of these themes. As noted in the previous chapter, it 
balances at the intersection of different interpretations of BRICS itself: that of BRICS as 
a Russian anti-Western project, and that of BRICS as a legitimate and strengthening 
feature of contemporary global governance. Because the topic is so new and so unsettled, 
I have chosen to separate the literature review into an independent chapter rather than 
folding it into the initial analysis of Russian approaches to the international system. The 
aim in this chapter is twofold: to highlight main approaches within the new field of 
studying BRICS as a unitary actor on the international stage, and to investigate more 
fully the emerging literature on Russia and BRICS. 
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The chapter begins with a review of scholarly analyses of BRICS as a group, focusing on 
how experts conceive of the group’s role (current or future) in global governance. It then 
examines how major general studies of Russian foreign policy have addressed BRICS. 
The penultimate section looks at the literature on Russian policy towards BRICS and 
debates over whether or not Russia is a rightful member of the group. Finally, I identify 




One final note is needed about the terminology employed to describe BRICS. As 
discussed in more detail below, the question of how to define BRICS remains an ongoing 
concern for both the politicians engaged with it and the academics that study it. The 
official Russian term is obedinenie (association). “Group” is another term used frequently 
in both Russian and non-Russian literature, and is arguably a more neutral term than 
“association.” Still others have spoken about BRICS as a “quasi-organization,” a term as 
cumbersome as it is unhelpful. I shall for the most part speak just of “BRICS,” with the 
understanding that these countries are coordinating in a way that makes it conceptually 
rational to speak of common goals and activities, but are not (yet) sufficiently 
institutionalized to merit a more formal designation. However, for the sake of linguistic 
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Development of BRICS as an International Association 
 
Although the BRIC acronym has been around since 2001, and firmly within the public 
sphere since 2003, academic analysis of the group as such remains sparse.
4
 The field 
narrows still further when the focus is the geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects of the 
group, rather than literature aimed at business students or potential investors.
5
 The term 
BRIC originated in a 2001 paper about the future of the global economy by Jim O’Neill, 
then director of global economic research at Goldman Sachs. It became BRICS when 
South Africa joined the group in 2011. The history of this transition and the group is 
discussed more fully in the following chapter. The focus here is on how scholars and 
analysts write about BRICS, and what role, if any, they see for the group on the 
international stage.  
 
Some of the reticence toward BRICS in the academic world may come from a certain 
disdain for the idea’s origins as a private sector investment strategy. Even though the idea 
of BRICS has now spread far beyond the halls of Wall Street, it remains a strong brand 
for Goldman Sachs from which the institution has profited enormously.
6
 There is also, 
however, a more fundamental concern among academics that runs deeper than 
intellectual snobbery. A driving question of the literature is whether these countries can 
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fairly be considered comparable.
7
 As Valerie Bunce memorably phrased the question in 
her sharp response to Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl in the debate over transitology in 
the 1990s, the question is whether the BRICS countries are all “varietals of fruit,” or 
whether they are instead “apples and kangaroos.” In the latter case, comparison will 
produce no useful insights.
8
 If the countries are not comparable, then analyzing them as a 
group, and analyzing intra-group dynamics, is suspect. 
 
The literature takes several different approaches to the question of comparability. Some 
come at it from an empirical perspective, focusing on the ways these countries are 
historically, demographically, and geographically similar. For example, in an article that 
based on a conference held at the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN), Alexander 
Bobrovnikov and Vladimir Davydov looked primarily at economic indicators. Writing 
before the BRIC idea had penetrated the literature, these authors discussed the Giant 
Emerging Economies (GECs), and separated them into two levels, with BRIC as the most 
potentially powerful.
9
 Bobrovnikov and Davydov argued that the GECs, and the BRICs 
in particular, are all geographically and demographically large countries with significant 
natural resources, rapid GDP growth, and additional growth potential. Each also is a 
regional power, often has recognized military prowess, and is somewhat powerful in 
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existing organs of global governance.
10
 Based on these indicators, Bobrovnikov and 
Davydov concluded that the GECs, and the BRIC countries especially, were poised to 





Andrew Hurrell, in the introductory essay to a special issue of International Affairs 
devoted to the BRIC countries, offers a similar analysis. He argues that there are four 
compelling reasons to consider the BRIC countries as a comparable group. First, they are 
all large, regionally powerful states with “some capacity to contribute to the production 
of international order, regionally or globally.” Second, all four believe that they have a 
right to a larger say in world affairs and have enough power to mount a credible 
challenge to the existing order. Third, there are multiplying ties between the states at both 
the bilateral and the multilateral levels. Finally, all four original BRIC states are on the 
margins of the existing international system.
12
 Further, “they all have historically 
espoused conceptions of international order that challenged those of the liberal developed 





Hurrell, however, steps further into theoretical questions and implications than do 
Bobrovnikov and Davydov. In so doing, he presages the conceptual debate that appears 
in the literature beginning with Leslie Elliott Armijo’s 2007 article, “The BRICs 
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Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as Analytical Category: Mirage or 
Insight?”
14
 Armijo investigates whether BRIC constitutes a valid category under any of 
the three leading International Relations (IR) theoretic paradigms: realism, 
institutionalism, and economic liberalism.
15
 Since the four states have different levels of 
material power, different domestic institutions, and different approaches to integration 
with the global economy, Armijo concludes that BRIC cannot rightly be considered a true 
category of rising powers.
16
 She offers the caveat, however, that the BRIC concept 





Other researchers agree with Armijo that BRIC is not a clear category or coalition, but 
suggest instead that it would be more useful to understand the group as an international 
regime. The paradigmatic definition of international regimes comes from Stephen 
Krasner’s International Regimes. Krasner defines regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”
18
 Conceptualizing BRIC 
as a regime rather than as a set category, a coalition, or a proto-alliance allows scholars to 
accept the significant differences between the BRICs while still considering them as a 
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group with limited shared aims around which cooperation coalesces.
19
 The primary 
common aim is reform of international financial architecture. The assumption is that 
cooperation will not proceed beyond that point because shared interests among the group 




Theodor Tudoroiu also presents BRIC as an international regime, but considers 
cooperation beyond global finance. Tudoroiu argues that the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) provides a helpful metric against which to analyze BRIC.
21
 
He notes that OPEC began as a political initiative and in its heyday was at the forefront 
of the broader anti-West and global South movement.
22
 For example, OPEC established a 
multilateral development fund analogous to the BRICS development bank.
23
 In addition, 
just as BRICS does now, OPEC “called…for the establishment of a new international 
economic order based on justice, mutual understanding and genuine concern for the well-
being of all peoples.”
24
 This mirrors the BRICS demands for a more democratic 
international order. 
 
Tudoroiu, however, offers an interesting twist on analysis of BRICs as a regime by 
bringing in ideational aspects as well. Using a weak cognitivist variant of regime theory, 
Tudoroiu asserts that while incentives and utility maximization are important elements 
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for understanding BRIC cooperation, so too were certain shared beliefs about the nature 
of the international system. While this did not, and will not, rise to the level of a common 
identity or the formation of a new international community, it has “created affinities and 
natural solidarity between the rather similar BRIC states as well as between them and 
other emerging countries.”
25
 These affinities have simultaneously eased cooperation 
between the BRIC states and hampered cooperation with the West. 
 
The tension in the literature between defining BRICS as a group of states with similar 
interests versus imparting onto them a group identity cuts to the core of the difficulty in 
understanding what BRICS is and what its impact could be. At a basic level, there are 
clear similarities among the BRICS countries that make comparison fairly 
straightforward. All are geographically enormous, continental in scale or nearly so. They 
comprise upwards of 40% of global landmass and global population, and when combined 
they are the largest economic bloc other than the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). Through 2013, all were fast-growing economies but were for 
the most part still developing. Finally, all have historically been on the periphery of the 
global order.
26
 There are therefore both empirical and conceptual bases for comparison. 
Nevertheless, there remains discomfort with accepting the group as a coherent, or at least 
comparable, whole. 
 
Marion Fourcade offers a possible solution. She simultaneously sidesteps the question of 
analytic validity of the concept while also providing an explanation for the particular 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., 39. 
26




appeal of the idea. Fourcade, writing in a special issue of Review of International 
Political Economy exploring the BRICs and the Washington Consensus, argues that 
BRICs is best understood as a “narrative strategy.” While its original goal was to change 
investment patterns and showcase the power of Goldman Sachs to “categorize” the global 
economy, it became more than that as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis.
27
 
Fourcade notes that there was a visible increase in the belief in the power of the BRICs at 
the same time that the far less flattering acronym PIGS emerged to describe debt-strapped 
members of the Eurozone.
28
 The solid and dependable notion of global BRICs in the 
midst of the financial turmoil roiling the developed world became a symbol of the power 
shift away from the traditional centers.
29
 The financial crisis therefore was instrumental 
in propelling the idea out of geoeconomics and into geopolitics. 
 
Conceiving of BRIC as a narrative strategy, as do Fourcade and the Brazilian scholar 
Oliver Stuenkel, allows for two important levels of flexibility in interpretation of the 
group’s significance.
30
 First, it gives space to appreciate how the use of the term has 
changed over time, especially as a result of the global financial crisis. Second, conceiving 
of BRICS as a narrative strategy gives room to show how the members of the group have 
manipulated its meaning, with each member crafting out of BRIC the narrative it found 
most useful. 
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The 2008 global financial crisis was a critical juncture for BRIC.
31
 As BRIC countries 
continued to grow despite market crashes in developed countries, the narrative of BRIC 
began to encompass the notion of global power shifts. Amidst the panic of the crisis, 
analysts both in the West and in the BRIC countries declared the end of American 
hegemony and the arrival of multipolarity.
32
 The rise of belief in BRIC as the future at 
precisely the moment when there was no certainty about the future points to a critical 
aspect of discourse about BRIC. Despite the compelling reasons for believing that the 
four original BRIC countries have the capacity to be global powers, they are not yet, nor 
will they be (by traditional measures) for some time. Instead, much of the belief in the 
power of BRIC and the validity of the idea is a projection of what they could be rather 
than what they already are. As Andrew Hart and Bruce Jones argue, “there is something 
akin to a ‘shadow of the future’ effect at work that helps to explain why…many of the 
BRICs, especially China, are treated as if they were already major powers.”
33
 Because the 
BRICs had been on a clear and measurable ascent before the crisis, their continued ascent 




This projection highlights an inflection point in the BRIC narrative, when the story 
became more about politics than economics. It also reveals an undercurrent of tension in 
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the debate about BRIC’s future. The notion of BRIC’s rise is predicated on the 
assumption that economic power can effectively be translated into political power. 
However, as numerous analysts have noted, it is a mistake to assume that economic 
power can automatically be transformed into political influence.
35
 Further, despite their 
similarities, the BRIC countries differ in their economic systems, economic bases, 
military prowess, and place in the current global power hierarchy (as measured by role in 




These debates about whether or not BRICS is worth studying and analyzing persist. 
Nearly ten years on from the first official meeting in 2006, however, the literature has 
settled somewhat. John Kirton, the Director of the BRICS Information Centre at the 
University of Toronto, identifies ten established schools of thought on BRICS.
37
 One of 
those schools looks at BRICS primarily as “Russia’s counter-hegemonic coalition.”
38
 
Several others debate the place of BRICS vis-à-vis the Group of Eight (G8) and the 




Kirton himself is likely in the school that argues that BRICS has become an independent 
and successful group. He contends that BRICS has persisted and strengthened primarily 
because of:  
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[T]he failure of the international institutions from the 1940s and 1975 [the 
G7] to give the leading emerging powers an equal role in solving the 





Kirton assesses BRICS’s performance since the first summit in 2009 along six metrics 
including compliance with commitments and clarity of mission. He finds that the group 





In the introduction of his 2015 book BRICS and the Future of Global Order, Oliver 
Stuenkel writes: 
 
The transformation of the BRICs acronym from an investment term into a 
household name of international politics and, more recently, into a semi-
institutionalized political outfit is one of the defining developments in 




The juxtaposition of the vague term “semi-institutionalized political outfit” with the 
proclamation that BRICS is “one of the defining developments in international politics” 
sums up the difficulty facing a scholar writing about BRICS. The group is not yet an 
international organization or even necessarily an informal organ of global governance 
analogous to the G7. Yet at the same time, the group has held seven summits, none of 
which a single BRICS leader has ever missed. It has developed working groups and 
contact groups on issues ranging from international financial architecture to health and 
education. While much of this cooperation has yet to bear fruit, it continues to move 
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forward. Calling BRICS an international regime or a narrative strategy, therefore, is no 
longer either sufficient or appropriate.  
 
There is no guarantee, however, that the group will move beyond the awkward in-
between phase of institutional development into something more substantial. This makes 
assessing the role of the group within the foreign policy of its members more challenging, 
for two conflicting reasons. On the one hand, the group’s amorphousness can make its 
seem more like a narrative strategy than something that could develop into an 
international organization. This makes it tempting to ignore. On the other hand, the 
group’s promise, given its membership and rapid development thus far, can make it easy 
to overstate the group’s role in current foreign policy strategy. Most of the literature on 
Russia has erred to far in the first direction, as I discuss below. 
 
BRICS and Russian Foreign Policy 
 
Scholars writing broad reviews of Russian foreign policy tend not to give much attention 
to BRICS. It does not appear at all in Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications 
(2009), despite the fact that Russia released its first press statement about participation in 
the group in July of 2008 and Putin alluded to the group in his 2007 speech at the Munich 
Security Conference.
43
 The term BRIC does appear in the index of first edition of 
Russian Foreign Policy: The Return to Great Power Politics, but in the text it is only an 
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aside in a discussion of Russian relations with the other group members.
44
 Even some 
very recent reviews bypass the topic entirely: the term “BRICS” does not appear in the 
index at all of the fifth edition of The Foreign Policy of Russia by Robert Donaldson and 
Joseph Nogee, and a full text search of the book yields just one result: a passing reference 




Donaldson and Nogee (2014) aside, analyses published after 2010 do usually include 
cursory analysis of BRICS as a new element of Russian foreign policy. The coverage 
varies in its emphasis. Some authors stick to a brief statement about the group offering 
Russia an alternative to the West.
46
 Others focus on the group’s potential to help Russia 
promote its interests as a rising economic power.
47
 Still others present a somewhat more 
multifaceted analysis, seeing in BRICS both Russian efforts to balance against the West 
as well as economic opportunity and manifestation of Russia’s peculiar approach to 
multilateralism.
48
 What all of these have in common, even in books devoted to Russian 
policy in general and not a specific bilateral relationship, is the paucity of space and 
analysis devoted to BRICS as a persistent element of Russian foreign policy. 
 
Two recent books somewhat buck this trend. Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, 
and Sectors, by Nikolas Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh, and Russia and the New World 
Disorder, by Bobo Lo, both offer substantive analyses of BRICS within Russian foreign 
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 Gvosdev and Marsh devote four pages to BRICS at the end of their discussion 
of the African and Latin American vectors of Russian policy. They link the project 
intellectually to Evgenii Primakov’s “Strategic Triangle” of Russia, India, and China 
(RIC), and argue that Moscow has “a clear desire” to build BRICS into a strong 
“alternative power center.”
50
 They also note that the group is important for Russia both in 
terms of bilateral relations with other BRICS member states as well as for the collective 




Lo is similarly serious in his analysis of the role BRICS plays in Russian foreign policy. 
He argues that the “sustained campaign to build up the BRICS as an international body 
on par with the G-8 and other Western-dominated institutions” is the most important of 
Moscow’s efforts to “bolster its international position.”
52
 Lo notes the discrepancy 
between what Russia desires from BRICS and what the group has actually offered in 
terms of both prestige and policy impact.
53
 He also states quite plainly that, “Despite 
protestations about its ‘non-bloc character and non-aggressive nature with regard to third 
parties, the BRICS for Moscow is all about countering the West in its various 
dimensions.”
54
 Though Lo devotes somewhat less space to BRICS than do Gvosdev and 
Marsh, his analysis stands out for how it links Russia’s BRICS policy to its wider foreign 
policy aims. 
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In her 2010 article “Russia’s BRICs Diplomacy: Rising Outsider with Dreams of an 
Insider,” Cynthia Roberts questions the explicitly anti-hegemonic aims of Russia’s 
BRICS policy. She argues that Russia effectively used the forum as a “power multiplier” 
that increases Russia’s voice in some parts of the international system.
55
 However, she 
contends that BRIC(S) is not a Russian attempt to revise the international system 
wholesale, but rather a mechanism through which Russia can “renegotiate the terms of its 
accommodation to the Western system.”
56
 Unlike Lo, she does not see BRICS as an anti-
American project.
57
 In Roberts’s telling, BRICS is a manifestation of grudging 
acceptance of U.S. dominance in the international system, and a subsequent attempt to 
make strides on the margins. 
 
In the edited volume The Rise of the BRICS in the Global Economy, Stephen Fortescue 
agrees.
58
 He argues: 
 
The BRICS is an attempt to square the circle of challenging Western 
hegemony without rejecting it, and doing so in a way that does not require 
either demeaning or dangerous alignments with more radically critical 
states, or limiting its ambitions to dominating its own part of the world. 
The BRICS is made of countries which, to varying degrees, have their 
own great power and civilizational claims, both global and regional levels, 




For both Fortescue and Roberts, Russia’s BRICS policy is aimed at balancing against 
Western hegemony, but is not explicitly motivated by anti-Western sentiment. What’s 
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more, it shows an acknowledgment in Moscow that partnering with other large powers 
will be the most effective way to achieve its aims of revising, but not overthrowing, the 
current international system. 
 
Should Russia be a BRIC? 
 
Some of the debate about Russia and BRICS is not about Russian policy, per se, but 
rather the extent to which it is even logical to group Russia together with the other three 
original BRIC countries.
60
 On the one hand, Russia is a nuclear weapon state that holds a 
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Until 2014 Russia was a 
member of the G8, and it holds an Executive Director seat at the International Monetary 
Fund. It is also an energy super power with the largest global gas reserves. Russia has 
much higher literacy rates than the other BRICS, as well as higher GDP per capita 
(though South Africa is not far behind).
61
 Further, while dependence on energy remains a 
worry for the economy, the domestic market has strong potential and there has already 
been some diversification.
62
 While no longer a superpower, Russia is clearly both a 
regional power and a country with significant sway – as both help and hindrance – on the 
international stage. 
                                                 
60
 From the perspective of O’Neil’s original conception, each of the four countries has come under criticism 
at least once for its inclusion in the group. See Jim O’Neill, The Growth Map: Economic Opportunity in the 
BRICs and beyond (New York: Portfolio / Penguin, 2011), 45. As regards South Africa’s accession, which 
made BRICs BRICS, no one makes the argument that it was on pure economic merits, since it is dwarfed 
by the other four countries on O’Neil’s parameters. Debate continues over the political logic of South 





 Aleksandr Gevorkyan, “Is Russia Still a BRIC? Some Observations on the Economy and Its Potential for 





 On the other hand, while Russia remains a regional power with influential international 
memberships, it is no longer one half of a bipolar world order. This relative decline in 
power prompted one analyst to argue that Russia is best understood as a falling power 
“attempting to stop the bleeding.”
63
 In addition, the dependence of the Russian economy 
on hydrocarbon exports has made other industries in Russia less competitive.
64
 Finally, 
although it was growing steadily before the 2008 crisis, Russia was by far the hardest hit 
of the BRIC countries.
65
 On both economic and political measures, then, classifying 
Russia as an emerging power – as a BRIC – is not an altogether clear choice. 
 
And yet of all four of the original BRIC countries, Russia has been the clear leader in 
transforming and shaping the BRIC narrative. Indeed, almost all scholarship about 
BRICS political activities includes some mention of Russia’s role in the forum’s 
formation. Christian Brütsch and Mihaela Papa refer to Russia as “the initial BRIC 
leader.”
66
 Oliver Stuenkel notes that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is often 
credited as “the intellectual architect of the politicization of the BRICs platform.”
67
 
Cynthia Roberts argues that Russia was very adept at turning the economic designation of 
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being a BRIC to political advantage in order to further “Russia’s own international 
agenda.”
68
 Going one step further, Sadik Ünay declares:  
 
Russia’s public diplomacy toward the institutionalization of the BRICS 
and the development of a widespread awareness with the global public 
opinion concerning the idea of a multipolar global economic – and, 
increasingly, political – order could be considered one of Moscow’s most 




Without Russian diplomatic energy and impetus, BRICS as a political forum would not 
exist. 
 
Russia has also has been the most vocal member of the forum. Along with Brazil, Russia 
has been most willing to seize onto the narrative potential of BRICS as representative of 
an alternate development path.
70
 At a conference held at the Observer Research 
Foundation (ORF) in May 2009 in preparation for the first BRIC summit in June 2009, 
the Russian participant was the only one to suggest that BRIC had the potential to stand 
“as an alternative to the Western World Order.”
71
 Even earlier, at a sideline meeting of 
BRIC leaders at the 2008 G8 summit in Hokkaido, Japan, Russia made clear its desire for 
institutionalization.
72
 Russia is the member who first brought the group together and 
crafted its political narrative. It is also the member that has pushed longest and most 
forcefully for institutionalization. 
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Contribution of this Study 
 
The roots of the BRICS narrative in Russian political discourse and strategy, however, 
have never been exposed and dissected. While the authors discussed above take for 
granted that BRICS is something that Russia wants and cares about to some degree, none 
has traced precisely how the idea developed over an extended period of time. Neither has 
any author done extended work on how the BRICS narrative links specifically with 
discourse on national identity and Russia’s relationship with the West. This makes the 
change in the Russian approach following the onset of the crisis in Ukraine harder to 
appreciate. That is the primary contribution of this study. This dissertation offers the first 
retrospective analysis of BRICS within Russian foreign policy discourse. 
 
This is important because it was not inevitable that BRICS would become important, 
either in Russian policy or more generally. Understanding how the idea was deployed 
before it rose up the list of foreign policy priorities yields useful insight into how BRICS 
itself has evolved. A central argument of this dissertation is that while Russia was the 
most vocal about the importance of BRICS in the “new world order,” the group was in 
fact nothing more than a narrative strategy for Russia until the crisis in Ukraine forced 
the Russian leadership to think more seriously about the group as an international 
association. Yet even if the leadership did not put resources behind its rhetoric until after 
the onset of the crisis, the group began to institutionalize on its own, as a result of 






 In other words, even while the Russian leadership focused on BRICS as a 
narrative strategy, the group continued to develop, such that it was available as an 
alternate foreign policy vector when relations with the West cratered. 
 
This study, therefore, links two different readings of BRICS. It falls between both those 
who see the group as essentially a Russian anti-hegemonic project and those who see it as 
something that has developed into an independent, unitary actor within global 
governance. Since 2008, BRICS has become an organization worth watching, and this 
transformation has allowed Russia to bypass some of the more negative consequences of 
its ruptured relationships to its West, particularly with regard to its international image. 
The haven the BRICS has provided from sanctions and from visible isolation is an 
example of the splintering of the American-led international system. This is not because 
the BRICS themselves will take up the baton of international leadership. Instead, it is a 
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3. From BRIC to BRICS: An Institutional History 
 
 
Today, the BRICs have become essential players in major international 
decision- making. As such, we are acutely aware of our potential as agents 
of change in making global governance both more transparent and 
democratic.  
 




Although the stories this study tells are intertwined, they also developed on somewhat 
different tracks. It is easier, therefore, to separate out the narratives in the early parts 
before bringing them back together in the final chapters. Further, having a complete and 
uninterrupted history of the institutional development of BRICS is useful grounding for 
the deeper analysis of the term’s evolution in Russian discourse. The goal in this chapter, 
therefore, is to give a straightforward institutional history of BRICS and an assessment of 
its accomplishments thus far, divorced from the changing ways in which Russia 
approached the group over time. 
 
The chapter proceeds in two parts. The first part approaches BRICS development from a 
qualitative perspective. It begins with a brief account of how the term BRIC jumped from 
the private sector to the public sphere, emphasizing how the idea fit with other notions in 
the intellectual ether of the time. It then looks at three institutional antecedents of BRICS: 
Evgenii Primakov’s “Strategic Triangle” of Russia, India, and China (RIC); the India-
Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA); and the Outreach 5 (O5/G8+5 process). 
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The narrative then turns to BRICS itself, looking at the group’s early years and then its 
rapid rise to prominence in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The qualitative 
analysis concludes with a consideration of the VI BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, Brazil in 
July 2014. 
 
The second part of the chapter presents BRICS from a quantitative perspective. This 
quantitative snapshot of main economic indicators gives visual and numerical 
representations of how the economic relationships among these countries have evolved 
from the initial BRICS appellation in 2001 to the present day. The generally weak 
economic relationships also vividly underscore that politics provides a stronger rationale 
for continued cooperation than do economics. The quantitative section concludes with an 




The term BRIC first appeared in a 2001 analytical report called “Building Better Global 
Economic BRICS.”
2
 The author was Jim O’Neill, then head of global economics research 
at Goldman Sachs. The paper was inspired by O’Neill’s realization, spurred in part by the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, that in future “globalization” would no longer be 
synonymous with “Americanization.”
3
 The report’s goal was to identify the likely future 
leaders of the global economy, based on anticipated gross domestic product (GDP) 
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growth rates, GDP per capita, and population size.
4
 Using these parameters, O’Neill 
concluded that the expected share of global GDP of Brazil, Russia, India, and China 




O’Neill was not blind to the potential political implications of his analysis. In his paper, 
he argued that based on the figures presented, “it seems quite clear that the current G7 
needs to be ‘upgraded’ and room made for the BRICs in order to allow for more effective 
economic policymaking.”
6
 However, his emphasis was very much on these four countries 





Indeed, O’Neill’s paper was so successful from the perspective of Goldman’s marketing 
department that in 2003 two of his colleagues released a follow-up report entitled 
“Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050.”
8
 This report was if anything aimed more 
specifically at an investor audience than its predecessor. Even so, it was with this report 
that the idea of BRIC made the leap from the private sector to the public sphere.
9
 The 
idea of the rise of the non-Western world was compelling because it capitalized on the 
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simultaneous increase in economic fortunes in the Global South and the growing 





The 2003 report also had the good fortune to be released as the countries themselves were 
beginning to think about how increasing South-South cooperation would be to their 
benefit. For example, in December 2002, then President-Elect of Brazil Luiz Inacio Lula 
da Silva announced that he would make improving ties with rising powers, especially 
China, India, and Russia, a priority for his administration’s foreign policy. Celso 





There was therefore some luck in how the BRIC term took hold. Goldman Sachs was not 
the only company thinking about the role of these countries in the coming century; 
O’Neill was not even the first to publish on the topic. On the business side, Deutsche 
Bank and PricewaterhouseCoopers both did work on which countries to watch.
12
 On the 
academic side, authors including Ignacy Sachs, Jeffery Garten and Robert Chase were 
writing about the possible political economic and policy impact of rising states.
13
 The 
BRIC acronym, however, had the virtue of coming from one of the world’s most 
prominent investment banks, of being clever and catchy, and of being reinforced by 
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external events not driven by Wall Street. While the BRICS group has come to be seen as 
an unexpected outgrowth of O’Neill’s investment strategy, though, the groundwork for a 
network of these countries was already developing parallel to the succession of reports 
coming out of Goldman Sachs’s analytical department. 
 
BRICS Institutional Roots: RIC, IBSA, and the O5 
 
Although no one expected the BRIC countries to organize into an independent political 
bloc, and then add to their number, the idea of these countries coordinating with one 
another did not originate with the advent of the BRIC term itself. Instead, their 
coordination has three distinct institutional roots: Evgenii Primakov’s “Strategic 
Triangle” of Russia, India, and China (RIC); the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue 
Forum (IBSA); and the Outreach 5 (O5), initiated by the Group of Eight (G8) at the 2005 
Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland. All three groups – two initiated by the countries 
themselves, and one by Western powers – have different origins and purposes, but each 
played an important part in fostering the development of BRICS. 
 
The earliest antecedent to BRICS is RIC, initially proposed by Evgenii Primakov in 1999 
while he was Prime Minister of Russia.
14
 RIC was an explicit effort to balance against the 
West by aligning with non-Western great powers.
15
 Fearing that it was too antagonistic 
towards the United States, neither China nor India was enthused by the proposal when it 
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 However, in the face of geopolitical shifts, growing Russo-Chinese 
ties, and the gradual normalization of Sino-Indian relations, interest in the idea grew in 
Beijing and Delhi.
17
 Officials from the three countries began gathering on the sidelines of 
international meetings in 2003, and the first stand-alone meeting of RIC foreign ministers 
took place in Vladivostok in 2005.
18
 The leaders first met in the RIC format at the 




Although the leaders have met under RIC auspices, there has never been an independent 
RIC leaders summit, and the RIC dialogue is coordinated primarily through the foreign 
ministries.
20
 The primary operational focus of RIC is increasing regional security in 
Eurasia.
21
 However, it also includes formal cooperation on agriculture, poverty, and 
health, as well as some emphasis on non-governmental contacts.
22
 Despite an expanding 
official agenda, however, actual intra-RIC cooperation remains low, and the organization 
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From the perspective of RIC as an antecedent to BRICS, there are two significant points. 
It was the first quasi-formalized group that brought Russia, India, and China together. 
More importantly, the ideological basis of both RIC and BRICS, especially from the 
Russian perspective, is almost identical.
24
 In an examination of Russian policy toward 
BRICS, then, the antecedent of RIC is critical, even if RIC itself has been somewhat 
underwhelming.  
 
The next forum to emerge was the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), 
which was formalized in the June 2003 Brasilia Declaration.
25
 The decision to formalize 
the group was spurred in part by anger with the G8. In 2003, the leaders of India, Brazil, 
and South Africa were invited to attend the G8 Summit in Evian, France, but the leaders 
left feeling as though their presence had been more ornamental than substantive.
26
 The 




IBSA describes itself as an informal group designed to promote cooperation among 
countries of the Global South. It is based on principles of “democracy, respect for human 
rights, and Rule of Law.”
28
 The group is in many ways a more logical and cohesive group 
than either RIC or BRICS. The countries all have democratic political systems, they all 
lack representation on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and all have similar 
challenges to overcome, including significant income inequality and a multiethnic and 
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 Like RIC, IBSA never achieved the worldwide name 
recognition that BRICS enjoys, though IBSA too continues to meet as an independent 
forum. Unlike RIC, IBSA holds dedicated independent summits.  
 
IBSA constitutes the second building block of BRICS for two main reasons. First, it is 
the forum that brought together the democratic members of BRICS for the first time. 
Second, and no less important, it is the origin of the BRICS mantle of representing the 





The final piece of the institutional mosaic that formed the foundation for BRICS is the 
Outreach 5, also known as the G8+5 or (later) the Heiligendamm Process. Initiated by 
Tony Blair for the 2005 G8 Summit in Gleneagles, the O5 came about in large part as a 
result of increasing generalized anxiety about the legitimacy of the G8, on the part of 
both its membership and those who felt they were (wrongly) excluded.
31
 The five 
countries invited to the summit as part of the initiative were China, India, Brazil, Mexico, 
and South Africa. Since Russia was then a member of the G8, all the future BRICS were 
present. The O5 had a fairly limited mandate; it was initially convened to consider 
                                                 
29
 Michael Emerson, “Do the BRICS Make a Bloc?,” CEPS Commentary (Brussels, Belgium: Centre for 
European Policy Studies, April 30, 2012), 2, http://www.ceps.eu/book/do-brics-make-bloc. 
30
 Oliver Stuenkel, “The Uncertain Future of IBSA” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
February 18, 2015), http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/02/18/uncertain-future-of-ibsa/i2j5. 
31
 Andrew F Cooper and Kelly Jackson, “The Incremental Transformation of the G8 through the 
Heiligendamm Process,” Studia Diplomatica 61, no. 2 (2008): 79–80; Anthony Payne, “The G8 in a 




“issues of climate change, clean energy, and environment.”
32
 That focus has broadened 





With the rise of the G20 following the 2008 financial crisis, the inclusion of outside 
powers at G8/G7 meetings is less important, and the O5 is not consistently included in 
G8/G7 meetings.
34
 At the time of its initiation, however, the O5 constituted an explicit 
recognition from traditional powers that global governance architecture was not 
sufficiently representative or inclusive. As the independent creation of RIC and IBSA 
demonstrate, those outside the G8 did not need to be told that they were 
underrepresented. What is conceptually important about the creation of the O5 is that it 
signified a point where it was not just global malcontents who wished to change the 
system. Instead, all the major states seemed to be reaching the conclusion that the system 
that had persisted in various permutations since the end of World War II needed serious 
adjustment. 
 
RIC, IBSA, and the O5 never made headline news. Though they all persist in some form, 
each is also weaker than BRICS itself and none meet with regularity. Together, though, 
they serve as important precedents for cooperation among traditionally peripheral powers 
with the specific aim of addressing global problems and revising the existing architecture 
of global governance. 
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BRIC Begins to Organize 
 
In the midst of the institutional innovation of RIC, IBSA, and the O5, the idea began to 
take hold in Brazil and Russia of deploying the BRIC designation to achieve political 
aims.
35
 Coordination among the countries began in 2005 with a meeting of the deputy 
foreign ministers.
36
 The following year, at Russian President Vladimir Putin’s initiative, 
the four foreign ministers met on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA).
37
 The first meeting of heads of state took place on the sidelines of the 2008 G8 
in Hokkaido, Japan, again at Russia’s behest.
38
 At that meeting, the leaders agreed to hold 
the first stand-alone BRIC summit in Ekaterinburg, Russia the following year; the group 
has met annually at the heads of state level ever since. The transformation of the group 
from investment strategy to political forum was completed in 2011, when South Africa 
joined and BRIC became BRICS. 
 
This initial period from 2005 to 2008 reveals two significant elements of BRIC’s 
coalescence. First, it shows that the impetus for these early meetings came from the very 
top. For example, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, who served as Ambassador to India from 2004-
2009 and would have been a logical candidate for priming his Indian counterparts for a 
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meeting, was not involved in arranging the 2006 meeting at the UN.
39
 Although academic 





The second conceptual novelty of the early period is how little it involves anyone from an 
economic ministry. All of the initial gatherings, or at least those in the public record, 
were of representatives from the foreign ministry or, later, the leaders themselves. In 
Russia, the idea originated in the policy planning section of the foreign ministry, and only 
later were economic ministries included in the process.
41
 Further, as discussed in the first 
chapter, MID has no formal authority over foreign economic policy. This suggests that 
the initial overtures from the Russian side were concerned with politics rather than 
economics. The other countries had more interest in the economics, as evidenced by the 
initial 2006 agreement to focus primarily on increasing cooperation with respect to trade 
and management of the international financial system.
42
 However, other than sideline 
meetings at the semi-annual World Bank and IMF meetings, coordination involved 
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This early decoupling of BRIC as a political entity from BRIC as an investment strategy 
is exemplified in the ire that South Africa’s initial exclusion from the group incurred in 
Pretoria.
44
 From the very beginning of BRIC coordination on the international stage, 
South Africa lobbied for inclusion.
45
 President Jacob Zuma wrote a letter to the group in 
2009 seeking membership, and in 2010 he lobbied each of the original BRIC members 
individually, sometimes bringing large delegations of businessmen to highlight the trade 
opportunities that existed.
46
 Though the lobbying method focused on business, however, 
the goal was to “[project] South Africa as an emerging power and regional leader.”
47
 The 
South African leadership also saw significant convergence between South African and 




The implication is that South Africa was not unhappy that Jim O’Neill did not name it as 
one of the four emerging economies to watch in 2001. Instead, the problem was being 
excluded as BRIC began to cooperate as a political organism.
49
 As Frances Kornegay, Jr., 
an American-born scholar who lives and works in South Africa, writes: 
 
As BRIC has become BRICS, the resulting quintet, in jazz-like fashion, 
has retuned itself in accordance with the rhythmic beat originally intended 
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– one having nothing to do with the increasingly discordant notes in the 




Note Kornegay’s assumption that cooperation among the BRIC(S) countries was never 
governed by Goldman’s parameters. South Africa from the beginning understood BRIC 
as a political initiative designed to challenge the global status quo. Attaining BRICS 
membership has helped South Africa solidify its regional role and could be considered 




South Africa is not alone in its understanding of BRICS. The BRICS group that now 
exists is entirely distinct from Jim O’Neill’s “global economic BRICs.”
52
 According to 
Georgii Toloraya, CEO of the National Committee for BRICS Research (NKI BRIKS) in 
Russia, BRICS is first and foremost a political group.
53
 Most of the coordination happens 
in international financial organizations, but the fight is over political control of the organs 
of global economic governance. Further, long term goals are broader, including an 
expansion of the United Nations Security Council. The end goal, as an Indian expert put 
it, is “to redesign the world;” the BRICS wish to revise the current system to the point 
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A Brief Digression: What is Global Governance? 
 
At this point it is necessary to consider more fully what the BRICS and their antecedent 
organizations mean when they express a concern for increased legitimacy in organs of 
global governance. “Global governance” is a very vague term that means many different 
things depending on context and audience. For the BRICS, however, it has come to have 
quite specific meaning that is worth parsing out more explicitly. This section first offers a 
general definition of global governance. It then identifies the primary loci of BRICS’s 
dissatisfaction and intent. 
 
Thomas Weiss and Ramesh Thakur define global governance as “the sum of laws, norms, 
policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate relations among citizens, 
society, markets, and the state in the international arena.”
55
 Organs of global governance 
include international institutions such as the IMF and the UN, international courts, and 
multinational companies, as well as prevailing norms and expectations (such as 
Responsibility to Protect, R2P).
56
 They also increasingly include informal constellations 
of countries, such as the G7/8 and the G20.  
 
There are dozens of ideas and organizations that fall under the general rubric of “organs 
of global governance.” The main grievances of the RIC/IBSA countries, later codified in 
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BRICS statements, can be simplified into one ideational objection and two concrete 
institutional objections. I detail these below. 
 
The ideational objection is that Western hegemony is no longer appropriate in global 
governance. There has long been concern over Western dominance of international 
institutions, and nations outside the ideological West, particularly in the developing 
world, have long felt a lack of ownership in the American-dominated international 
order.
57
 General concern and specific protests have crystallized in recent years, however, 
as a result of shifts in economic power and perceived Western violations of international 
law, in particular disregard for national sovereignty.
58
 The BRICS countries seek a world 
order that allows for a multiplicity of values and domestic orders, rather than the 
perceived imposition of a single set of norms and standards. 
 
The ideational objection can seem amorphous and easier to dismiss, especially since the 
BRICS have not substituted an alternative normative framework. The institutional 
objections, however, have remained distinct and concrete since the initial BRIC meetings. 
The BRICS demands tend to center around two institutions: the IMF and the United 
Nations Security Council.
59
 When the BRICS summit documents speak of the need for 
more democratic international relations, they refer in particular to increased quota and 
voting weights in the IMF and expanding the UNSC to include India, Brazil, and South 
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Africa. As discussed in the first chapter, voting weights in the IMF do not represent the 
contemporary distribution of economic power. The same might be said of the UNSC, 
with regard to political power. The IBSA countries have long histories of seeking 
permanent UNSC seats with veto power. China and Russia, in the context of BRICS, 
rhetorically support these countries’ goal to have a larger voice in the United Nations, but 




Throughout the remainder of the dissertation, the idea of reforming global governance 
will be used in reference specifically to these concerns and demands: the general desire 
for the West to cede ideational control, and the localized concerns about representation in 
the IMF and the UNSC. These also are some of the concerns that RIC, IBSA, and the O5 
aimed to address, from different angles. The bases of these concerns, and the extent to 
which they are linked to anti-Americanism or rooted in real grievances with the dominant 
system, is addressed in more detail in chapter 6. 
 
The Global Financial Crisis, the Rise to Prominence, and Nascent 
Institutionalization 
 
Although the BRIC countries began meeting in 2005, they forged as a group only in the 
crucible of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. They quickly became an important sub-
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group in the newly prominent G20.
61
 At Brazil’s initiative, the Finance Ministers began 
meeting as a group following the 2008 G20 in São Paolo. In 2009, the finance ministers 
met twice to coordinate their positions for upcoming G20 meetings.
62
 That coordination 
paid dividends. The high water mark of BRIC visibility and success within the G20 came 
at the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit, when the group was able to push through significant 
reforms on weights and quotas within the IMF. As a mark of their influence at the time, 
then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner met with the countries as a group, the 




Since the 2009 G20, much BRICS coordination has focused on strengthening relations 
among members of the group rather than acting as a bloc to achieve ends in larger 
international arenas. This is in part because the IMF quota and governance reforms 
agreed to during the Pittsburgh Summit remain stuck in the U.S. Congress with no 
movement in sight, despite pressure from Fund leaders.
64
 However, this may have been 
something of a blessing in disguise in the long term. While all five countries would prefer 
to see the reforms go through, the forced focus on building the internal aspect of BRICS 
has not been wasted effort. 
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The leaders’ summits get most of the press, but they are only the tip of the iceberg when 
it comes to coordination and cooperation within the BRICS framework. The countries 
have slowly ramped up their cooperation; it now includes working groups on topics 
ranging from health to agriculture to education. In 2012, the countries established the 
BRICS Think Tank Council (BTTC).
65
 The BTTC designated specific institutes in each 
country to act as BRICS research centers, and supports the Academic Forums that have 
run annually since 2008. At the fifth summit in 2013 in Durban, South Africa, the group 
created the BRICS Business Forum. The BRICS Business Forum is an analogue to the 
B20 (a forum through which international business leaders provide policy 
recommendations to the G20), and formalizes the business meetings that began during 




These are not just empty statements and institutions. The national think tanks that are part 
of the BTTC, and the yearly Academic Forums they support, have produced a wide 
variety of reports. The BTTC is currently working on a Strategic Concept for BRICS, 
spurred in part by a paper authored by several Indian experts from Observer Research 
Foundation, the Indian arm of the BTTC.
67
 The Russian arm, the National Committee for 
BRICS Research (NKI BRIKS), is also active. It has produced several monographs and 
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edited volumes, hosts large international conferences on a regular basis, and circulates 




On a more concrete level, the BTTC has supported socialization among academics from 
the different countries, bringing what began as a very leader-led initiative further down 
into the respective societies. The feedback loop is not yet reciprocal: the ideas from the 
Academic Forums tend not to make it into the final summit statements.
69
 However, their 
persistence and the substantive research presented at the forums are signs of BRICS 
making it down to another level of local elites. More broadly, the cross-pollination of 
ideas among scholars from the Global South is an indication of how BRICS has 
facilitated the multipolarization of ideas about international relations and global 




The most significant BRICS achievements to date, however, happened during the 2014 
summit in Fortaleza, Brazil. The Fortaleza summit is important for two reasons: one 
about optics and one about actions. The 2014 summit was the sixth BRICS summit. It 
marked the beginning of the second summit rotation. All of the member countries have 
now hosted at least once. Further, every member other than South Africa has retained its 
interest in the group through a change in leadership, and no leader has ever missed a 
summit. The group can therefore point to an institutional track record of convening on an 
annual basis that has survived to repeat hosting and new administrations in both its 
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democratic and non-democratic members. This supports the contention that the group 
will persist as a force within the international arena. 
 
More important are the deliverables from the sixth summit. In Fortaleza, the leaders 
agreed to establish a BRICS development bank (the New Development Bank, NDB) and 
a contingency reserve arrangement (CRA).
71
 It is too soon to judge how well these 
institutions will function, but they are significant not just because they are the first 
concrete BRICS institutions, but also because they represent the first time that BRICS 
membership has imposed a cost on its members. Until Fortaleza, one of the main benefits 
of BRICS was that it offered members some level of extra clout within international 
forums without also imposing costs for membership.
72
 The NDB and the CRA are modest 
by international standards: the NDB has initial authorized capital of $50 billion, and the 
CRA has committed funds of $100 billion.
73
 The initial sums not withstanding, the 
creation of these institutions does suggest a growing willingness among members to 
devote more than just their voices to the BRICS cause. 
 
There is another element of this institutional creation that bears mention. Much of the 
criticism of BRICS’s viability focuses on the many divisions among the member 
countries, and in particular on the animosity between India and China. That these five 
countries were able to agree on who hosted the bank (China), who would be the first 
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president (India), and other sticky political issues suggests that the five are learning to 
cooperate as a group.
74
 The significance of that agreement should not be overblown, but 
it is also clearly a step forward in BRICS cooperation and cohesion. 
 
The NDB officially launched in July 2015 in Shanghai.
75
 Prospects for the NDB 
especially look promising, in part because China sees it as supportive of its Asian 
International Infrastructure Bank (AIIB).
76
 Indeed, Kundapur Vaman Kamath, the new 
NDB president, stated that the two institutions would closely cooperate.
77
 While their 
missions may seem somewhat iterative of each other, they have different geographic 
scopes. The AIIB will focus specifically on development financing in Asia, whereas the 
NDB has a global remit and an office in South Africa.
78
 The two also have different 
voting structures: though Beijing is the primary economic force in both, it holds a 49 
percent stake in the AIIB, whereas voting weights in the NDB are spread equally among 
the five members.
79
 Together, the two institutions represent China’s effort to make its 
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mark in development financing, as well as the lessening of the dominance of the Bretton 




BRICS is still in early days, and it would be unwise to make predictions about its future 
prospects. What the gradual increase in internal institutionalization and activity indicates, 
however, is that the group is durable. Similar to the G7, it now operates like an 
international club, with privileges for its members and mechanisms for observers and 
dialogue partners.
81
 It also has a clear policy outlook, and an increasingly distinct 
agenda.
82
 Further, its track record indicates that it continues to be a group in which its 
members find value, and to which its members are increasingly willing to devote not only 
time but financial resources as well. This suggests that BRICS is likely to continue its 
slow, plodding, but determined evolution towards becoming a permanent feature of the 
global governance landscape. 
 
BRICS by the Numbers 
 
The previous sections have detailed BRICS’s institutional development from a qualitative 
perspective. This section considers BRICS from a quantitative angle, looking specifically 
at the following indicators: BRICS GDP growth; BRICS share of global GDP; major 
trade partners of each BRICS country; and institutional trends. 
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The purpose of this analysis is not to provide a quantitative picture that mirrors the 
qualitative picture. Instead, it is to offer support to the contention that economic relations 
are not sufficient to explain overall BRICS institutionalization. In addition, and 
somewhat in contrast to the previous point, much of the motivation for intra-BRICS 
cooperation is to promote economic development in each country. Although the main 
focus in this dissertation is on the political aspect of the group and its development as a 
cohesive international organization, internal cooperation comprises the majority of 
BRICS activities at this point. It is therefore important to explore, however briefly, the 
extent to which these countries do invest in economic relations with their BRICS 
partners. 
 
BRICS and the World Economy 
 
The general economic picture is unsurprising. First and foremost, China is the economic 
giant of the BRICS on all metrics. Second, and also important, over the last decade all of 
the BRICS generally grew at a faster pace than either the G7 as a group or most 
individual G7 member (Figures 1 and 2). Growth has been slowing overall for several 
years, but it was not until the 2014 crises in Brazil, Russia, and South Africa, and the 
uptick in growth in the United States, that any G7 economy showed stronger growth than 
the BRICS. Overall, although the global economic position of the BRICS is not as strong 
as it was (either factually or in terms of perception), they still collectively hold a large 
and growing share of world GDP, especially when measured using purchasing power 
parity (PPP) (Figure 3). This is important because even though the official position is that 
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BRICS is a political group no longer united just by strong economic performance, their 
growth rates continue to be an important prism through which observers perceive the 
strength and longevity of the group. 
 
A second word about China is warranted. As Figure 3 vividly demonstrates, the 
discussion of the BRICS’s share of global GDP is in effect synonymous with speaking 
about China’s share of global GDP. India makes some contribution, but Brazil, Russia, 
and South Africa are clear laggards, even in years when their growth rates were 
impressive. This raises the question of whether it is misleading to speak in aggregate 
about BRICS’s share of global GDP, and thereby bestow upon the other BRICS the 
reflected glory of China’s economic success. This question is simultaneously critical and 
entirely beside the point. From one side, it is likely that if China were to find BRICS 
cooperation against its interest and publicly disavow membership, interest in the BRICS 
would plummet. On the other hand, however, growth is already slowing in China and 
across the other BRICS, and yet cooperation continues.
83
 This further underscores the 
fundamental argument that there is more to the BRICS story than macroeconomics.  
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Figure 1: BRICS GDP Growth, 2000-2014 
 




























































Figure 3: BRICS National Shares of World GDP (PPP), 2000-2014 (estimated after 2011) 
Source: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database October 2015 
Intra-BRICS Economic Relations 
 
The main story of intra-BRICS economics is that cross-national economic relations, with 
the singular exception of each country’s relationship with China, are very weak. An 
analysis of the top five trade partners by exports and imports of each BRICS member 
draws out this point. The tables below (Figure 4) present the top five trading partners of 
each BRICS country in 2001, when the group was first defined economically, and then 
annually from 2005 through 2013.
84
 The data demonstrate that nearly ten years of 
cooperation has had little impact on trade patterns. There is no single significant intra-
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BRICS trade relationship other than China’s outsized presence in each country’s trade. 
Further, none of the BRICS feature among China’s main trade partners.  
 
The trade data also points to another interesting angle: with few exceptions, the top five 
trading partners of the BRICS are all developed economies. Again, that has not really 
shifted over the last decade, despite the weaker growth in the United States and Europe 
compared with the developing world. This is important, because it illustrates the gap 
between the rhetoric about BRICS as a paradigm for South-South cooperation and the 
reality that the countries remain much more economically tied to Western countries than 
to any country in the developing world.  
 
Finally, trade is not the only area where intra-BRICS economic relations are 
fundamentally weak. The story is much the same with regard to inward and outward 
foreign direct investment (FDI): cross-BRICS FDI is very weak. China is a player in all 
of the markets, and Russia a marginal player in China, but all are far down the list of 
sources and destinations for FDI.
85
 Ultimately, there may be no better proof that BRICS 
is a political rather than economic group than the paucity of economic relations among its 
members. 
 
Indeed, those who dismiss BRICS as unimportant on the basis of both weak economic 
performance and weak intragroup economic ties miss the point. The BRICS countries 
have different regime types, differently structured domestic economies, and different 
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economic bases, not to mention their geographic dispersion.
86
 All of these make the 
group a poor candidate for either a free trade zone or anything resembling an optimum 
currency area.
87
 These differences, however, need not hinder political cooperation. As 
argued in the preceding sections, BRICS cooperation is primarily concerned with a 
reallocation of power within global economic governance. Accomplishing that goal 
requires alignment on a discreet set of political concerns. The motivation for presenting 
the data below, therefore, to underscore that meager economic relations have not 
hindered cooperation in other areas.  
 
Figure 4: Major Trading Partners of BRICS Countries 
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The Numbers of BRICS Institutionalization 
 
Unlike these weak economic relationships, the level of BRICS institutionalization has 
increased substantially. First, there have been a rising number of stand-alone meetings of 
BRICS governmental representatives of all levels (Figure 5).
90
 The trends in Figure 5 
demonstrate where there is serious interest amongst BRICS partners to deepen 
cooperation. For example, the repeated meetings of health ministers and economic 
representatives indicate that these are areas where the group members find value in 
developing BRICS capacity on these topics. By contrast, the sporadic meetings of the 
agriculture ministers and the ministers for science, technology, and innovation suggest 
there is less political will to explore these areas. Most important, however, is the general 
upward trend in the number of official contacts. Further, this chart does not include either 
meetings from 2015 (due to incomplete data), or the many track II BRICS initiatives, 
including the annual Academic Forum and BRICS Business Council meetings. 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Leaders 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Foreign Ministers 1 2 1 2 0 1 2 
Heath 0 0 1 2 1 3 2 
Trade and 
Economy 
0 0 1 2 2 1 1 
Finance 1 2 0 1 2 1 4 




0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Education 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
TOTAL 3 5 5 10 7 11 11 
 
Figure 5: Meetings of BRICS Leaders and Ministers, 2008-2014 
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Source: Kirton (2015) Appendix A 
 
More significant than the upward trend in the number of meetings is the increasing level 
of compliance with commitments from those meetings. John Kirton and several co-
authors have developed a methodology to measure compliance of groups including the 
G8, the G20, and the UN. As he explains it, “the method requires extensive, systematic 
research on the actual behaviour of BRICS members in implementing their priority 
summit commitments and doing so caused by and consistent with the summit 
commitments their leaders made.”
91
 Assessing specifically the commitments made during 
BRICS annual leader summits from 2009 through 2013, Kirton finds a compliance record 
of over 70%, on average.
92
 This record is comparable to average compliance in the G7/8 
for its first 37 years.
93
 Overall, therefore, quantitative analysis of BRICS supports the 
conclusions from the qualitative analysis that the group is deepening cooperation and 




BRICS has come a long way since 2001. Building on three previous configurations of 
developing countries, the group has matured into a forum that holds multiple independent 
meetings annually, including one among its leaders. The leaders also always convene on 
the sidelines of other global forums, and often pre-coordinate the group’s position on 
questions of interest. Cooperation encompasses everything from finance to health and 
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includes academic and business councils that supplement the contacts between officials. 
In less than a decade, BRICS has transformed itself into an accepted feature of the 
landscape of global governance. 
 
Economic cooperation, however, remains anemic. There is no strong economic network 
among the BRICS countries. Instead, each has strong bilateral ties with China, with the 
West, and within its own region. This reinforces the position that BRICS is at this point 
primarily political. It poses a problem, however, in that much of intra-BRICS cooperation 
is theoretically aimed towards addressing common socio-economic challenges that hinder 
economic development in emerging powers. For that goal to come to fruition, the group 
will need a much denser web of economic ties. 
 
The idea of BRICS as a political organism, however, brings the narrative back to Russia. 
The next chapter presents an analysis of Russian elite political discourse during Vladimir 
Putin’s first two presidential terms. Most of this period predates the coalescence of 
BRICS into a political group. Instead, the emphasis is on how changing rhetoric from 
Russian leadership about the concepts of sovereignty and national identity laid the 
foundations for the role BRICS would come to play in Russian foreign policy before the 






4. Laying the Rhetorical Foundation for BRIC: The Evolution 
of the Concepts of Sovereignty and National Identity, 2000-
2007 
Do you believe that if [Peter I] had found a rich and fertile history…he would not have 
hesitated to cast the nation into a new world, to divest it of its nationality? On the 
contrary, would he not have sought the means of regenerating the nation in this 
nationality itself? And as for the nation, would it have put up with the fact that its past 
was ravaged, that Europe’s was, as it were, imposed upon it? 
 




No doubt, messianism is of no use to us now, but the mission of the Russian nation needs 
to be specified. Without establishing Russia’s role among other countries…without 
understanding who we are and why we are here, out national life will not be full-fledged. 
 




Being named a BRIC by Goldman Sachs in 2001 could not have come at a timelier 
moment for Russia. The country was beginning to recover from nearly a decade of 
economic instability that culminated in the August 1998 default. Being included in the 
list of likely future leaders of the global economy by one of the world’s premier 
investment banks provided external validation that others had noticed Russia’s revival. 
 
There was no immediate move, however, to begin bringing BRIC together as a political 
group. The notion of the rise of the non-Western world appealed to existing strains within 
Russian foreign policy, particularly with Eurasianists and Great Power Balancers, both of 
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whom gained power in the latter years of the Yeltsin presidency. Nevertheless, the focus, 
especially during Putin’s first presidential term, was on consolidating domestic economic 
growth and political stability. In addition, Putin’s early political rhetoric lacked the 
bluster and wounded pride that marked many of the statements from the Yeltsin era.
3
 
Therefore, though it was evident from the outset that Putin would not pursue a strictly 
pro-Western foreign policy, neither did he immediately begin building alternative 
coalitions (rhetorical or otherwise). 
 
Further, the BRIC appellation hit Russia at the core of its internal debate over national 
identity. Being a BRIC also meant being separate from Europe and the West, if the idea 
were taken to a political connotation. The debates over identity and civilizational 
association (European or specifically Russian) had hamstrung foreign policy under 
Yeltsin.
4
 Putin, because of his ties to both the liberal Anatoly Sobchak and the more 
conservative security forces, was acceptable across the identity spectrum. He also had 
sufficient political acumen to understand that reviving the national identity debate would 
undermine his efforts to put Russia on a more stable path both domestically and 
internationally.
5
 Therefore, though much of his early rhetoric placed Russia more in 
European than Eurasian civilization, civilizational discourse in general was a minor 
feature of his early speeches. 
 
This approach shifted over the course of Putin’s first two terms as president. As a result 
of changes in both the domestic and international environments, Putin’s political rhetoric 
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became more strident and more anti-Western over his first eight years in office. This 
chapter examines how that shift laid the groundwork for incorporating BRIC into Russian 
foreign policy. The aim is to trace the evolution of two concepts critical for 
understanding Russia’s relationship to BRIC: sovereignty and national identity. 
Identifying how the rhetorical framing of these ideas showcased an increasingly 
antagonistic view of the West sets the stage for understanding the role BRIC would play 
in Russian foreign policy. 
 
A Note on Sources 
 
The main sources for this chapter are the annual presidential speeches to the Federal 
Assembly, and the official foreign policy concepts and documents that have been adopted 
since 2000. The analysis assumes that from 2000-2008 Vladimir Putin was the ultimate 
arbiter of Russian foreign policy strategy, and therefore his speeches can be taken as 
direct evidence of foreign policy planning. As discussed in the first chapter, these 
speeches are not taken as direct evidence of coming policy choices. Instead, the argument 
is that the evolving outlook on display in the speeches reflected changing approaches to 
engagement in the international arena. 
 
Analysis of the annual addresses, as opposed to just official MID documents, also gives a 
more nuanced perspective on attitude evolution. Putin approved a foreign policy concept 
and a national security concept at the beginning of his first tenure as president. Though a 
new official foreign policy concept was not adopted until Dmitri Medvedev assumed the 
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presidency in 2008, MID produced an internal review in 2007 that gives insight into 
major changes from the time of the adoption of the 2000 concepts. There are significant 
differences between the 2000 and 2007 documents, and the annual presidential addresses 
give a window into the source of those differences. Put another way, the 2000 and 2007 
documents show a beginning and an end to a process; the annual speeches show the 
interim steps. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that Putin himself viewed these speeches as policy-setting 
events. In his 2006 address, he stated that, “today’s and previous addresses provide the 
basis for domestic and foreign policy for the next decade.”
6
 If these speeches, as Putin 
argued, set the basis for policy, then they can be analyzed to illuminate how policy aims 
were articulated, and how that articulation changed over time. 
 
Sovereignty and Independence 
 
One of the persistent themes in official rhetoric about foreign policy in Russia is the 
degree of policy “independence” – the extent to which Russia is able to conduct the 
foreign policy it wishes, without concern for international influences or repercussions. 
The idea of policy independence is closely linked with the broader concept of national 
sovereignty. As explained in the first chapter, sovereignty in the Russian lexicon means 
complete control over domestic affairs without external meddling or any devolution of 
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control to supranational or international bodies.
7
 Sovereignty, in turn, is tied to the overall 
goal of multipolarity, a world system wherein no single country has the power to bend 
other great powers to its will. 
 
The tone in the National Security Concept and the Foreign Policy Concept that Putin 
approved in his first months in office bear out this point. The National Security Concept 
avows that, “Russia will help shape the ideology behind the rise of a multipolar world.”
8
 
Similarly, the Foreign Policy Concept notes the importance of Russia’s balanced and 
multivector policy, and lists the creation of a new world order based on multipolarity as 
the top international priority.
9
 However, while the fundamental assumption of 
sovereignty and independence was present from the beginning, the way the ideas were 
framed and presented changed from 2000 to 2008.  
 
During the 2000 Address to the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin declared 
unequivocally, “the independence of our foreign policy is not in doubt.”
10
 The tone, 
however, was not confrontational. Instead, it reads almost as a required nod to a long-
standing Russian policy in the midst of a speech much more consumed with overcoming 
Russian domestic struggles. This is not to argue that Putin did not believe in the 
importance of Russian foreign policy independence. Rather, his primary focus was on 
domestic issues. Similarly, in an article published shortly before he assumed office as 
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acting president, Putin carefully framed Russia’s development within the context of a 
larger universal narrative and process.
11
 Further, the absence of mention of foreign policy 
independence in the annual addresses from 2001, 2002, and 2003 suggest that in the early 





In part, this is because the early years of Putin’s tenure were devoted to stabilizing Russia 
both politically and economically. As Ben Judah argues, Putin and his first prime 
minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, “were waging a two-front war for legitimacy: one a battle 
for Chechnya and the other a struggle to push through economic reforms that had stalled 
in the late 1990s.”
13
 The problem was not only one of discreet issues, such as tax reform 
and instability in the Caucasus. Instead, part of Putin’s task was to restore faith in the 
government after the erratic final years of his predecessor. This was also important for 
foreign policy: Putin had to stabilize the situation so that foreign policy became more 
consistent and less apt to fall victim to party politics.
14
 In practice, this involved bringing 
domestic constituencies in line by building a broad base of support and gaining the 
support of both the elite and the general public.
15
 Part of gaining that confidence was 
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stabilizing the economy, returning the country to a balanced budget and showing that 




By 2004, this had been accomplished. Between 2000 and 2003 (inclusive), Russia’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) grew at an average rate of 6.8% per year.
17
 In addition, in 2004 
Russia went through a stable election cycle, with Putin elected to another four-year term. 
The 2004 elections were less competitive than previous presidential elections.
18
 However, 
this is evidence of less democracy, not less stability; in Putin’s mind, these may be two 
sides of the same coin. By these metrics and many others, Russia was a dramatically 
more stable country in 2004 than it had been when Putin inherited control four years 
prior. Putin touted these accomplishments in his 2004 address to the Federal Assembly. 
How he did so, however, matters, and is an indication that 2004 was a turning point in 
how Putin discussed the twin concepts of independence and sovereignty.  
 
During the 2004 address, Putin announced that in the previous year, “for the first time in 
a long period Russia became a politically and economically stable country in financial 
relations and in international affairs.”
19
 Had he simply left it at that, it would be 
reasonable to interpret the declaration as simply acknowledgment of the improvement in 
the national economy and increased domestic political stability. However, Putin 
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combined his praise for Russia’s newly stable situation with a warning that Russia’s 
resurgence would engender discontent in other corners of the world. He stated: 
 
Far from everyone in the world wishes to deal with an independent, 
strong, and self-assured Russia. Now in the global competitive fight, 
which actively uses political, economic and information pressure, the 
strengthening of our statehood [gosudarstvennosti] is sometimes 




The warning that Russia’s resurgence would provoke negative reactions in other 
countries shows the beginning of the return of the “fortress Russia” mentality.
21
 It also 
points to a link between a Russia that pursues an independent policy and one that is alone 
in its fight for its place in the global order. 
 
There are two other important pieces here. The first is the reference to gosudarstvennost. 
Jeffery Mankoff translates this as “etatism” (statism), and defines it as: 
 
The idea that the state should play a leading role in the economic and 
political life of the country, and that the national interests in foreign 





As noted in the first chapter, the centrality of the wellbeing of the state, rather than the 
emphasis on the wellbeing of the citizens of that state, marks one of the key differences 
in how Russia defines sovereignty from how it is defined in the West. While this was not 
a new idea to Russian discourse in 2004, it is significant that it is this specific definition, 
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rather than the more generic “sovereignty” (used earlier in the quotation) that Putin 
brings in as he is reviving his discussion about Russia’s political independence. 
 
The second element of note is linked to the idea of sovereignty, and especially control 
over domestic affairs. In his reference that some countries equate the strengthening of the 
Russian state with authoritarianism, Putin underscores the fact that some of the 
discomfort other countries may have with Russia’s rise was about the Russian domestic 
order rather than its increased assertiveness in foreign policy. Much of the BRICS 
argument with the current global order hinges on disagreement with the perceived 
interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. It is therefore worth highlighting 
the reemergence of this argument in Russian political discourse in the year before the 
BRIC countries held their first informal meeting. 
 
Although improved domestic conditions and increased national confidence comprise part 
of the basis for this newly assertive tone, it is also a product of changes in Russia’s 
international relationships. By 2004, what had begun as good relations between Putin and 
then-U.S. President George W. Bush, bolstered by close cooperation following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, had deteriorated considerably. The decline began 
in May 2002, when Bush made clear that the United States would withdraw from the 
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and begin pursuing missile defense 
initiatives.
23
 Other than calling the decision a “mistake,” Putin reacted coolly to the 
announcement.
24
 He averred that an American missile defense program would not 
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threaten the Russian deterrent, and cooperation on issues of mutual interest continued.
25
  
Although the specific issue of missile defense would not become the main irritant in the 
relationship until later, the U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty marked the end of the 




In 2004, the primary causes of strain in U.S.-Russian relations were the Iraq war, the 
recent spate of color revolutions in the post-Soviet space, and Russia’s domestic politics. 
In 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq without UNSC authorization, Russia joined 
with France and Germany to condemn the invasion.
27
 The initial U.S. reaction was 
summed up as “punish France, ignore Germany, forgive Russia,” attributed to then-
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.
28
 That attitude did not last long. The 
repercussions of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and in particular the Bush “Freedom Agenda” 
and its implications for democratization efforts in former Soviet republics, further soured 
already troubled U.S.-Russian relations.  
 
Russia’s domestic situation compounded the problem. The core of the disagreement 
between the United States and Russia over both the invasion of Iraq as well as the 
broader “Freedom Agenda” was the problem of interference in the domestic affairs of 
sovereign states in contravention of international law. The Freedom Agenda became 
central to American foreign policy at the same time that tainted presidential elections and 




 Stent, The Limits of Partnership, 66. 
27
 John Tagliabue, “France, Germany and Russia Vow to Stop Use of Force Against Iraq,” The New York 
Times, March 5, 2003, sec. International Style / Europe, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/05/international/europe/05CND-PARI.html. 
28




the seizure of the Yukos oil company signaled Russian’s domestic trajectory away from 
democracy and liberal economic reform. This disagreement is the root of Putin’s 
statement about increasing state capacity being “consciously construed as 
authoritarianism.” Putin is arguing that by the precepts of the Freedom Agenda, 
intentionally misconstruing a strong independent Russia as authoritarian would give the 





The strain in relations with the United States affected how Putin described Russia’s 
international partnerships in the 2004 address. In listing important international partners, 
Putin equates the importance of Russia’s relations with the United States with that of its 
relations with China and India.
30
 This is not a serious equation. Putin did actively pursue 
partnerships with countries and organizations in the Asia Pacific from the beginning of 
his term.
31
 However, Russia did not begin really designing a coherent policy towards 
Asia until after the 2008 financial crisis, and even now the relationship remains quite 
shallow.
32
 However, the emphasis on relations with China and India was a signal of the 
renewed attention to Primakov’s Strategic Triangle (RIC – Russia-India-China) in 
Russian strategy after lying fallow since its inception in 1997.
33
 Further, it indicated the 
beginning of the rhetorical deployment of Russia’s relations with these countries as an 
alternative to its relationship with its Western partners. 
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The shift in rhetorical framing of sovereignty and independence between 2000 and 2006 
was overall fairly mild. 2007, however, marked a seismic change in the development of 
these concepts, and concurrently of the incorporation of BRIC into Russian foreign 
policy strategy and discourse. Two documents exemplify this change: publicly, Putin’s 
speech at the annual Munich Security Conference signaled his administration’s change in 
perspective.
34
 Internal to the government, the 2007 Survey of Russian Foreign Policy, the 
first major review of foreign policy since Putin assumed office in 2000, laid out the 




In truth, Putin’s Munich speech was something of a coming out party for views that had 
been in development for some time. In a 2006 speech to members of the United Russia 
Party, then-First Deputy Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration Vladislav 
Surkov said that the former members of the Eastern Bloc who joined the European Union 
were simply trading one type of diminished sovereignty for another, an overt denigration 
of Western integration.
36
 In the same speech, Surkov declared that sovereignty was the 
“political synonym of [Russian] competitiveness.”
37
 By 2007, four years after the 
invasion of Iraq and three years after the Yukos affair, Putin’s dissatisfaction with U.S. 
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foreign policy, and the West more broadly, was already well documented. That 
dissatisfaction was also being stoked anew by the announcement about planned U.S. 




The Munich speech is therefore not distinctive because of its general content. Instead, its 
import derives from the following three elements: its tone, its specificity, and its 
foreshadowing of future policies. On tone, this was no gentle chiding of the keepers of 
the global status quo; it was a forceful and even vitriolic recrimination against nearly two 
decades of (perceived) ill treatment. Putin condemned what he saw as the hypocrisies of 
the United States with regard to democracy, arguing “Russia – we – are constantly being 
taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn 
themselves.”
39
 Here Putin conflates democracy at the domestic level – the U.S. concern – 
with democracy in international relations – the Russian concern. The implicit message, 
however, is unequivocal: the United States expects other countries to operate by one set 
of standards, while it remains unbound those same standards. 
 
Putin then made that message explicit. He said:  
 
One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has 
overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the 
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This was not a new criticism, but it was more forceful than its previous iterations. If 
Western policymakers had before been able to brush Russian concerns aside, Munich 
made clear that further inattention was no longer an option.  
 
Second, the speech represented the first formal announcement of Russia’s 
“nonalignment” and search for new partners and a new system. At the conclusion of his 
remarks, Putin stated: 
 
Russia is a country with a history that spans more than one thousand years 
and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent 
foreign policy 
 
We are not going to change this tradition today. At the same time, we are 
well aware of how the world has changed and we have a realistic sense of 
our own opportunities and potential. And of course we would like to 
interact with responsible and independent partners with whom we could 
work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would 




There are two important elements here: the stress on Russia as an independent actor on 
the international stage, and the call to build a new world order that does not privilege the 
interests of certain members of the international community over those of others. The 
former is a public declaration that Russia is a country out to protect its own interests and 
does not consider itself bound by the preferences of the Euro-Atlantic community. The 
latter is a verbatim foreshadowing of the overall goal that would soon be incorporated in 
every BRICS summit declaration. 
 





This foreshadowing of BRICS concerns is the third symbolism in the Munich speech. 
During the speech, after highlighting the impressive growth rates of Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China, Putin declared that “[t]here is no reason to doubt that the economic potential 
of the new centres of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political 
influence and will strengthen multipolarity.”
42
 The quick connection between the 
economic rise of the BRICs and the assumption of their future political prowess is 
evidence that, less than five months after the first meeting of the BRIC foreign ministers 
at the 2006 UNGA, Putin was already thinking about how BRIC could be mobilized as a 
political force. 
 
These public pronouncements are reinforced by the findings and recommendations in the 
2007 Survey on Russian Foreign Policy, an internal document produced by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. The survey hails the “newly acquired policy independence of Russia,” 
and argues that the time is ripe for Russia to take a more active role as a subject rather 
than an object of international affairs.
43
 As the introduction to the nearly seventy-page 
document explains:  
 
Russia is firmly entering the mainstream of international life, and 
therefore the supertask [sverkhzadacha] of the Survey is intellectually and 
psychologically to get accustomed to this new position for us. The 
qualitatively new situation in international relations creates favorable 
opportunities for our intellectual leadership in a number of areas of world 
politics. In other words, it is about Russia’s active participation not only in 
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The “qualitatively new situation” to which the document refers is the effects of 
globalization. The survey opens with the following observation:  
 
Substantial changes have taken place on the world scene in recent years. 
The growing processes of globalization, despite their contradictory 
consequences, lead to a more even distribution of resources of influence 
and economic growth, thus laying the objective basis for a multipolar 




The rest of the document details a plan for how best to capitalize on those developments 
to increase Russian weight in the international system. BRIC is explicitly part of that 
plan. Though the group is only mentioned once, in the section on economic diplomacy, 
the Survey recommends that Russia “continue developing cooperation in [the BRIC] 
format.”
46
 More significantly, it also recommends that cooperation move beyond 
economics and onto other issues of mutual concern, including counter-terrorism.
47
 This is 
an indication that in 2007 the Russian foreign policy apparatus already saw in BRIC a 
political platform. The overriding message of the 2007 Survey is of a coming change in 
the international order. It is also of a resurgent Russia, one with the capacity to influence 
this change, and to do so from an independent foreign policy position.  
 
Russia’s Evolving National Identity and the Rise of “Civilizationalism” in 
Foreign Policy Discourse 
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The preceding section explored the development of the concepts of sovereignty and 
independence in Russian foreign policy discourse. This section considers the evolution of 
the rhetorical framing of Russian national identity during Putin’s first two terms in office, 
with particular emphasis on two issues: the question of Russia’s developmental path, and 
how that question morphs into the related but broader idea of a “dialogue of 
civilizations.” The discussion builds on previous discussions of Russian national identity, 
but brings the focus to how Russia’s identity was publicly formulated in official speeches 
and documents during Putin first two terms in office. 
 
As in the preceding section, the analysis draws on the annual presidential addresses and 
official policy concepts to demonstrate both gradual evolution and watershed moments. 
Two main questions animate the exploration. First, the extent to which Russia’s European 
identity is stressed over a unique Russian identity. Second, and related, is the broader 
question of how the idea of “civilization” is framed, particularly whether it is singular or 
multiple, and how it is connected to economic and political development. 
 
In “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium,” Putin made clear his views on Russia’s place 
in the world and its future development. He argued: 
 
Russia is completing the first, transition stage of economic and political 
reforms. Despite problems and mistakes, it has entered the highway by 
which the whole of humanity is traveling. Only this way offers the 
possibility of dynamic economic growth and higher living standards, as 
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To underscore the message of joining the universal path to development, Putin stated that 
Communism “was a road to a blind alley, which is far away from the mainstream of 
civilization.”
49
 Indeed, much of the first section of the Millennium Manifesto details the 
negative legacies the Soviet economic structure bequeathed to Russia, including the 
emphasis on natural resources and the lack of competition.
50
 In his analysis of the current 
situation in Russia, Putin declared: “today we are reaping the bitter fruit, both material 
and mental, of the past decades.”
51
 The desire to leave behind the previous model of 
development and its crippling effects on Russia’s global competitiveness are clear. 
 
Putin is not arguing that all countries and peoples are the same. He writes about the 
specificities of Russian national identity, and how those specificities fit with more 
universal values. He speaks of the dangers of simply applying foreign models whole 
cloth.
52
 The emphasis on a strong and stable state as a prerequisite for Russian success 
that would become sharper over the course of his first term in office also comes through 
clearly in the Millennium Manifesto. He also decries all extreme reform models, 
including those pursued in the early 1990s.
53
 However, Putin’s argument is primarily that 
the principles of a model must fit the realities on the ground. He is not arguing that 
having a distinct national identity implies being a member of a distinct civilization 
requiring an entirely different development path.  
 













Second, and equally significant, is the abandonment of the longstanding tradition of 
Russia as the vanguard of a countermovement in the global marketplace of ideas. This 
marks a decisive turn from (late) tsarist and Soviet iterations of Russian foreign policy, 
where leadership of a global counterculture – whether Moscow as the “Third Rome” or, 
as in the previous example, Communism – was a bedrock principle. Russia (like the 
United States) has a long history of believing it has a global mission.
54
 Putin’s call to join 
the path of the rest of civilization and his disavowal of Communism and all it represented 
developmentally thus marked a major change. 
 
This is not to argue that Russia professed no global ambition during Putin’s early years in 
office. As noted above, the 2000 National Security Concept underlines the importance of 
promoting a multipolar world with Russia as “one of its influential centres.”
55
 The 2000 
Foreign Policy Concept, like all of its successors, identifies the formation of a new world 
order as the top Russian priority in “resolving global problems.”
56
 The difference is that 
in the earlier documents, Russia’s conflicts with Western policies are framed in political 
rather than civilizational or identity terms. 
 
The annual addresses to the Federal Assembly from 2000-2003 support this 
interpretation. In these speeches, Putin expressed frustration with humanitarian 
intervention and NATO expansion, but he also repeatedly stressed that relations with the 
European Union and the United States were Russia’s top foreign policy priorities after 
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relations with the countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Throughout this period, the refrain was of Russia reclaiming its rightful place as a 




This approach is best exemplified in the 2003 Address, where Putin touted the 
achievement of the full membership in the Group of Eight (G8) as the best indication of 
Russia’s international integration. He declared: 
 
Above everything else, in June of last year Russia was invited to become a 
full member of the club of eight most developed states in the world. In it, 
together with our partners, we are working on providing for our national 





Here is a clear statement of both international priorities and, less directly, Russian 
identity. Russia is identified as a country of the Global North, a developed country 
cooperating with its rightful partners, the other most developed countries. Further, Putin 
speaks of the idea of confronting common problems of “modern civilization.” Although 
elsewhere in the speech Putin speaks of Russia as “unique community,” and there is the 
reference to protecting Russian national interests, there is no indication of the existence 
of a multiplicity of civilizations or alternative paths of national development. 
 
As with the discourse about sovereignty and independence, the approach to identity 
began shifting noticeably in 2004. However, the change was not immediately apparent as 
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an adjustment in the framing of national identity. Instead, the change is visible in two 
smaller rhetorical stresses and innovations that began appearing in the annual addresses 
after 2004. The first is the renewed emphasis on World War II (the Great Patriotic War) 
as a cornerstone of contemporary Russian national identity. The second is the revival of 
the idea of responsibility for ethnic Russians living beyond Russia’s borders.  
The Narrative of the Great Patriotic War 
 
It is hard to overstate the impact of the Second World War on the Soviet Union. The 
USSR suffered the greatest losses among the combatant powers during the war, and also 
made the greatest contribution to the Allied victory.
59
 The number of Soviet casualties 
was five times that of German casualties.
60
 Despite these unimaginable losses, or perhaps 
because of the collective experience of surviving and ultimately defeating the enemy, 
“the war strengthened Communist rule, especially by creating a sense of besieged 
national unity and providing the government with a source of legitimacy as defender of 
the homeland.”
61
 It is the idea of the war as a source of unity in a hostile world that 
became most important when Putin began reviving the memory of war in 2005. 
 
During his 2005 address (the 60
th
 anniversary of the Victory), Putin argued that, “Victory 
was possible not just through the strength of weapons, but through the strength of all the 
peoples [narodov] united at the time in the union state.”
62
 The important element here is 
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the emphasis on the spiritual aspect of victory, reinforced later in the speech with the 
statement that “the soldiers of the Great Patriotic War should by rights be called soldiers 
of freedom [po pravu nazyvaiut soldatami svobody].”
63
 Such a characterization explicitly 
ignores both the atrocities of the Soviet army on its march to Berlin (and earlier, such as 
the Katyn massacre), as well as the brutal regime these soldiers served and suffered 
under. Glossing over these more uncomfortable sides of the Soviet war experience, 
Putin’s arguments are consciously linked with statements about contemporary Russia’s 
freedom, as a sovereign nation, to define its own path to and variant of democracy.
64
 
Veneration of the Victory, and pageantry on May 9 (den Pobedy, Victory Day), have 
become critical elements in the Putin government’s efforts to construct a modern Russian 
national identity.  
 
As noted above, the Soviet experience during the war was indelibly extreme. It is only 
logical that it would be incorporated into later constructions of the national sense of self. 
The problem is that the veneration has taken on an exclusionary character. Highlighting 
the singular achievement of the Soviet Union in defeating the Nazis and saving Europe – 
and linking that singularity to modern Russian identity – creates a separation between 
Russia and the rest of Europe. It also recalls the Brezhnev policy of lionizing the role of 
the Communist Party in the World War II victory as part of its own regime legitimation 
strategy following Nikita Khrushchev’s ouster.
65
 More problematically, the emphasis on 
the Soviet achievements during World War II without mention of Soviet crimes, and 
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especially the seizure of the Baltic states and the atrocities committed in Poland, drive a 
wedge between Russia and its closest European neighbors. 
 
This leads to the broader problem of the lionization of the memory of the Great Patriotic 
War: the man who led the country at the time. Analysis of Putin’s appeal to the 
(selective) memory of World War II would be incomplete without discussion of Stalin 
and Stalinism. As Robert Legvold writes of Stalin: 
 
Never before or since has a Russian ruler so ravaged existing political, 
economic, and social structure. Not a single institution, from the family to 
the inner sanctum of power…escaped wholesale transmogrification. More 
than that, of course, the collectivization of agriculture, the forced-draft 
industrialization, and the purge of the party and the military thoroughly 




Stalin and the system he created were responsible for millions of civilian deaths across 
the Soviet Union, as a result of direct execution, state-sponsored famine, and slave labor 
in the GULAG system. Further, his faith that Hitler would honor the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 left the USSR unprepared for war and likely increased the 
number of Soviet casualties among both soldiers and civilians. 
 
Yet despite these crimes, Stalin has a complicated place in post-Soviet historical 
narratives. According to a poll commissioned by the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace and conducted by the Levada Center in 2012: 
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Almost half of Russians surveyed believe “Stalin was a wise leader who 
brought the Soviet Union to might and prosperity. But over half of the 
Russians surveyed believe that Stalin’s acts of repression constituted “a 
political crime that cannot be justified.” And about two thirds agree that 
“for all Stalin’s mistakes and misdeeds, the most important thing is that 




As the survey results show, it is precisely Stalin’s links to World War II that makes his 
legacy so complicated. If Stalin’s crimes are fully acknowledged, then this taints his 
biggest achievement: the Soviet victory in World War II.
68
 Therefore, while his image 
has been erased from public life and street signs, he remains “a hidden hero,” whose 





Putin’s approach to Stalin during his first two terms in office reflected the ambiguity of 
Stalin’s place in the Russian consciousness. The strong state Putin established, with its 
dependence on the security ministries, is a Soviet vision of the state, and Stalin is closely 
associated with that model.
70
 Putin oversaw a system where school textbooks were 
changed to extoll Stalin as “an efficient manager” while simultaneously including Gulag 
Archipelago on the reading list.
71
 In October 2007, Putin visited one of places where 
mass executions took place during the Great Terror and was apparently moved and 
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shocked by the experience.
72
 Nevertheless, his regime has also prevented the 
establishment of an official memorial center for Stalin’s victims, and Memorial, the 
Russian organization devoted to rehabilitating Stalin’s victims, is under frequent threat of 
closure.
73
 Ultimately, the approach from 2000-2008 was one of a careful balance. Putin 
acknowledged some level of wrongdoing on the part of Stalin and his system, but he did 
not allow criticism to progress to a point that it threatened the narrative of the Great 
Patriotic War, especially when that narrative became more important to Putin’s 
construction of national identity.
74
 
The “Russian World” and Civilizational Discourse 
 
The other shift that happened with Putin’s second term in office was the revival of the 
idea of the broader Russian community beyond Russia’s geographical borders. Mentions 
of Russia’s responsibility to protect compatriots abroad are long-standing features of 
official Russian policy documents, but after 2004 the tone began to change. Indeed, the 
famous line of the collapse of the USSR as the “biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 
twentieth century [krupneishei geopoliticheskoi katastrofa veka],” which appeared in 
Putin’s 2005 Annual Address, is nested within a paragraph about Russians finding 




The emphasis on the existence of a “Russian world,” to be strengthened through the 
promulgation of Russian language and culture, is in some ways simply an example of 
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Russia experimenting with deploying soft power. It has also been interpreted as a renewal 
of historical Russian imperialism. Both of these interpretations have merit. In this 
analysis, however, what is important is the reintroduction of idea that Russians are a 
distinct and unique civilization. Though not fully articulated in the annual speeches until 
later, these quiet nods to the idea laid the groundwork for the major innovations on this 
topic introduced in the 2007 foreign policy survey. 
 
As with the discourse on independence and national sovereignty, 2007 marked a turning 
point in the discourse on civilization. The section on multilateral diplomacy of the 2007 
survey prepared by the MFA includes an entire subsection entitled “Dialogue Among 
Civilizations.” The subsection opens with a statement about the dangers of globalization 
erasing “national distinctiveness,” and goes on to argue: 
 
The promotion of the dialogue among civilizations in these circumstances 
is becoming one of the most important elements of our foreign policy 
strategy. There are grounds to make this theme the thread running through 
our international contacts and secure it as the “big idea” of Russian 
diplomacy for the foreseeable future. This is already becoming an 
effective means for asserting the intellectual leadership of Russia in world 
politics, upholding our foreign policy independence and advancing 





This paragraph points to two major deviations from the Millennium article that Putin 
endorsed seven years prior. First is the idea of multiple civilizations, as opposed to, as in 
the Millennium Address, joining the path that all of civilization joins. This is particularly 
notable because the notion of a dialogue of civilizations is standard language in BRICS 
statements and declarations.  
                                                 
76




The second deviation is more striking, and, from the perspective of how BRICS fits into 
Russian foreign policy, more important. Here is the reintroduction of the search for the 
next “great idea” that will reinstate Russia as the leader of a global counterculture. This is 
quite different from the assertion in the Millennium article that the Bolshevist experiment 
was an “historic futility.”
77
 It also suggests that part of the goal in bringing BRIC together 
was to create a forum where Russia could offer “big ideas.”
78
 The phrase “intellectual 
leadership” is especially significant, as it is the same phrase the leader of NKI BRIKS 




The 2007 Survey also explicitly identifies the aim of establishing Russia, and Russians, 
as a distinct civilization. In the subsection “Protecting the interests of Compatriots 
Abroad,” which appears in a chapter on “the Humanitarian Direction of Foreign Policy,” 
the report states: 
 
For the new Russia, especially as tens of millions of our people [desiatki 
millionov nashikh liudei] as a result of the breakup of the USSR have 
found themselves outside of the country, defending compatriots’ interests 
is a natural foreign policy priority, whose significance will only grow. 
There is a need for continuous all-round assistance to the strengthening of 
the compatriots’ links with the historical Homeland and the creation of a 




There are several notable ideas in this paragraph. First, the paragraph recalls the 
phraseology of the paragraph from the 2005 Annual Address about the context of the 
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collapse of the Soviet Union as a great geopolitical catastrophe, suggesting that the 
message of that speech has been internalized into policy direction. Second, in 
recommending that resources be devoted to “creating” Russia and Russians as a distinct 
civilization, the Survey implicitly indicates that the proposal represents a shift in policy. 
The recommendation builds on previously adopted documents related to language and 
resettlement assistance programs for Russians living abroad, but this shows a unification 
of these disparate attempts into a higher-level, conceptual push towards public unification 




Restoring Balance to Putin’s Rhetorical Balancing 
 
It is important to remember that even as Putin’s rhetoric on issues of sovereignty and 
civilization became more strident, it never progressed to the point of a wholesale 
rejection of the West in terms of either identity or policy during his first two presidential 
terms. Neither was it an uncomplicated process of separation. Even in speeches 
delineating Russia from its European neighbors, Putin also declared that the country was 
a “great European nation.”
82
 The 2007 foreign policy survey touts Russia’s inclusion in 
the G8 as proof that the group is becoming more representative and no longer simply “an 
exclusive ‘club of Western powers,’” while at the same time Russia balked at the idea of 
inviting the O5 countries to the 2006 G8 summit in St. Petersburg, the first hosted by 
Russia.
83
 Russia was also initially opposed to the G20 financial group, worried that 
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including other countries would minimize its own power, even though it was already 




There are several interrelated issues here. Partly, it is that regardless of the change in 
rhetoric, the political elite, including Putin, remained firmly Western oriented.
85
 In 
addition, the overriding goal has always been maintaining Russia’s preeminence in the 
world’s most powerful (or most exclusive) clubs. Up until the beginning of the financial 
crisis, those clubs were almost entirely Western. The rhetoric, therefore, indicated 
possible changes in policy direction; it did not represent a real sea change in the core 
political perspective. In that sense, the combative and separatist rhetoric that emerged 
over Putin’s first two terms in office is better understood as a warning shot against 
Western countries to prevent them from encroaching on Russian national interests rather 
than an intention to leave the Western sphere entirely. 
 
This leads to the second issue: balancing. BRIC was in no way capable of being an actual 
balance against the West between 2000 and 2007. Although the countries’ growth and 
future potential were recognized very early in Putin’s first term, meetings did not begin 
until 2005. Indeed, as the brief partnership with France and Germany in the wake of the 
onset of the Iraq War demonstrates, early balancing efforts were more about dividing the 
United States and Europe rather than forming new coalitions. Finally, public efforts to 
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coordinate against Western influence before the onset of the crisis, notably Russia’s 
nomination of an alternative candidate for the position of Managing Director of the 
International Monetary Fund in 2007, were unsuccessful.
86
 The best Putin could do, 
therefore, was establish Russia’s status as an independent actor rhetorically, deploying 
the BRIC moniker as a buttress where possible, while slowly building up the group 
behind the scenes.  
 
Finally, there is the question of economics. While it is tempting to read Russia’s BRIC 
engagement, and the idea of a “multi-vector” policy more broadly, as strictly anti-
Western, this would be an oversimplification, especially in the early years. The one 
absolute constant in all of Putin’s speeches in his first two terms, and a constant which 
held in the official concepts produced by the ministries, was that the primary foreign and 
domestic policy goal was economic development. This necessitated both a diversification 
of the economy away from natural resources (which Putin did not achieve) and a 
diversification of economic partners (which he did). During his time as president, Russian 
trade with non-European partners did increase somewhat, as seen in the charts presented 
in the previous chapter. Therefore, although BRIC was and is more about politics than 
economics for Russia, it is worth remembering that it also served economic objectives.  
 
Understanding the role BRIC would play in Russian foreign policy once the group 
debuted on the international scene, therefore, requires accepting several competing truths 
simultaneously. Rhetoric about Russia as its own civilization distinct from Europe and 
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the country’s right to define its own development path increased between 2000 and 2007; 
this was both cause and consequence of deteriorating relations with the West. At the 
same time, the preference for remaining in the top echelon of international clubs 
mandated continued prioritization of groups like the G8 over fledgling associations with 
other powers. Finally, economic logic offered a veneer for emphasizing relations beyond 




There is no official record of the first meetings of BRIC representatives. Major 
newspapers (Russian or otherwise) did not cover them, and it was not until the first 
leaders’ meeting at the 2008 Hokkaido G8 that the Kremlin even published a press 
release about BRIC.
87
 Neither was BRIC mentioned in any of the Annual Addresses 
during Putin’s first two terms in office. In terms of documentary evidence, the very early 
years of BRIC in Russian political discourse are visible almost exclusively in how 
attendant concepts were framed. 
 
This may be a result of the lack of an initial vision for what BRIC could become. Cynthia 
Roberts argues that Russia’s initiation of BRIC meetings was more a tactical move than a 
strategic one.
88
 From a procedural perspective, this is probably true. Certainly, it made 
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little sense to advertise the group until its potential was evident. As soon as it became 





However, there is also evidence that BRIC was beginning to feature in Russian foreign 
policy planning before the 2008 financial crisis. This is evident in Putin’s 2007 speech at 
the Munich Security Conference, where he suggested that new economic centers would 
become the new global political leaders. BRIC also features in the 2007 Foreign Policy 
Survey. Though the group is mentioned only in the context of economic diplomacy, the 
report stresses the importance of continuing to develop it as a dialogue forum. By 2007, 
BRIC had penetrated into MID strategic planning as a useful vector for Russian foreign 
policy, beyond the use of each individual BRIC country as an economic partner. 
 
What is more important, however, is the extent to which the evolution of rhetoric during 
Putin’s first two terms in office created a space for BRIC to be incorporated into Russian 
foreign policy. This is primarily a result of the twin phenomena of increasing frustration 
with the West and economic growth that made Russia a more self-assured actor on the 
international stage. By the time of the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, Putin had 
publicly redefined Russia’s international orientation sufficiently to support a credible 
belief that the country was no longer interested in joining the Western-led international 
system, but would instead forge an alternative path. That this was in some ways a 
rhetorical feint is both critical and incidental. Critical, because that is very much the role 
BRIC played for Russia between 2008 and 2013: that of a theoretical alternative option 
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deployed as a bargaining chip in other forums. It is incidental, though, because 
maintaining the fiction of BRIC as a real alternative led to an ongoing push for actual 
institutionalization.  
 
In a twist of fate, even as Putin had primed the foreign policy machine to promote BRIC 
as political group with the principal aim of balancing against Western hegemony, he also 
installed a successor whose rhetoric was markedly more conciliatory towards Russia’s 
erstwhile partners in the West. Political BRIC thus began to flourish contemporaneously 
with the U.S.-Russia Reset and better Russia-NATO relations than had existed since the 
early 1990s. The evolution of BRIC under Medvedev, and how it was incorporated into 




5. Potemkin Villages and Rhetorical Bridges: BRICS in 
Russian Policy, 2008-2013 
The Lisbon summit has made decisions related to the forming of a modern partnership, 
one based on the indivisibility of security, mutual trust, transparency, and predictability. 
We have decided on how we will work on the creation of a common space of peace and 
security in the Euro-Atlantic region. This makes us moderately optimistic when we 
evaluate the prospects of our work on Russia’s initiative on a new European security 
treaty. 
 





Cooperation in the BRICS format is one of the key long-term priorities in foreign policy 
for the Russian Federation. 
 




The Russian approach to BRICS between 2008 and 2013 should have become 
progressively deeper, wider, and more nuanced. Over the preceding seven years, 
Vladimir Putin’s rhetorical constructions of sovereignty and national identity had 
prepared the foreign policy establishment to embrace BRIC as an alternative to the 
Western-led international system. When BRIC burst forth in the wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis, it could have become a centerpiece of a new Russian foreign policy. 
 
Instead, the approach to BRIC in this era remained largely static. The Russian leadership 
maintained it as a rhetorical alternative, but never invested in it as a real policy priority. 
What’s more, Putin’s anointment of Dmitry Medvedev as his successor almost 
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guaranteed that Russian political rhetoric and policy choices would reorient toward the 
West. Why Putin chose a successor who was so palatable to the West after years of 
increasingly anti-American rhetoric, and how much agency Medvedev had over his 
foreign and domestic policy remain unknowns.
3
 This complicates the analysis of Russian 
policy and political rhetoric during his tenure. 
 
The complications are compounded by the confluence of several major regional and 
global events that occurred near the beginning of Medvedev’s term in office. These 
include the August 2008 war with Georgia, the September 2008 onset of the acute phase 
of the Global Financial Crisis, and the November 2008 election of Barack Obama as U.S. 
president. The result was a fundamentally altered international context from that which 
had existed when Putin left the presidency in May 2008. These shifts produced openings 
in several directions for the Russian leadership to change the course of Russian foreign 
policy; the option they chose is indicative of underlying Russian foreign policy 
orientations and preoccupations. 
 
Finally, the rapid evolution of BRICS itself during this period poses its own set of 
constraints. As discussed in chapter three, the onset of the 2008 financial crisis was a 
catalyst for BRIC’s development as a coordinated group. It is therefore an unequal 
comparison to consider Medvedev’s policy towards BRICS against Putin’s earlier stage 
setting. Although Putin had cued up the foreign minister meetings, Medvedev was the 
first Russian president to meet formally with his BRIC counterparts (in July 2008), and 
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was at the helm when world events suddenly gave BRIC a perfect entre onto the 
international stage. It is hard to determine whether the increased emphasis Medvedev 
gave to BRIC in his first year, therefore, was because of Russian political leanings, his 
own inclinations, or simply because the context had changed and the opportunity 
presented itself.  
 
By the same token, that early phase of BRIC’s international prominence did not last. By 
2011, the group had adopted a much more inward looking approach to cooperation.
4
 The 
intra-BRICS agenda supported Russian goals for economic modernization. It detracted 
focus, however from the element of the group that had always most interested the 
Russian leadership, and which Putin had developed through his rhetoric as president: 
BRIC as a balance against the West, and a way to gain leverage in Russia’s ongoing 
attempts to revise the post-Cold War international institutional architecture. Though 
Medvedev was less vocally anti-American than Putin, he was no less committed to 
bringing about a multipolar world. When BRICS turned inward, the group was no longer 




As a result of the changing international context and the changes within BRICS itself, 
BRICS did not penetrate Russian foreign policy beyond official rhetoric either during 
Medvedev’s term or for the first two years of Vladimir Putin’s third term. Further, the 
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rhetoric itself stayed fairly shallow. Though leaders could have highlighted the growing 
economic and development agenda, the focus stayed on the role BRICS could play in 
changing the international order.  
 
Though leaders remained frozen on the international aspect of BRICS, Russian 
academics and experts at state research institutions considered BRICS in a more nuanced 
fashion. They produced a plethora of books, reports and analyses about current and 
potential areas of BRICS cooperation. In some ways, this intellectual output filled in gaps 
that the narrow official approach to BRICS left open, thereby showing a deeper thinking 
about BRICS among the intellectual elite than was evident in the ruling elite. These 
scholars produced a framework of ideas and goals for BRICS that could be further 
developed if desire (or need) arose. Though the work was often supported with state 
funds, however, the analysis was not incorporated into official discourse. This suggests 
that the goal of supporting BRICS research projects was part of the overall Russian 
attempt to build a façade of BRICS policy rather than an indication of official interest in 
the details of the topic.  
 
This chapter finally unites the three main narratives of the dissertation. The first section 
considers official approaches to BRICS from 2008 through 2013, with particular 
reference to how changing relations with the West and other international projects 
affected how officials portrayed the role of the BRICS group and its importance to 
Russia. The second section analyzes the unofficial approach to BRICS during this era, 




Finally, the third section draws those two prior analyses together to explain why the 
Russian approach to BRICS was so loud but so empty, even when BRICS itself was 
developing so rapidly. 
 
A Note on Sources 
 
As with the preceding chapter, presidential speeches and statements form the majority of 
the source base. The ambiguity of Medvedev’s de facto power vis-à-vis Putin, who was 
then prime minister, however, makes it more difficult to ascribe to his speeches the same 
agenda-setting power as to those given by Putin during his (first) presidential tenure. The 
challenge is that Medvedev was neither puppet nor free agent. Instead, he was 
somewhere in between, but the precise balance is unknown. Further, it is unlikely that the 
balance remained constant throughout Medvedev’s four-year term.   
 
The question of how independent Medvedev was is of particular importance in 
considering foreign policy, the realm in which he was constitutionally supreme. There are 
conflicting opinions on this issue. Gordon Hahn, for example, argues that in the first two 
years of the tandemocracy “except for sporadic forays into foreign policy, Putin…settled 
into the economic policymaking as premier and avoid[ed] involvement in the president’s 
prerogatives, at least in public.”
6
 By contrast, Angela Stent, citing an unnamed U.S. 
official, argues that Medvedev wished to “’establish his own power base,” but was unable 
                                                 
6




to do so, for fear of threatening Putin.
7
 Though the context is a more general question of 
which leader in the tandem held more power, it suggests that in all areas, including 
foreign policy, Medvedev’s actions were constrained. In addition, the 2008 Foreign 
Policy Concept, which Medvedev approved shortly upon taking office, vested some 




Given these unknowns, the approach to the analysis will be as follows. At the basic level, 
I assume that Medvedev was not merely a stooge, but rather represented a faction of the 
elite who for some period was ascendant over Putin’s traditional power ministry clan.
9
 
Therefore, his words had weight. Indeed, even assuming Putin was quite powerful behind 
the scenes, Medvedev, especially in his first two years, presented a different vision for 
Russia than that which Putin had put forth during the final years of his second 
presidential term. Whatever the power dynamics, it is clear that Medvedev was permitted 
to do so, and this is significant. As argued in the first chapter, the words of the leader 
matter. Therefore, it is almost irrelevant whether Medvedev was “allowed” to be reform 
oriented and less anti-Western in his foreign policy, or whether he was independent 
enough to present those ideas over Putin’s objections. Either way, the views were 
publicized, suggesting a shift in direction. 
 
Just because those views were promulgated at the highest level, though, does not mean 
elite infighting had ceased and everyone had acquiesced to the new priorities. Russian 
elite opinion has never been monolithic. When Putin was president in his first two terms, 
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however, he commanded sufficient respect and power that it is fair to consider his 
statements as representatives of the overwhelmingly dominant portion of the ruling elite 
(as distinct from the intellectual elite). Medvedev was seen as president conditional on 
Putin’s good will. Therefore, though Medvedev’s words and speeches will be given pride 
of place, in this chapter more supporting documents, such as speeches by the foreign 
minister, will be drawn in as additional support. 
 
BRICS in Russian Official Policy, 2008-2013 
 
2008: The Year that Everything Could Have Changed  
 
By every measure, 2008 was a watershed year in international politics and economics.
10
 
Domestically, both Russia and America held presidential elections, and each brought in a 
leader whose stance appeared quite different from his predecessor’s and whose election 
was a landmark event. However uncontested his election, the election of Dmitry 
Medvedev marked the first peaceful democratic transfer of power in Russian history.
11
 
Barack Obama became the first African-American president of the United States, and his 
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election was a symbol both domestically and internationally of a repudiation of the 
divisive policies of the George W. Bush era.
12
   
 
Relations between Russia and the United States also suffered a severe shock in 2008. The 
August war with Georgia was a wake-up call that bilateral relations had been allowed to 
drift dangerously. American and Russian analysts called for a more pragmatic approach 
to the bilateral relationship. As one Russian expert put it, “Washington needs to think 
strategically about Russia, not theologically or ideologically.”
13
 An American expert 
argued that, “The crisis in Georgia brings us face-to-face with the reality that the United 
States and Russia have squandered the opportunity to build a relationship that works for 
both parties.”
14
 Though the dividends did not begin to materialize until 2009, this sudden 
jolt spurred both sides to renew their emphasis on the bilateral relationship, in ways that 
had implications for each country’s wider foreign policy stance. 
 
The shocks were not just domestic and bilateral, however. In September 2008, after a 
tense weekend of closed-door negotiations at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the 
U.S. government declined to bail out Lehman Brothers, a multinational financial services 
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firm headquartered in midtown Manhattan.
15
 On September 15, 2008, Lehman collapsed, 
sending shockwaves through the international financial system.
16
 In addition to roiling 
international markets, Lehman’s demise intensified an ongoing discussion about the 
creation of new international financial governance architecture because of the signal it 





The combination of the decline in bilateral Russian-American relations as a result of the 
war in Georgia with the more general global questioning of America’s role in the world 
following the beginning of the financial crisis had a noticeable effect on Russian rhetoric. 
During his first address to the Federal Assembly, President Medvedev blamed both the 
Georgia war and the financial crisis on irresponsible American policy.
18
 He also listed 
BRIC as a group with responsibility and importance for global governance, arguing: 
 
The mistakes and crises of 2008 are a lesson to all responsible nations that 
it is time for action. We need to radically reform the political and 
economic systems. Russia, in any event, will insist on this. We will work 
together on this with the United States, the European Union, the BRIC 
countries and all parties with an interest in reform. We will do everything 
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The message was clear: for Russia (rhetorically), the United States and the system it 
dominated had been overtaken by events, and Western powers would not have a 
monopoly on solving the problem they created. 
 
Part of the reason the Russian leadership was so quick to condemn the profligacy of 
Western policy was that while Western markets were troubled beginning in 2007, the 
effects hit Russia only after Lehman crashed. Indeed, “up until 2008, Russia was hailed 
as an economic miracle, enjoying rapid GDP growth, macroeconomic stability, and an 
unprecedented rise in real disposable income (more than 10 percent per annum on 
average over eight years).”
20
 In January of 2008, before the depth of the crisis was clear 
but when the problems in the U.S. economy were already evident, the Russian finance 
minister Alexei Kudrin stated that Russia would be an “island of stability” amidst the 
recessions hitting Western economies.
21
 In August 2008, Russia also had the world’s 




Nevertheless, the effect of the global crisis was already evident in Russia when 
Medvedev gave his address to the Federal Assembly in November 2008. By October of 
that year, the Russian stock market had lost 80 percent of its May 2008 value.
23
 Plunging 
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commodities prices, capital flight, and bailouts of inefficient state companies tore through 
the country’s foreign currency reserves.
24
 The Russian economy suffered the worst 
effects as a result of the 2008 crisis of any G20 economy.
25
 These economic realities, 
however, did not stop Medvedev from capitalizing on the global discontent with U.S. 
international leadership that the crisis had magnified and crystalized. 
 
Medvedev’s call to reconstruct global governance architecture to be more inclusive was 
not a new feature of Russian political rhetoric. Its roots trace back at least to Evgenii 
Primakov’s calls to establish a multipolar world in the late 1990s, and, in some guises, to 
the Soviet era as well. Neither was mention of BRIC as a force in bringing about a new 
world order entirely new; though this is the first annual address to mention the group, the 
sentiment is similar to that expressed by Putin in Munich in 2007. What is significant 
about this statement is twofold: first, Putin spoke generally about the rise of the BRICs as 
a new force in international politics. Medvedev, in the statement quoted above and again 
later in the same speech, explicitly referred to BRIC as an organized group conceptually 
on par with the G8 in terms of its role as forum responsible for global governance. In 





This new emphasis on BRIC followed statements made by Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov after the first stand-alone meeting of the BRIC foreign ministers in 
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Ekaterinburg, Russia in May 2008. The meeting was initiated by Russia. Following the 
meeting, Lavrov told the press:  
 
Russia attaches great significance to its development in the BRIC format. 
This is a format which is not far fetched [sic], but derives from real life. It 
derives from the fact that the high rates of economic growth exhibited by 
our countries largely ensure the steady development of the world 
economy. Now that there is much talk about reforming the prevailing 
global financial-economic architecture, we have something to discuss, 
especially the protection of our common interests, including responsibility 




When Lavrov gave his press conference the heads of state had never met formally as 
BRIC. The group had only just held its first stand-alone conference, as opposed to 
sideline meetings at other events. When Medvedev spoke, the leaders had held a sideline 
at the Hokkaido G8, but had not held their first summit. Russian political leaders, 
therefore, appear to have included BRIC as a significant group as a signal of Russia’s 




The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept that Medvedev signed in July 2008 undergirded the 
aspirations expressed in both Medvedev’s and Lavrov’s statements.
29
 The new concept, 
the first since 2000, includes many of the innovations from the 2007 review of foreign 
policy, including the idea of Russia once again being prepared to be an international 
                                                 
27
 “Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey 
Lavrov at Press Conference Following Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Russia, India and China 




 In June 2008, Brazilian Foreign Minister Ceslo Amorim published an article (in Portuguese) entitled 
“The BRICs and the Reorganization of the World.” This suggests that by mid-2008 Russia was not the only 
BRIC country to be integrating the group into its foreign policy position. See Stuenkel, The BRICS and the 
Future of Global Order, 12–13. 
29





leader, and the centrality of the civilizational dimension of international relations. In 
another signal of Russia’s shift away from a Western-centric approach toward a more 
fully multivector foreign policy, the concept also explicitly mentions the Troika (the 
Russia-India-China configuration) and BRIC as two forums Russia will actively use, in 




The 2008 Concept, however, also suggests a greater emphasis on economic stability and 
international economic integration than did its predecessor from 2000. Although it 
proposes a need to reshuffle international governance and represents a Russia more 
assured of its place, it also is less combative about that place than the concept Putin 
adopted in his first presidential term (discussed in the previous chapter).
31
 Instead, the 
document proclaims the importance of “network diplomacy,” announcing Russia’s 
intention to “cooperate not as part of a group, but with shifting groups of countries as 
necessary.”
32
 In other words, Russia wishes to be everywhere, and part of every 
discussion, driving towards the goal of enhanced international power through increased 
economic growth. It is a continuation of the long-standing emphasis on Russia as an 
independent international actor. The emphasis on economics, however, is new. 
 
The decrease in pugilistic rhetoric was also visible in how Lavrov spoke about BRIC in 
his press conference following the 2008 Ekaterinburg meeting of the foreign ministers. In 
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the quotation above, Lavrov framed BRIC as the logical outgrowth of “real life.”
33
 BRIC 
is presented as a group prepared to take responsibility for improving global governance 
architecture, motivated to act in concert because of shared common interests. Though 
these sentiments are not substantively different from what Putin said in Munich, the gloss 
is one of global cooperation rather than global confrontation. Put another way, BRIC here 
is presented as one of many tools in Russia’s pocket that the country could and would use 
to pursue its interests. It is by no means a replacement for other international 
partnerships. This presentation is also more in line with the tone of later BRICS summit 
declarations, and accords with the official BRICS position that its formation has been a 
response to objective shifts in global economic power. 
 
The moderation in rhetoric was not the only indication that BRIC would not supersede 
traditional partnerships in Russia’s foreign policy priorities. In 2008, concurrent with the 
increased public emphasis on BRIC as a force in global governance, Medvedev also 
looked West. During the World Policy Conference in Evian, France, the Russian 
president outlined his proposal for a new European Security Treaty (EST).
34
 He struck 
many of the same themes as he would in his 2008 address to the Federal Assembly the 
following month, as well as in the recently adopted Foreign Policy Concept. His 
statements, however, were all nested within a firm argument that Russia is an integral 
part of the Euro-Atlantic world.
35
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The EST proposal was poorly thought out and very vague on details. It also included 
suggestions that would clearly be anathema to NATO and the European Union, including 
a minimization of each of their roles in European security architecture.
36
 It was, however, 
also the first major international policy proposal of Medvedev’s presidency. Although he 
did not elaborate on the details until October 2008, Medvedev actually first presented the 
proposal at a meeting in Berlin before any of the 2008 crises hit.
37
 This suggests that 
improving relations with the West was a higher priority for Medvedev than BRIC. The 
EST remained a key priority even after the August War and the onset of the financial 
crisis, as evidenced by the release of the full draft treaty in November 2009. Therefore, 
while BRIC was an important rhetorical device in 2008, it did not displace the traditional 




This is not to argue that Medvedev ever intended a return to the 1990s policy of 
(perceived) subordination of Russian national interests to Western leadership. Quite the 
contrary: the EST was itself indicative that Medvedev, like his predecessor, was 
committed to the goal of renegotiating post-Cold War institutional architecture. Unlike 
Putin, however, the proposal for revision centered around the Euro-Atlantic space. In 
Munich, Putin presented a Russia fed up with the West and ready to shift its focus to 
entirely new quarters. With the EST, whatever its faults and impracticalities, Medvedev 
highlighted that while the creation of a new world order was the international political 
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priority of his presidency, he would aim to do so from a Western-oriented perspective. 
The proposal is also evidence of the ongoing tension in Russian elite discourse over 
trying to be accepted by the West and trying to compete with or balance against it. 
 
It is worth noting that while the EST was a firm indication of Medvedev’s political goals, 
the economic goals were somewhat different. Most important, the Global Financial Crisis 
for the first time forced Russia to develop a comprehensive economic policy toward 
China. While economic relations had existed on paper for some time, such as a 
Memorandum of Understanding between China and Gazprom from 2006, the Russian 
side was not convinced of the worth of those deals.
39
 After the Global Financial Crisis, 
and especially after the precipitous drop in Russian GDP in 2009, that changed.
40
 In 
2010, China became Russia’s largest trading partner.
41
 That same year, the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade announced the intention to increase Chinese foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in Russia by $10 billion over the next ten years, from $2 billion 
to $12 billion.
42
 The unwillingness of Western banks to lend to Rosneft and Transneft 
(state oil and oil transit companies) after the financial crisis hit Russia in 2009 also acted 
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2009-2011: Stasis  
 
Rhetorical emphasis on BRIC subsided after 2008. This was a result of improved 
Russian-U.S. and Russian-NATO relations, specifics of Medvedev’s policy priorities, 
and changes within BRIC itself. Throughout the remainder of Medvedev’s term and into 
the beginning of Putin’s return to the presidency, therefore, the approach to BRICS in 
Russian foreign policy remained unchanged. It served the specific role of “rhetorical 
balancing” – with varying degrees of confrontational overtones – without becoming a real 
priority for the leadership.  
 
U.S.-Russian relations improved dramatically following the election of Barack Obama. In 
part, this was because there was nowhere to go but up after the nadir of the Georgia War. 
There was also optimism on both sides that with two leaders who came of age at the end 
of the Cold War, the historical baggage of the relationship could finally be jettisoned in 
favor of a new, modern partnership. Most important, though, was the presence in 
Washington of an administration that appeared willing to take a pragmatic rather than 
value-driven approach to U.S.-Russian relations.
44
 This new approach was motivated 
both by the shock of the collapse in relations following the Georgia War as well as a 
move among American experts to consider U.S. policy toward more holistically, as one 
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The U.S.-Russia Reset got off to a rocky start when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton gave Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov a button labeled “overload” instead 
of “reset.” Despite these rough beginnings, however, the new approach bore significant 
early fruit.
46
 Following a sunny first meeting between the two leaders at the London G20 
in April 2009, the two countries concluded a much-needed successor to the lapsed 
START agreement and established a Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC). The BPC 
included working groups focusing on areas such as energy, democracy and human rights, 
and counterterrorism. Much to the benefit of the United States and its NATO allies, the 
Reset also produced an agreement on the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which 




Perhaps the most important benefit of the Reset from the Russian perspective, however, 
was the cancellation of planned missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic in 
favor of the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA). As discussed in the previous chapter, 
missile defense has long been an irritant in U.S.-Russian relations, especially since 
George W. Bush unilaterally withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty in June 2002. U.S. administrations have always held that the purpose of a missile 
defense system in Europe is to protect European allies from Iran, and that the system 
would have no effect on the Russian nuclear deterrent. Russia, however, maintains that 
the system undermines strategic stability and poses a threat to Russian national interests. 
The sites in Poland and the Czech Republic were especially distasteful to the Russian 
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leadership because they were to be situated on the territory of former Warsaw Pact allies. 
President Obama emphasized that the switch to the PAA was driven by a new threat 
assessment rather than a desire to placate Russia. He also, however, reportedly sent a 
secret letter to Medvedev early in his term offering to withdraw the plan for sites in 
Poland and the Czech Republic if Russia agreed to cooperate on sanctioning Iran.
48
 On 
hearing of the cancellation of those plans, the Russian MFA stated that it was a positive 




The move to the PAA paved the way for deeper cooperation on missile defense under 
both bilateral and NATO auspices. At the bilateral level, the Arms Control and 
International Security Working Group of the BPC included discussions on how to 
cooperate on missile defense.
50
 The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, a high level 
trilateral track II project, coordinated a working group on missile defense that included 
the former Chief of Staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces on the Russian side, the former 
Director of the Missile Defense Agency on the U.S. side, and a former defense minister 
of Poland, among other experts.
51
 The payoff of these efforts, combined with work in the 
NATO-Russia Council, reached its zenith during the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, 
when President Medvedev addressed the Alliance and supported the broad strokes of a 
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joint missile defense project.
52
 Though the project was presented in less conciliatory 
terms during his annual address to the Federal Assembly the following week, it was 




The upswing in relations with Russia’s traditional partners, though, was not the only 
reason BRIC was a low priority. As discussed above, Medvedev was more oriented 
toward economic liberalization and international economic integration than Putin had 
been by the end of his first tenure as president. This new approach was hinted at in the 
2008 foreign policy concept. In 2009, Medvedev released an article entitled Rossiia, 
vpered! (Forward Russia!) that focused mostly on domestic goals.
54
 Though it also 
included some discussion of foreign policy, the discussion was more fully fleshed out in 
the unofficial 2010 survey of Russian foreign policy that was leaked to the Russian 
edition of Newsweek.
55
 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not confirm that 
the leaked document represented a new doctrine, but analysts and newspapers accept it as 
a genuine reflection of the Medvedev team’s foreign policy outlook at the time.
56
 Further, 
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the Ministry did confirm that the paper was prepared in response to President 




In part, the new orientation towards economic modernization and diversification put forth 
in both Rossiia vpered! and the leaked foreign policy paper was spurred by necessity. 
Unlike its BRIC partners, which managed to get through the 2008 crisis largely 
unscathed, Russia’s GDP plummeted by 7.9% in 2009.
58
 As noted above, it was the 
hardest-hit economy in all of the G20.
59
 As a result, the confidence that marked the end 





The text of the leaked 2010 paper, however, suggests that the focus on economic 
modernization and integration was not simply a result of immediate necessity. Entitled 
“Program for the Effective Exploitation on A Systemic Basis of Foreign Policy Factors 
for the Purposes of the Long-Term Development of the Russian Federation,” the 
document runs more than fifty pages and details goals for Russia’s economic relationship 
with countries in every region of the world.
61
 Unlike previous concepts and surveys, 
which all speak explicitly about the need to construct a new world order, the main thrust 
of the Program is how to promote balanced economic relations across the globe as a way 
of speeding Russian development. The United States and Europe are seen as essential to 
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this process as potential sources of high technology. The Program also asserts that 
increasing economic integration with the Asia Pacific Region is of paramount importance 
as part of the larger project of developing the Russian Far East. Nevertheless, the sections 
on China and India are remarkably short, and in the preamble, written as a cover letter to 





Lavrov’s preamble is the only section of the Program that reads like other Russian 
foreign policy documents. In it, he identifies the United States as a source of global 
political and economic instability, and he stresses the importance of BRIC coordination 
in effecting (promised) changes in IMF quotas. Lavrov also argues that one of the 
primary goals of U.S. policy is “to marginalize multilateral formats where the United 
States is not a member, including BRIC and the [Shanghai Cooperation Organization].”
63
 
The overriding message of the preamble is that Russia must modernize its economy in 




The idea of economic modernization via the BRIC mechanism is absent from the rest of 
the document, including in the discussion of bilateral relations with the individual 
countries themselves. This absence reinforces the notion that Russia was not really 
interested in the economic potential of the group. By the time the Program was leaked to 
                                                 
62
 Ibid.; Roger McDermott, “Kremlin Contemplates a Seismic Shift in Russian Foreign Policy,” Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, May 17, 2010, 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36393&cHash=f2c72323eb. 
63
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “O programme effektivnogo ispolzovaniia na sistemoi osnove 






Russkii Newsweek, BRIC had already held two summits. Although the group was still in 
its infancy, the Joint Statement from the second summit included a commitment to 
cooperate in the energy sphere on research and development (R&D) and high technology 
transfer.
65
 The group had also agreed to explore a wide range of sectoral cooperation, and 





If Russia valued these developments, the growing intra-group economic agenda should 
have been incorporated into the official framing of BRIC in speeches and documents 
from that point onwards. In some ways it was. In his 2010 address to the Federal 
Assembly, President Medvedev spoke of the importance of “economic diplomacy” and 
the need to build “modernization alliances” with the BRIC countries, among others.
67
 The 
2011 speech contains a similar, though weaker, exhortation.
68
 In both cases, though, the 
mention of the economic potential of BRICS was entwined with a statement on the role 
of BRICS in increasing Russia’s international voice. During this time, economics and 
internal development of BRICS as a mechanism became the principal priorities for the 
group, as demonstrated in the summit declarations beginning with the 2011 Sanya 
Declaration. Regardless of these developments, in most statements, Medvedev still 
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Even Medvedev’s speeches at the BRICS summits often emphasized BRICS on the 
international stage over the intra-BRICS agenda. In the press statement following the first 
BRIC summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009, President Medvedev emphasized the primacy of 
the foreign ministries in coordinating BRIC. The implication was that other ministries, 
including those charged with economic development and cooperation, would play 
secondary roles.
70
 Similarly, in his speech at the fourth summit in New Delhi in 2012, 
Medvedev proposed that: 
 
A gradual transformation of BRICS into a fully-developed mechanism of 
interaction on major issues in global economy and politics could become 
our strategic goal. Such a step forward is only possible through joint 
efforts on the concept. I would like to suggest that our Foreign Ministers 
begin this work. 
 
The adoption of the forum’s foreign relations strategy is also long overdue 
as it will help anchor the BRICS in the international relations system, to 
expand and strengthen the gravitational field which is already being 




The speech did also praise burgeoning intra-BRICS cooperation, but not to do so would 
have been impolitic. However, besides touting the growing BRICS Business Forum, 
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Medvedev seemed most interested in increasing BRICS’s role in the larger international 
system or, at a minimum, how intra-BRICS cooperation would support that goal.
72
 He 
was much less enamored with the benefits of BRICS cooperation for Russian economic 
development or the other less political aspects of intra-BRICS coordination. 
 
2012-2013: Putin’s Return and the Rise of the Eurasian Union 
 
When Putin returned to the Russian presidency in 2012, it might have been logical to 
assume a renewed emphasis on BRICS. The group was now a more established actor 
with a growing independent agenda, including a preliminary agreement to form a BRICS 
development bank.
73
 In addition, most of Medvedev’s much-vaunted efforts in improving 
relations with the West and modernizing the Russian economy had failed to deliver on 
their initial promise. Joint cooperation on missile defense collapsed for good in 
November 2011.
74
 When Michael McFaul, the principal architect of the Reset, came to 
Moscow in January 2012 to become U.S. Ambassador to Russia, he arrived just after a 
series of popular protests against rigged elections. The protests, and McFaul’s academic 
specialty in democratization, prompted accusations from Moscow that the United States 
was trying to foment a “color revolution” in Russia, just as it had in Georgia and 
Ukraine.
75
 After McFaul gave a speech on U.S.-Russian relations at the Higher School of 
Economics in Moscow the following May, the Ministry released an official statement 
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accusing McFaul of crossing the boundaries of diplomatic decency.
76
 McFaul’s 
statements about avoiding linkages between American relations with countries in the 
former Soviet space and American relations with Russia provoked particular ire.
77
 The 
Reset was dead, and the importance of BRICS could conceivably have expanded in its 
wake. 
 
It did not. Instead, Putin turned his focus to the Eurasian Union, a project he proposed in 
one of a series of articles he wrote as part of his 2011-2012 presidential campaign. Putin 
detailed a vision to bring together many of the former Soviet Republics into a customs 
union and free trade area, with some features that mirrored the operation of the European 
Union.
78
 This was a renewal and expansion of a project that had been nominally part of 
Russian foreign (economic) policy since the mid-1990s, but Putin’s article gave the plan 
new life. 
 
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev first proposed the idea of a Eurasian Union in 
1994. However, as discussed in the first chapter, Russia’s interest in the idea waxed and 
waned in the intervening years between that proposal and its emergence as a central tenet 
of Putin’s foreign policy during his third presidential term. Indeed, for much of the post-
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Cold War era, Russian interest in pursuing the Eurasian Union had been lukewarm, and 
the country was largely unwilling to undertake policies (e.g. tariff reductions) that would 





The turning point came in 2009, when then-Prime Minister Putin announced that Russia 
would withdraw its bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in favor of a joint 
bid as a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Putin made his announcement 
during the annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), sometimes seen 
as Russia’s version of the Davos World Economic Forum and a time when foreign eyes 
are more focused on Russia than they might be otherwise. The announcement came as a 
surprise to many both in and outside of Russia.
80
 Though the Russian leadership 
ultimately reversed the statement and affirmed that Russia would seek individual WTO 
accession, efforts to build and strengthen the Customs Union continued. The Customs 
Union officially went into effect in 2010. The laws on making the Customs Union a 
single economic space entered into force in January 2012.
81
 Integration with the former 
Soviet space has nominally been the top priority in Russian foreign policy since the end 
of the Kozyrev era. Putin’s new vision, however, gave that vague priority a specificity 
and explicit prominence it had not previously enjoyed. 
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In years since Putin’s announcement at the 2009 SPIEF, the Russian conception of the 
Eurasian Union took on a more political angle.
82
 This caused friction with the other 
members, particularly Kazakhstan, which also has not benefited as much economically 
from the Customs Union as it anticipated.
83
 In December 2013, Nazarbayev came out 
against further politicization of the project, and serious conceptual differences over the 
future of the Eurasian Union exist between Kazakhstan and Russia.
84
 Nevertheless, even 
if the project stays strictly in the economic realm and does not progress to political 
cooperation, this iteration of the project has proved more durable than past efforts. 
 
BRICS, by contrast, remained primarily in the realm of rhetoric. The discussion of 
BRICS and its role in global affairs in Putin’s 2012 and 2013 addresses to the Federal 
Assembly recalled the rhetoric of 2006 and 2007 in its emphasis on BRICS over Western 
organizations. However, his statements reflected neither an advancement in the approach 
towards the group nor the strides the group had made towards institutionalization over the 
preceding years.
85
 Similarly, though the foreign policy concept Putin approved in 2013 
highlighted BRICS over the G8 in the discussion of how Russia would use its 
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international connections to build a new world order, the concept otherwise ignored 




Putin’s press statement following the Durban summit in 2013 reinforced the perception 
that he was more interested in the idea of BRICS rather than the nuts and bolts of intra-
BRICS cooperation. The theme of the Durban summit was “BRICS and Africa: 
Partnership for Development, Integration, and Industrialization.”
87
 In his press statement, 
Putin focused on the work of the BRICS Business Forum, which if successful would 
theoretically bring substantive financial benefit to Russia, but beyond that the statement 
seems almost perfunctory. He slipped in references to Russia’s taking a leading role in 
promoting the group’s development and reminded the audience that the member 
countries were “global growth leaders.” However, there was little in the short address to 





The official “Concept of the Participation of the Russian Federation in BRICS” 
(henceforth “BRICS Concept”) was approved in March 2013 just ahead of BRICS 
summit in Durban.
89
 It is a useful window into the duality of the Russian approach to 
BRICS before the onset of the crisis in Ukraine.
90
 On the one hand, the Concept lays out 
a long-term goal of further institutional formalization of the BRICS association, and lists 
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the ways the BRICS group can support Russian foreign policy and domestic economic 
goals.
91
 On the other hand, the text emphasizes maintaining informal links and not 
institutionalizing the group to the point that it overrides bilateral relations.
92
 The BRICS 
concept is more detailed in its vision for the group than the speeches of either Putin or 
Medvedev had been on the topic. However, it does not include ideas that had not already 




This lack of conceptual innovation, especially from the country that sees itself as the 
intellectual architect of BRICS, is revealing.
94
 It indicates that through the end of 2013, 
Russian policies and intentions towards BRICS remained both narrow and shallow. 
BRICS was another table to sit at and a useful theoretical alternative to Western clubs. It 
also was a convenient rhetorical weapon to show both domestic and international 
audiences that Russia had other friends besides Europe and the United States. It was not 
taken seriously, however, as a real alternative option for Russia. As Alexander Sergunin 
argues:  
 
BRICS for Russia seems to represent mainly a vehicle for global 
normative transformation, while for achieving specific geopolitical 
objectives Moscow prefers to use other organizations…which are regional 
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In other words, the real value of BRICS to Russia was in the ability to speak about and 
tout its existence and maturation as an international group as a way of pushing back 
against global norms with which it disagreed. The substance of cooperation was much 
less important. 
 
BRICS in Russian Intellectual Circles, 2008-2013 
 
In contrast to the narrow official approach, the period between 2008 and 2013 saw an 
enormous output of academic analysis on BRICS and the role of Russia in BRICS. Some 
of that was a response to the evolution of the forum. As BRICS added working groups 
and expanded its membership to include South Africa, research expanded 
correspondingly. However, in some cases research in Russia predated the inclusion of 
those topics in BRICS, notably with the work on a strategic concept.
96
 Overall, the work 
of Russian academics on BRICS between 2008 and 2013 was broader and more nuanced 
than the official presentation of the project in government speeches and concepts. 
 
The academic books range from region-specific analysis about BRICS and Africa or 
Latin America, often produced in preparation for or as a consequence of a BRICS 
summit, to detailed conference reports and publications covering almost every topic 
imaginable.
97
 Some books also explored BRICS from angles of particular concern to 
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Russia, such as natural resource cooperation.
98
 Articles in academic journals also delved 
into the details, examining topics ranging from comparative foreign direct investment 
among the BRICS to the potential for BRICS to play a bigger role in Russian foreign 




This flowering of BRICS research becomes more interesting when contextualized by the 
fact that the line between state and academia in Russia is somewhat blurred, since most of 
the main research institutions as well as the most prominent universities are state-owned. 
Russian educational institutions such as the constellation of institutes under the Russian 
Academy of Sciences (RAN) are considered “budgetary institutions,” which are a special 
class of institutions created by the state to serve specific, non-commercial purposes.
100
 
Budgetary institutions are usually financed from the federal or local government 
budget.
101
 Formally, though the majority of funding comes from government dollars, 
educational institutions have full autonomy over the direction of research, faculty 
selection, and financial activity.
102
 They also are supposed to have rights over their 
capital assets, including property, and are allowed to rent these out as they see fit.
103
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 Ibid., I:29. 
103




The role of the Ministry of Education, and the state more generally, with respect to 
educational institutions is officially limited to enforcing standards, accreditation, and 
other similar roles.
104
 In practice, however, the laws regarding state control over 
educational institutions are poorly and unevenly enforced, largely as a result of 
ambiguities in the legislative language.
105
 In addition, RAN has been undergoing a long 
and controversial reform process that has altered how funding is dispensed. The reform 
has incurred accusations that the government (and Putin himself) is exerting more direct 
control.
106
 In 2013, when a bill to reform RAN was introduced into the Duma, Prime 
Minister Medvedev stated: “academic science should provide full-fledged expert support 
to the state in priority areas.”
107
 The 2013 bill was extremely controversial, in part 
because its authorship remains unclear; the Ministry of Education and Science denied that 




In addition to state financing of research, there is a great deal of cross-fertilization 
between universities, institutes, and government. For example, Vyacheslav Nikonov is 
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simultaneously a member of the Duma, the Dean of the School of Public Administration 
at Moscow State University, and the Chair of the Presidium of NKI BRIKS. In addition, 
both the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (MGIMO) and the NKI BRIKS 
are formally part of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Indeed, President Medvedev himself established NKI BRIKS in 2011. It is the Russian 
arm of the BRICS Think Tank Council.
109
 It acts as a coordinating body for BRICS 
research in Russia at a variety of institutes and universities.
110
 Since the spring of 2012, 
NKI BRIKS has also published a semi-regular bulletin that summarizes main BRICS 
research worldwide.
111
 In addition, in 2013, the organization released Strategiia Rossii v 
BRIKS: tseli i instrumenty (Russia’s Strategy in BRICS: Goals and Instruments), which 




The different types and levels of association with the federal government mean there is a 
continuum of research independence. Work that is formally released by one of the 
institutes of RAN, especially if it is not listed as an NKI BRIKS publication on the 
website, is likely further from state influence than, for example, Strategiia Rossii v 
BRIKS. At the same time, though, because of the cross-fertilization, much of the research 
could be considered part of a “Track II” level project rather than something wholly 
separate from government discourse. This is not to argue that every time a Russian 
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scholar published a book or article on BRICS it was automatically because of a 
government directive. Rather, the point is that despite the fairly unidimensional official 
discussion of BRICS at the highest official levels, government money was making 
possible more nuanced input from universities and research institutes. 
  
In some cases, government also engaged with academia directly. In 2011, MGIMO 
sponsored a large conference addressing the issues of BRICS in world politics and intra-
BRICS cooperation as a means of modernization.
113
 Vadim Lukov, the ambassador in the 
MFA tasked with coordinating Russia’s engagement with BRICS, took part, as did 
ambassadors from other BRICS countries. Between 2008 and 2013 (and onward), the 
Russian MFA’s journal Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn (International Affairs) published articles 





Because these works are not part of official government discourse, they have greater 
freedom to explore and propose a wider array of possible roles for BRICS on the global 
stage. Some build directly off of common BRICS themes, such as the details of monetary 
cooperation within the group, and the likelihood of various options for trade and 
monetary cooperation.
115
 Other suggestions seem quite radical: for example, one 
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contribution from the MGIMO conference suggests that it would be unwise to rule out 
military cooperation among the BRICS, especially if the United States and NATO 
continue their destabilizing policies.
116
 This suggestion is not entirely without support: In 
2013, NKI BRIKS sponsored a conference about instituting military cooperation among 
the BRICS.
117
 Following the conference, Nikonov stated that the situation in Syria was 
impetus for exploring military cooperation.
118
 However, there is not widespread support 
for including a military dimension in BRICS cooperation, and becoming a military 
alliance would undercut the general BRICS position that they are not a bloc aligned 
against any other blocs in the international system.  
 
The academic analysis is also not all unstintingly adulatory. Even among those analysts 
who support Russia’s membership in BRICS and find it to be in line with Russia’s 
strategic objectives, there is no illusion that BRICS is prepared to replace the G7 or that it 
is a grouping without internal divisions among its members.
119
 There is also recognition 
that in order to be sustainable, BRICS must develop its own positive agenda, rather than 
simply standing against perceived Western excesses.
120
 Suggestions involve coordination 
on efforts to include BRICS currencies in the international reserves of other countries; 
economic and technological cooperation to support modernization; and cooperation on 
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 Most (though not all) of the authors agree that 
while BRICS holds potential if handled properly, the group is still in institutional infancy. 
 
Strategiia Rossii v BRIKS represents an effort to define a clear and robust positive agenda 
for BRICS that supports Russian foreign policy goals and ambitions. The book covers a 
wide array of topics, ranging from older issues of reforming the international financial 
system to newer frontiers such as the possibilities of cooperation in the civil nuclear 
sphere. It includes contributions from both regional and functional experts from some of 
the most respected universities and research institutes in Russia.
122
  The collection is a 
detailed effort to make BRICS into a full-fledged international grouping with distinct and 
specific mandates that support Russian foreign policy and foreign economic policy 
objectives. 
 
The problem with Strategiia Rossiia v BRIKS is that it is in large part a review of existing 
levels of cooperation. The articles it includes do not push the idea forward conceptually 
much more so than did the official BRICS concept. This suggests a larger point about the 
type of demand the research answered. Publishing a book about possible directions in 
which BRICS could develop was useful in terms of optics. It showed that BRICS was a 
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Similarly, consider the BRICS Center at MGIMO, which was established in 2011 and 
organized the conference that produced the collection in which many of the works cited 
here appear.
124
 As noted above, MGIMO is formally a part of MID. If BRICS were a 
priority in Russian foreign policy, then presumably the university that trains a vast 
majority of future Russian diplomats would invest in educating those future diplomats 
accordingly and the MGIMO BRICS Center would reflect that prioritization. Instead, the 
Center is one tiny office at the far end of the old building of the MGIMO complex, whose 
only real staff is its director. As serious as individual scholars are about the prospects of 
BRICS, the official infrastructure surrounding them is more about showing that such a 
center exists rather than facilitating BRICS research.  
 
This points to a broader conclusion. From the nexus of the official rhetoric about BRICS 
as a new alternative of BRICS and the academic analysis emerges Russia’s real goal 
towards BRICS before the Ukraine crisis. For all the mentions of BRICS in high-level 
speeches and research produced at state or near-state institutions, the official interest in 
BRICS before 2014 was primarily as a rhetorical feint to help Russia boost its 
international standing and punch above its weight in global decision-making. Academic 
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research supported that goal in so far as it gave the appearance of BRICS being high on 
the agenda. That official discourse was for the most part disinterested in the ideas coming 
out of the state research institutions indicates that Russian political leaders were more 
interested in talking about the institutionalization of BRICS than actually implementing 
that goal. 
 
BRICS as Bridge? 
 
As discussed in the second chapter, Russia’s desire to use BRICS to increase its weight in 
the international system is among the more standard explanations of Russia’s policy 
toward the group. Where previous analysis falls somewhat short is in defining precisely 
how Russia hoped to use BRICS to magnify its voice, especially since BRICS would 
seem at first to be a “second best” solution. As Cynthia Roberts notes, coordination with 
these large emerging countries did give Russia a bigger voice in some international 
organizations (such as the IMF). It did not, however, produce similar effects in Euro-
Atlantic organizations, such as NATO or the G8, which are the prime locus of Russian 
dissatisfaction with the current system.
125
 The rise of BRICS certainly did nothing to 
make Western states take Medvedev’s EST proposal seriously. 
 
However, there is another angle that is worth considering. As much as the effort to 
institutionalize BRICS was designed to give Russia (rhetorical) parallel options to further 
accommodation with the West, there was also a hope that the country could use its unique 
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position as a member of both the G8 and BRICS to increase its influence in both.
126
 It is 
here that Roberts’s theory about BRICS as a power multiplier needs to be extended: the 
aim was not just to gain influence in general international organizations, but was also 
about looking for a way to position the country such that it could increase its leverage in 
those clubs with which it was most concerned. BRICS initially offered Russia an 
opportunity to portray itself as the link between (old) Western institutions and the 
emerging powers, with the goal of using its membership in both and dual-emerging and 




Unsurprisingly, these hopes went largely unrealized. In the period from 2008-2010, when 
BRICS coordination was most successful on the world stage, membership in the group 
did make Russia’s foreign policy look more balanced, showing relations with rising 
powers even as Russia assented to the Reset. It did not, however, increase Russia’s 
leverage vis-à-vis traditional powers except within the limited arena of the IMF. Once the 
BRICS agenda began to focus more on building intra-BRICS cooperation, it no longer 
served the same use of providing Russia with a non-Western pseudo-analogue to the G8. 
The burgeoning BRICS agenda, which focused primarily on economic modernization and 
socio-economic challenges of developing countries, was not irrelevant to Russia’s needs. 
It was not, however, what Russia sought or wanted out of the forum.  
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Until it was ejected from the G8 in 2014, Russia was a member of both the old and the 
new global governance frameworks. Further, the same Russian diplomat was responsible 
for Russian activities within the G8, the G20, and BRICS.
128
 Russia is also historically a 
power that desires the role of norm-setter, rather than norm-taker, on the international 
stage. Russia hoped that its membership in the G8 combined with the efforts to make 
BRICS seem like the next big thing in global governance would help push the traditional 
powers to make adjustments while not forcing Russia to relinquish its seat at the most 
prestigious international tables. The idea of BRICS as a bridge, therefore, has a dual 
meaning. In one sense, Russia hoped it could act as a bridge between the old and the new. 
In the other, Russia hoped that BRICS would provide a bridge to what it had always 
desired but membership in the G8 had not provided: a place at the top of the international 
power hierarchy. 
 
Russia has a long tradition of positioning itself as a bridge, both civilizational and 
otherwise, between Europe and Asia, or, more recently, between the United States and 
China.
129
 What is interesting about the BRICS project is that Russia used it 
simultaneously to balance against the West and also as a mechanism for increasing its 
value to the West. Since Russia’s investment in the project did not expand much beyond 
rhetorically extolling the group’s virtues, however, the group was less effective than it 
might have been for either objective. By 2013, BRICS had forced reforms in the IMF, 
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expanded to include another member state, and begun seriously considering creating its 
own development bank and currency pool. Though the agenda remained speculative, the 
group had progressed sufficiently from its beginnings that had the Russian leadership 
wished, it could have legitimately touted those accomplishments. The failure of the 
political leadership to convey these achievements indicates that the Russian leadership 




Russian policy towards BRICS between 2008 and 2013 was a lot of show and very little 
substance. The period saw rapid development of the BRICS mechanism itself and 
expanded opportunities for both rhetorical framing and concrete cooperation. 
Nevertheless, the approach of the Russian ruling elite remained frozen in its original 
conception of BRICS as a rhetorical tool of international politics. The leadership did not 
incorporate the changes within the forum into either its rhetoric or policy planning. 
 
By contrast, the academic community showed more appreciation of the possibilities of 
the evolving BRICS mechanism. Reports covering every angle of Russia’s participation 
in BRICS, including suggestions that would likely be rejected by the other BRICS 
members, emerged in concert with the expanding BRICS agenda and membership. These 






As 2013 drew to a close, it became clear that this framework would be put to use sooner 
than anticipated. The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine turned regional politics upside 
down, and pushed longstanding Russian foreign policy doctrines from the realm of 
rhetoric to one of concrete consideration. The next chapter will explore how the 
repercussions of Maidan, and Russia’s reaction to them, changed the approach to BRICS 





6. From Bridge to Bulwark?: Russia and BRICS After the 
Onset of the Ukraine Crisis 
This year, as has been the case during crucial historical moments, our people have 
demonstrated national enthusiasm, vital endurance, and patriotism. The difficulties we 
are facing today also create new opportunities for us. We are ready to take up any 
challenge and win. 
 




The escalation of hostile language, sanctions and counter-sanctions, and force does not 
contribute to a sustainable and peaceful solution, according to international law, 
including the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter. 
 




As fall turned to winter in 2013, Russian foreign policy and elite political rhetoric seemed 
to have settled into a familiar pattern. President Putin frequently decried the danger of 
“value-based approaches” in international relations, and BRICS was fully integrated, 
along with the G20, the G8, and the SCO, into sound bites about the new world order.
3
 
Even as Putin criticized American foreign policy, however, Russian-Western cooperation 
continued on some issues, including the Northern Distribution Network, which was slated 
to play a critical role in the planned U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan.
4
 Russia was 
preparing to host its second G8 summit in January 2014. The deteriorating situation in 
Syria brought the United States and Russia to the table as partners, albeit partners with 
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vastly different visions for how to bring the conflict to an end. In short, there was nothing 
to suggest that the tense accommodation between Russia and Western powers would not 
continue just as it had for the majority of the post-Cold War era. 
 
Things were changing, however, and quickly. In November 2013, the long-simmering 
integration dilemma between Russia and Europe exploded into an open tug-of-war over 
Ukraine’s economic affiliation and integration. As the situation in Ukraine, fueled by 
domestic politics and foreign meddling, spiraled out of control, Russia found itself no 
longer on the margins of the Euro-Atlantic order, but unambiguously in conflict with it. 
As a result, a decade of rhetoric about the importance of BRICS both to Russia and to the 
future of the global order took on a much deeper resonance. In the wake of the 
geopolitical tensions set off by the crisis in Ukraine, Russian leaders began to bring their 
endorsement of BRICS from the realm of rhetoric to one of serious consideration as a 
viable alternative for Russian foreign policy. It also made Russia’s latent anti-Western 
agenda for the BRICS group much more explicit, raising questions about how far the 
other BRICS countries might be willing to go in their support. 
 
This chapter begins with a review of the crisis in Ukraine through 2014, and the varying 
responses to those events by Western powers and the BRICS countries. It then turns to 
how Russia’s approach to BRICS has altered at the practical and rhetorical levels as a 
result of the rupture with the West. This in turn leads to analysis of the role of anti-
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The Crisis in Ukraine (2013-2014) 
Euromaidan and the Ouster of Viktor Yanukovych 
 
The Euromaidan Revolution began when protesters gathered in Kyiv’s Independence 
Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) on the evening of November 21, 2013. Initially at issue 
was Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision not to sign a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement with the European Union, but the 
protests were later fueled by Yanukovych’s use of force against the protesters as well as 
revelations about astonishing level of corruption within his regime.
6
 Though the roots of 
the protests were mutlifactorial, the public narrative quickly became that of a proxy fight 
between Russia and the West for control over Ukraine’s political and economic future. 
Putin had lobbied hard for Ukraine to join the Customs Union (and by extension the 
developing Eurasian Union); EU laws made membership in those organizations 
incompatible with the DCFTA.
7
 Observers interpreted Yanukovych’s decision not to sign 
the DCFTA as a choice of Moscow over the West.
8
 This interpretation was reinforced by 
the deal Yanukovych reached with Moscow in December 2013 for a $15 billion bail out 
and a sharp reduction in the price of gas.
9
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December 2013 and January 2014 witnessed a rapid deterioration of the situation. 
Protests spread to other cities in Western Ukraine and citizens in the east, historically 
both Russophone and more Russophilic than Western Ukrainians, began protesting in 
fear of what was happening in Kyiv. Yanukovych at first refused to negotiate with the 
opposition, and instead signed an anti-protest law in mid-January 2014. The law was 
repealed less than two weeks later, but by then the situation was moving forward on its 
own momentum.
10
 Yanukovych’s violence against the protesters also increased: between 




After that spate of violence, though, it seemed that the crisis might be over. On February 
21, 2014, Yanukovych and the main opposition leaders signed an EU-brokered deal that 
promised a “political resolution to the crisis.”
12
 The deal included agreement on a 
timeline for constitutional reform, parliamentary and presidential elections, and amnesty 
for the protesters.
13
 Yet that very evening, due to both pressure from the opposition and 
abandonment by his erstwhile allies, Yanukovych fled the capital, and the opposition 
took control of the government.
14
 According to a Russian government-produced 
documentary in 2015, Russian military helicopters evacuated Yanukovych first to Crimea 
and shortly thereafter into southern Russia.
15
 Yanukovych gave a press conference from 
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the Russian town of Rostov-on-don on February 28, 2014 in which he urged Russia to 
take action against the new Ukrainian government.
16
 He then disappeared from the public 
eye. 
 
The Annexation of Crimea and War in Eastern Ukraine 
 
Russia immediately declared the ouster of Yanukovych the result of an illegal coup, and 
delayed the bailout it had promised Ukraine while Yanukovych was still in power.
17
 
Russia also quickly took decisive action to protect its interests in Crimea, a historically 
Russian enclave that became part of the Ukrainian SSR in 1954.
18
 Crimea has both 
historic and strategic importance for Russia. It is where the 1945 Yalta Conference took 
place, in the old Imperial Livadia Palace. Leo Tolstoy fought in the Crimean War there, 
and wrote about in Sevastoplskie rasskazy [Sevastopol sketches].
19
 Indeed, the Crimean 
port city of Sevastopol has been the home of the Russian Black Sea Fleet for centuries. 
As a result, the local population has a high percentage of retired Russian military 
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personnel, and a history of demanding independence from Ukraine.
20
 Though earlier 
secessionist efforts failed, Crimea was officially an autonomous republic within Ukraine. 
 
The official Russian narrative holds that the seizure in of Crimea was a response to the 
unraveling situation in Kyiv. However, a document leaked to the Russian newspaper 
Novaya gazeta in February 2015 revealed that the Russian government had been 
preparing for a post-Yanukovych scenario weeks before his flight from Ukraine.
21
 
Novaya gazeta reported that an oligarch submitted a document with a plan to take Crimea 
to the Presidential Administration sometime between February 4 and February 12 of 
2014, while massive protests in Kyiv were still ongoing.
22
 It described the dangers 
Russian leadership foresaw if the “’Banderovskaia junta” of the Ukrainian opposition 
was allowed to prevail, and outlined a political and logistical strategy for Russia’s 
intervention into the conflict. The strategy included separating Crimea and eastern 
Ukraine from the rest of the country.
23
 The seizure of Crimea and the stoking of 
hostilities in Eastern Ukraine did not deviate overmuch from this early plan. 
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On February 27, 2014, unmarked Russian military personnel seized the Crimean 
parliament building and began occupying local Ukrainian military bases.
24
 This bloodless 
invasion was aided by local protests led by Sergei Aksyonov that had begun in response 
to the unrest in Kyiv. The Russian leadership quickly designated Aksyonov the legitimate 
leader in Crimea.
25
 Under his leadership, the Crimean Parliament voted to hold a 
referendum on independence from Ukraine.
26
 On March 16, in outright violation of 
Ukraine’s constitution, a reported ninety percent of Crimean residents voted to secede 
from Ukraine and join Russia.
27
 In a landmark speech on March 18, 2014, President Putin 




Following the annexation of Crimea, pro-Russian separatists in southeastern Ukraine 
began to mount their own rebellions. Fighting continues throughout the region, despite 
several attempts at reaching a ceasefire. Russia largely refuses to acknowledge the 
presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, but there is significant evidence that Russia is 
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providing ongoing material support to the separatists.
29
 By September 2014, there was 
also increasing evidence that support for the separatists had progressed from the 
provision of arms to involvement of Russian soldiers in the conflict.
30
 As of this writing, 




Vladimir Putin’s Justification for the Annexation of Crimea and its 
Implications 
 
In some ways, Putin’s March 18, 2014 speech announcing the annexation of Crimea was 
the logical extreme of the rhetorical approach he had cultivated over the preceding 
fourteen years. He highlighted Russia and Crimea’s unique historical bond, tracing their 
joint history to Crimea as the place where Prince Vladimir accepted Christianity in 988 
C.E. Putin also emphasized that modern Russia, unlike the Russia of the 1990s, is ready 
and able to defend its national interests; chief among these is the protection of Russian 
citizens, language, and culture abroad.
32
 This argument found particular resonance 
because one of the first actions of the new Ukrainian government was to ban Russian as 
the second official language in the country. Though the law was quickly overturned, it 
                                                 
29
 Maksymillian Czuperski et al., “Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine” (Washington, DC: 
Atlantic Council, May 2015), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/hiding-in-plain-sight-
putin-s-war-in-ukraine-and-boris-nemtsov-s-putin-war. 
30
 Benjamin Bidder et al., “Undeclared War: Putin’s Covert Invasion of Eastern Ukraine,” Spiegel Online, 
September 2, 2014, sec. International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/russia-expands-war-in-
eastern-ukraine-amid-web-of-lies-a-989290.html. 
31
 The Associated Press, “Ukraine Says 1 Solider Killed, 5 Wounded in Separatist Raids,” The New York 
Times, November 11, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/11/11/world/europe/ap-eu-
ukraine.html. 
32
 Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation.” 
 
 199 





The speech also tied the annexation of Crimea with the tradition of veneration of World 
War II. Putin asserted that, “Nationalists, neo-Nazis, and anti-Semites executed this coup. 
They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day.” The connection between the victory 
over fascism in World War II and the fight against Ukraine in the present day is notable 
for two reasons. First, and most obviously, it points to the overwhelming domestic 
element of Putin’s Ukraine policy. Just as Putin used the veneration of World War II in 
successive speeches and displays as part of rebuilding contemporary Russian national 
identity around a memory of unity, suffering, and ultimate victory, so too is the struggle 
against the “fascists and anti-Semites” in modern Ukraine aimed at bolstering Putin’s 
domestic popularity and consolidating his political base. The argument was particularly 
convincing given the involvement of the far right Ukrainian nationalist coalition Right 
Sector in toppling Yanukovych.
34
 The annexation of Crimea was by and large extremely 




The second significance of the nod to World War II is deeper than an effort to reinforce 
national unity. It is intricately tied to broader themes about Russia’s role in the world. In 
the fight against German and Italian fascism, the Soviet Union played a decisive role in 
overcoming Hitler’s terror and restoring world order. The main theme of Putin’s speech 
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on Crimea is that while Russia has continued to obey international law and respect world 
order, Ukraine and its Western supporters have become rogue states that threaten global 
stability. Putin presents a carefully constructed, if contradictory, argument that the 
annexation of Crimea was not in fact a violation of international law and, even if it was, it 
is no more a violation than the independence of Kosovo. He concluded the argument with 
a sweeping indictment of the current global order: 
 
[T]he situation in Ukraine reflects what is going on and what has been 
happening in the world over the past several decades. After the dissolution 
of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stability. Key international 
institutions are not getting any stronger; on the contrary, in many cases, 
they are sadly degrading. Our western partners, led by the United States of 
America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical 
policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have come to believe in their 
exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the 
world, that only they can ever be right. They act as they please: here and 
there, they use force against sovereign states, building coalitions based on 
the principle “If you are not with us, you are against us.” To make this 
aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions from 
international organisations, and if for some reason this does not work, they 




In a mirror image of the rhetoric in the United States and much of Europe, Putin casts 
Russia as the responsible global citizen, and the West as the outlaw.  
 
There is another significance to that quotation: the explicit transformation of the crisis in 
Ukraine into a conflict between Russia and the West. Reiterating arguments he had 
voiced on numerous previous occasions, Putin maintained that over the preceding twenty-
five years, Russia had always been willing to cooperate with the West but the interest was 
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 Instead, Russia’s national interests were systematically ignored and 
belittled. He accused NATO and the United States of repeatedly lying about their 
intentions, primarily with regard to the deployment of military personnel and 
infrastructure in the newer NATO members, and the goals for the planned missile defense 
installations.
38
 He concluded that section of his speech with the assertion that, “with 





As noted above, it was clear before this speech that Russia viewed U.S. and EU 
intervention in Ukraine, both before and after the final collapse of the Yanukovych 
government, as a direct violation of Russia’s national interests. Furthermore, American 
officials (unintentionally) were equally frank in their view of the “right” outcome of the 
conflict.
40
 In a leaked discussion between U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey R. Pyatt 
and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland, 
Nuland told Pyatt that she believed Arseniy Yatseniuk rather than Vitaly Klitschko 
should be part of a new Ukrainian government.
41
 The idea of Yanukovych retaining 
power did not come up in the conversation. It matters, however, that in a speech aimed at 
both the domestic and international audience, the two pillars that Putin chose as his main 
framework for justifying his actions in Crimea were international law and the U.S. 
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disregard for it, and a very explicit brand of anti-Americanism (and somewhat broader 
anti-Westernism).  
 
This framing has important implications both for how Russia positions itself vis-à-vis 
BRICS, and for how the BRICS countries responded both individually and collectively. 
First, Putin’s gymnastics in trying to justify the seizure of Crimea, thin as the final 
argument may be, allowed him to fit the annexation within his broader narrative of the 
primacy of international law and national sovereignty.
42
 These are persistent themes in 
his rhetoric. They also are the two basic tenets of the BRICS group. In cobbling together 
what Alexander Cooley terms a “patchwork of international principles, rules, and norms” 
to give his actions a veneer of legitimacy, Putin also provided other countries with just 
enough cover to stay silent. 
 
Global Responses to the Annexation of Crimea and the War in Eastern 
Ukraine 
 
Globally, there were two basic responses to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and ongoing 
covert actions in Ukraine: complete opprobrium, and silence. The opprobrium came from 
the West and its allies, with the United States at the forefront. On March 17, 2014, just 
after the referendum in Crimea and the day before Putin confirmed the annexation, U.S. 
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President Barack Obama declared the new U.S. policy of trying isolate Russia for its 
behavior in Ukraine. The U.S. president stated: 
 
From the start, the United States has mobilized the international 
community in support of Ukraine to isolate Russia for its actions and to 
reassure our allies and partners…And as I told President Putin yesterday, 
the referendum in Crimea was a clear violation of Ukrainian constitutions 





U.S. sanctions had been approved two weeks previously, following the invasion of 
Crimea. In the March 17 speech, Obama announced an expansion of those sanctions. He 
claimed the moral high ground and the support of the international community for the 
U.S. response to Russia’s actions.  
 
Three days later, after Putin had confirmed that Russia would absorb Crimea, Obama 
came onto the South Lawn of the White House to announce a further expansion of the 
sanctions. This time the sanctions covered not only top officials, but also oligarchs 
known to support Putin, and Bank Rossiia, the bank preferred by Russian senior 
leaders.
44
 Just as in his previous press statement, Obama once again cloaked his statement 
in the mantel of international law. On March 20, he said: 
 
Over the last several days, we’ve continued to be deeply concerned by 
events in Ukraine. We've seen an illegal referendum in Crimea; an 
illegitimate move by the Russians to annex Crimea; and dangerous risks 
of escalation, including threats to Ukrainian personnel in Crimea and 
threats to southern and eastern Ukraine as well. These are all choices that 
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the Russian government has made -- choices that have been rejected by 




The wording here is important. In both statements, Obama says again and again that 
Russia’s actions are “illegal,” or “illegitimate.” He asserts that Russia has lost the support 
of the international community, and that it will be isolated for its actions. 
 
The rhetoric from the European Union, though somewhat more measured, made the same 
basic assumption. On March 13, 2014, the European Parliament demanded that Russia 
withdraw all its troops from Ukraine, and condemned the Russian presence in Crimea as 
“a breach of international law.”
46
 It was initially harder to agree on sanctions in Europe, 
in part because European economies have much stronger ties with Russia than does the 
U.S. economy. However, following Crimea’s secession and absorption in Russia, the EU 
followed the U.S. example. As the crisis continued unabated, and devolved into armed 
conflict in Ukraine’s east, both the United States and the European Union passed 
successively harsher and more wide-ranging sanctions.
47
 These have included bans on 
travel for top Russian officials, sharply restricting access to capital for Russian 
companies and banks, and limiting Western exports of dual use technology imports and 
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Fierce as they may be, however, U.S. and EU sanctions are not representative of a wider 
trend. Contrary to President Obama’s press statements, the whole international 
community did not reject Russia’s actions outright. On March 27, 2014, the United 
Nations General Assembly passed UN Resolution 68/262, titled “Territorial Integrity of 
Ukraine,” which declared Crimea’s secession from Ukraine invalid.
49
 Of the 193 
members of the UN General Assembly, 100 voted in favor of the resolution, 11, 
including Russia, voted against it, and 58 members abstained (24 countries were 
absent).
50
 All four other BRICS countries numbered among the abstentions.
51
 In 
aggregate, only slightly more than half of United Nations member states supported the 
resolution. This is hardly a basis for Obama’s assertion that the international community 
as a whole had rejected Russia’s actions in Ukraine. 
 
The BRICS countries’ abstentions on Resolution 68/262 and unwillingness to condemn 
Russian actions in Crimea should have come as no surprise to anyone paying attention to 
the group. Three days before the UN vote, at the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, 
BRICS had offered a quiet rebuke to those countries trying to isolate Russia. In response 
to rumored efforts by the Australian foreign minister to ban President Putin from the 
November 2014 G20 Summit in Brisbane, the BRICS foreign ministers issued a joint 
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Silence is not the same thing as support. Indeed, outright support for Russia has been 
meager at best. It has come mainly from client states, such as Belarus or Armenia, or 
states that are themselves very isolated from the rest of the world, including Syria and 
North Korea.
53
 Silence does, however, give room for maneuver. The breathing room this 
silence provided, combined with worsening political relations with the West and 
tightening economic conditions, has changed how Russia talks about and interacts with 
the group. 
 
Intra-BRICS Practicalities After Ukraine 
Some Caveats 
 
Up to this point, the main argument of this dissertation has been that Russia’s top 
leadership found the idea of BRICS politically and rhetorically useful only within a 
narrow set of parameters. In some ways, it is still too soon to know the extent to which 
the crisis in Ukraine has changed that calculus. This is both because the crisis in Ukraine 
is still ongoing, and because of three distinct factors that confound the analysis. These are 
the economic downturn in Russia and other BRICS, path dependence of ongoing 
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institutionalization before the crisis, and the confluence of Russia’s chairmanship of 
BRICS with the crisis. I address each in turn below. 
 
On the economic side, early reports on Russia’s trade in 2014 do not show a significant 
increase in trade with other BRICS. However, the numbers are still preliminary and this 
may also be because of the overall downturn in the Russian economy.
54
 Western 
sanctions, a precipitous drop in the price of oil, and capital flight effectively stalled 
growth in the Russian economy in 2014.
55
 According to the World Bank’s September 
2015 report Russia Economic Report 34: Balancing Economic Adjustment and 
Transformation, the Russian economy is expected to contract by 3.8 percent in 2015.
56
 
Combined with weaker economic performance in the other BRICS, it would be 
unrealistic to see a sharp increase in intra-BRICS trade and economic activity in 2014 
when the final numbers are known.
57
 As discussed in the third chapter, intra-BRICS 
economic relations are in general a poor proxy for the strength of the group. However, 
since the Ufa Summit produced an agreement on intra-BRICS economic cooperation, it is 
worth noting that slow fulfillment of those goals may be more indicative of global 
economic trends than lack of commitment on the part of BRICS countries. 
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 Erich Follath and Martin Hesse, “Troubled Times: Developing Economies Hit a BRICS Wall,” Spiegel 




The second confounding factor in establishing how Russia’s approach to BRICS has 
changed as a result of the conflict with Ukraine is the group’s previously existing 
movement towards institutionalization. The deliverables from the 2014 summit in 
Fortaleza provide a perfect example. The BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement 
(CRA, discussed in more detail in chapter 3) gives Russia a theoretical alternative source 
of capital. This could prove quite useful considering Western sanctions make it hard for 
Russian banks to get short term financing in the West. However, the agreement on the 
CRA, as with the agreement on the BRICS bank, was in process long before the situation 
in Ukraine exploded. If, once the CRA is up and running, Russia makes use of it, then 
this would be evidence that BRICS has become more practically useful in Russian policy. 
Until then, the simultaneous agreement on the CRA and the exclusion of Russia from 
Western markets is at best an interesting coincidence. 
 
The same can be said of the myriad new forums and groups that emerged over the course 
of 2014 and 2015. These include the BRICS Parliamentary Forum, the BRICS Civil 
Forum, and the BRICS Youth Forum.
58
 On the one hand, as President Putin asserted in 
his welcome to the parliamentary delegates in Moscow in June 2015, contact between 
lawmakers of the BRICS countries is a substantive step in the development of the BRICS 
group as an international association. He also said that the Parliamentary forum “opened 
a qualitatively new level of engagement among the countries.”
59
 Similarly, the other 
forums all advance the goal of strengthening ties between the countries beyond the 
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governmental level and push the group toward institutionalization. Putin and his 
government have been strongly supportive of these efforts. 
 
On the other hand, however, many of the seemingly new forums have long histories. The 
idea for the BRICS Youth Forum, for example, is in BRICS action plans as far back as 
the 2012 summit in New Delhi.
60
 Similarly, though the Ufa Summit saw the first 
adoption of a formal strategy for economic partnership, the Fortaleza Declaration 
proclaimed that it was time to create such a strategy, suggesting work began under 
Brazil’s BRICS presidency.
61
 Further, some ideas that Russia is pushing hard under its 
chairmanship, such as cooperation on energy, have been included in statements from the 
very first summit in Ekaterinburg.
62
 The agreements and groupings that are emerging in 
the midst of the Ukraine crisis have had a long lead time. The combination of Russia’s 
chairmanship with the flurry of activity can make it seem as though after years of neglect 
Russia is working hard to make BRICS a true alternative to the West. Drawing that 
conclusion, however, neglects the reality that many of these projects were already in 
process before the crisis in Ukraine began. 
 
The final confounding factor in understanding how the Ukraine crisis has impacted 
Russia’s approach to BRICS on a practical level is the very fact of Russia’s 
chairmanship.
63
 There are two issues here: one external and one internal. From the 
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external perspective, the political rupture between Russia and the West means the latter 
will likely perceive everything Russia does vis-à-vis its BRICS chairmanship as 
essentially anti-Western.
64
 Russia would have hosted the BRICS Summit in 2015 
regardless of its other international entanglements; to interpret what happens under its 
chairmanship as strictly a reaction to Ukraine would be incorrect. This is not to argue that 
Ukraine and the rupture with the West has not affected how that chairmanship is 
administered or what proposals Russia puts forward (see below), but rather to offer the 
corrective that BRICS would likely have been a major feature in Russian politics in 2015 
even without the extra pressures the crisis exerts. 
 
This leads to the internal aspect of Russia’s chairmanship. Russian leaders tend to be 
event driven; for example, in the lead up to hosting the 2012 Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vladivostok, the leadership spent a lot of time and 
money speaking about the importance of Russia’s attachments in Asia. After the summit 
concluded, however, the focus shifted to the upcoming Olympics in Sochi, and the 
emphasis on relations in the East receded.
65
 By the same token, the way Russia 
approaches BRICS in a chairmanship year is different from the approach in a non-
chairmanship year. Just as it would be dangerous to read too much into Russia’s 
emphasis on BRICS as a straight rejection of the West, it would be incorrect to see the 
sudden surge in interest in the group as a total pivot in Russia’s foreign policy without 
accounting for the extra interest driven by its hosting duties. Put differently, while the 
crisis in Ukraine has changed the role of BRICS in Russian foreign policy, the crisis and 
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its effect on relations with the West are not the only reason Russia is investing so heavily 
in its BRICS membership in 2015.  
 
The Importance of Optics 
 
The above caveats notwithstanding, BRICS has become operationally useful for Russia 
since the start of the Ukraine crisis. The BRICS countries’ continued willingness to 
engage in both business and summitry with Russia is a powerful counter to the West’s 
attempt to isolate the country politically and economically.
66
 This is not just about the 
symbolic international gestures discussed above, such as the vote on UN resolution 
68/262 or the statement in The Hague about excluding Russia from the G20. Gestures 
like these are good for short-term boosts, but they do not offer sustainable relief. More 
important are things like the May 2014 $400 billion gas deal between Russia and China, 
or the possibility of substituting meat imports from Brazil instead of the EU meat banned 
by Putin’s “anti-sanctions.”
67
 The succession of BRICS-related events in Moscow over 
the course of 2015 is no less important: they are high-profile demonstrations that Western 
rhetorical censure and economic sanctions have failed in their objective to isolate Russia. 
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A June 2015 tweet from Ian Bremmer, president of the consulting firm Eurasia Group, 
summed up the situation nicely. Bremmer tweeted the following map, with the caption 





Figure 6: The World is Isolating Russia 
 
The map Bremmer tweeted is missing all of Africa, most of Asia, and everything south of 
Texas on the American continent. Indeed, it is basically a map of NATO, with a few 
additions. The world is not isolating Russia; the West is, and it has not attracted non-
Western countries to its cause. 
 
The sanctions have had an impact on the Russian economy, and trade with BRICS is 
insufficient to make up the budget shortfall created by the sanctions and the falling oil 
price. Further, the expected increase in trade with China has not materialized. This is 
partly because of some hesitation in China to engage in projects that directly contravene 
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 It also, however is a byproduct of the collapse in commodity prices, 
turmoil in Chinese markets, and the overall economic slowdown in emerging markets.
70
 
Nevertheless, as Bremmer’s map vividly demonstrates, Russia is not without partners. 
Considering that Russia’s interest in BRICS has historically been primarily about the 
optics of the group, it is fitting that these optics of ongoing political and economic 
partnership are now so operationally important for the country. 
 
The Concretization of Russia’s Goals Toward BRICS 
 
The change has been more than just about image. Whether as a result of the crisis or a 
result of its chairmanship, the Russian approach to BRICS, at least at the policy level, is 
far more concrete than it was even two years previously. The best evidence of this 
concretization is a comparison between the “Concept of participation of the Russian 
Federation in BRICS” approved in 2013, and the “Concept of the Russian Federation’s 
Presidency in BRICS in 2015-2016,” released on March 1, 2015.
71
 As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the 2013 concept outlines a long list of areas where Russia would like 
to see BRICS cooperation, but displays little interest in either firm institutionalization or 
pushing the boundaries of how BRICS could evolve. 
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The 2015 Concept, by contrast, is much more direct. The beginning of the Concept 
declares: 
A long-term objective of the Russian Federation in BRICS and, 
accordingly, a consistent goal of its presidency of the association is the 
gradual transformation of BRICS from a dialogue forum and a tool for 
coordinating positions on a limited range of issues into a full-scale 
mechanism for strategic and day-to-day cooperation on key issues of 
world politics and the global economy. This objective will be achieved by 
consistently expanding the range of cooperation areas, actively promoting 
the common interests of BRICS countries on the international scene, and 
creating an extensive system of mechanisms for cooperation, primarily in 
the financial and economic sphere, which will gradually evolve into 
concrete institutions. All this is intended to raise BRICS to the level of an 




As noted in the previous chapter, the 2013 Concept does include the goal of making 
BRICS a “full-fledged mechanism of strategic and ongoing cooperation on key 
international issues.” 
73
 That statement, however, is buried at the very end of the 
document. In 2015, the goal is in the second paragraph, setting the stage for the proposals 
that follow. As if to underscore the new commitment to making BRICS strong and 
permanent, the 2015 Concept lists enhancing “the efficiency of BRICS by improving the 
reporting process for previous commitments assumed by member countries” as one of the 




There are other departures, especially in terms of how BRICS acts as a sub-forum within 
larger organizations. For example, the 2013 Concept speaks generally of coordination in 
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forums such as the United Nations “on the basis of common interests.”
75
 The 2015 
Concept calls for “developing comprehensive cooperation in the UN.”
76
 The later 
document also pares down the goals, offering fewer potential areas of cooperation, but 
each with more detailed and implementable proposals. This is likely in part due to the 
differing objectives of each concept: one is long-term and the other is specifically related 
to Russia’s chairmanship. It is also evidence, though, of clearer thinking about the realm 
of the possible in BRICS, and which areas best serve Russia’s immediate objectives.  
 
As a case in point, the 2015 Concept specifically references Western sanctions on Russia 
as an impetus for strengthening intra-BRICS economic cooperation.
77
 Indeed, many of 
Russia’s suggestions for the BRICS are aimed at creating a parallel system to that 
controlled by Western states, perhaps as a way of circumnavigating the West’s attempted 
isolation of Russia. One of the proposals Russia put forth as chairman is to replace the 
U.S. government with the UN International Telecommunications Union (ITU) as the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) overseer.
78
 During his 
statement at the Fortaleza Summit, Putin suggested that BRICS use Russia’s GLONASS 
navigation system, which is an alternative to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS).
79
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In May 2015, the Central Bank of Russia suggested that the BRICS discuss creating their 




Some of these suggestions are likely to be controversial. Brazil, for example, is unlikely 
to support the plans to challenge internet governance.
81
 The SWIFT proposal, though, 
could find support from China, which is preparing to launch its own alternative system.
82
 
Whether or not these proposals come to fruition, however, they are indicative of two 
important developments. First, they show that the combination of the Ukraine crisis and 
the chairmanship have forced those involved in making Russia’s BRICS policy to think 
seriously about how the forum can help Russia navigate its new global context. Second, 
the efforts to create a parallel system indicate that the rhetoric of building a new world 
order is now translating into Russia’s operational approach to BRICS, at least as long as 
it is at the helm of the organization. 
 
The Concept for Russia’s BRICS presidency does not only show an evolution of Russia’s 
approach to BRICS in its policy relevant proposals. It also attempts to weave the group 
more closely into one of Putin’s main regime legitimation efforts: the veneration of 
World War II. The eighth section of the BRICS presidency concept is “Awareness-
raising during Russia’s Presidency,” and the goals it lists are all aimed toward increasing 
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awareness of BRICS on the international stage.
83
 One of the proposed methods of doing 
so is: 
 
[T]o hold, together with the BRICS partners, a number of publicity 
campaigns devoted to the 70th anniversary of the victory in WWII. In 
political terms, the events are aimed at promoting the ideas of friendship 
and mutual understanding among the peoples of the BRICS countries; stiff 
resistance to attempts to revive the ideology and policies of Nazism, 
racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia in all their manifestations; and 
preventing the falsification of history, which seeks to undermine the 




This brings the BRICS directly into a major part of Russian policy and national identity. 
Given how Putin has framed the reasons for Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine crisis, it 
also sets the BRICS directly against the West. 
 
BRICS vs. the West in Post-Ukraine Russian Political Rhetoric 
 
While the approach to BRICS became more multifaceted at the policy level, that change 
did not translate into more nuanced rhetoric at the highest political levels. Instead, the 
crisis in Ukraine did not so much change Putin’s rhetorical approach to BRICS so much 
as it removed its veil. As argued previously, from the very beginning Putin primarily 
deployed Russia’s membership in the group as a theoretical alternative option to the 
West. A level of anti-Westernism was inherent in this approach, but it was framed in the 
context of creating a more fair and balanced world order. The initial anti-Westernism was 
at the mild end of the anti-Westernism continuum outlined in the first chapter. Though 
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that framing remains in official group statements, in much of Putin’s rhetoric BRICS is 
now an explicitly anti-Western project, moving it to the more extreme end of the anti-
Westernism spectrum. 
 
In terms of evaluating anti-Western rhetoric after the Ukraine crisis, three Putin speeches 
are particularly telling. The first is the March 2014 speech discussed above, which 
announced the annexation of Crimea. The second is Putin’s speech and question and 
answer session at the annual Valdai International Discussion Club in October 2014.
85
 The 
third is the annual address to the Federal Assembly in December 2014.
86
 These speeches 
are explicitly, angrily, anti-Western, as demonstrated below.  
 
At Valdai, as in the March speech on Crimea, Putin accused the United States of being 
the source and cause of global instability. He stated: 
 
[T]he United States, having declared itself the winner of the Cold War, 
saw no need for [creating a new world order]. Instead of establishing a 
new balance of power, essential for maintaining order and stability, they 




The result of these steps, in Putin’s estimation, is a world where “[i]international law has 
been forced to retreat over and over by the onslaught of legal nihilism.”
88
 During the 
December address to the Federal Assembly, he sounded similar themes. In what was 
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ostensibly a section about the need to cooperate on fighting international terrorism, the 
speech takes a tangent onto the lingering ill effects of the 2002 U.S. abdication of the 
ABM Treaty (discussed in a previous chapter) and subsequent plans to build missile 
defense installations in Europe.
89
 Earlier in the speech, he asserted that Europe and the 
United States would have devised another reason to levy sanctions even in the absence of 
a crisis in Ukraine, because the real aim was “to contain Russia’s growing capabilities, 
affect our country in some way, or even take advantage of it.”
90
 This phrasing is 
reminiscent of the warning in Putin’s 2004 annual address about the ire Russian growth 
would incur, but evolved to suit the new context. Putin here displays not only a deep 
dislike of the West and its policies, but also a fundamental mistrust of its motives, 
making the possibility of cooperation, which he raises later in the speech, seem almost 
unimaginable.  
 
In the Valdai speech, Putin contrasted the behavior of the West with that of the BRICS, 
the SCO and the other organizations Russia has helped found. Unlike the West, which is 
actively trying to isolate Russia and acts without regard for international stability, 
BRICS, the SCO and the Eurasian Union provide stable partnerships that help Russia 
accomplish its “integration-oriented, positive, peaceful agenda.”
91
 Putin also framed these 
three organizations as open and non-confrontational, with the goal of bringing 
governments together rather than forming exclusionary blocs.
92
 The implicit negative 
parallel with NATO and the EU was unmistakable.  
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All three speeches also hark back to the theme of sovereignty that Putin developed over 
the course of his first two presidential terms (discussed in chapter 4). During the question 
and answer session at Valdai, in an unsubtle rebuke of U.S. hegemonic claims (this time 
in connection with whether or not Kosovo’s independence can serve as a precedent), he 
drew the following analogy: 
 
You may remember the wonderful saying: Whatever Jupiter is allowed, 
the Ox is not.  
 
We cannot agree with such an approach. The ox may not be allowed 
something, but the bear will not even bother to ask permission. Here we 
consider it the master of the taiga, and I know for sure that it does not 
intend to move to any other climatic zones – it will not be comfortable 





The meaning is that Russia will do what it feels necessary to protect its own interests. 
Putin pushes his remonstration even further with the reference to “climatic zones,” 
presumably a reference to Dmitri Medvedev’s claim after the 2008 war with Georgia 
about a sphere of “privileged interests” in Russia’s border regions.
94
   
 
Unlike the earlier era’s speeches touting Russia’s ability and willingness to protect its 
interests, however, the speeches in 2014 are retrospective. Putin’s claims during his 
March, October, and December 2014 addresses about Russia’s willingness to take 
unilateral action to protect vital interests were made in the wake of the manifestation of 
that willingness. If then 2007 Munich speech was a warning shot, then these speeches 








were the end of the battle.
95
 The annexation of Crimea was simply presented as a fait 
accompli; the bear did not ask for permission. 
 
Yet the repeated protestations against Western policies and the persistent anti-Western 
rhetoric that accompanies them are also somehow hollow. Rather than a clean break from 
the West, the speeches betray an ongoing focus on justifying Russia’s actions in the 
context of the West’s own misdeeds. The speech at Valdai, for example, was supposed to 
be a programmatic speech.
96
 Indeed, the theme of the conference was the need to build a 
new world order. Rather than offering suggestion on that theme, the address was instead a 
recrimination against both European and American policies since the end of the Cold 
War. Putin could have used the opportunity to outline his vision for how the different 
emerging elements of global governance, including BRICS, could be brought together 
into a coherent and workable system. He did not do that; instead, he spent the majority of 





The emphasis on the transgressions of the West, as opposed to on a forward-looking 
vision, is emblematic of the continued Western orientation of the political elite. 
Orientation is not the same as alignment. According to Dmitri Trenin, Russia is now fully 
outside the Western sphere.
98
 Another analyst referred to the break in relations following 
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the annexation of Crimea as a “divorce process” of Russia from the West.
99
 Instead, the 
orientation is a combination of a continued dominant identity as a first world country and 
also a deep and ongoing desire for recognition of great power status from the United 
States.
100
 As Fyodor Lukyanov put it, “the inability to abandon the West is the biggest 
obstacle to Russia’s success in BRICS.”
101
 In other words, Russia’s BRICS policies, and 
efforts to build BRICS into a major organ of global governance, are hampered by 
Russia’s continued need for Western recognition. As much as Russia may wish to build a 
new world order, it is still fighting the battles of the old one. 
 
Some of the analyses prepared in advance of the 2015 summit in Ufa bear out this 
reading. Consider, for example, Perspektivy i strategicheskie prioritety voskhozhdeniia 
BRIKS [Prospects and Strategic Priorities for the Rise of the BRICS], a study produced 
under the auspices of NKI BRIKS. The book purports to be an entire agenda for the 
future development of the group, including efforts at modeling possible growth patterns 
and exploring new areas for deepening the partnership.
102
 Much of the introductory 
section, however, is devoted to a repetition of the traditional litany of the crimes of the 
West. At one point, it goes so far as to assert that the ongoing crisis in Ukraine is an 
outright war that the United States and Europe are waging against Russia.
103
 Introducing 
what is otherwise a comprehensive qualitative and quantitative analysis of BRICS with 
the conflict between Russia and the West rather than the BRICS group’s achievements to 
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date belies Putin’s contention in the Valdai address that BRICS is not about forming 




The West is not omnipresent only in official rhetoric and documents. Academics, too, 
often see conflict with the West as the seed from which BRICS has grown. The response 
of Boris Martynov, the Deputy Director of the Institute of Latin America of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences (ILA RAN), to a set of questions about the development of BRICS 
in Russian foreign policy, is a good illustration. The academic prefaced his response with 
the following statement: 
 
For the beginning I must say that I do not like the USA (please, don`t get 
offended: nothing personal, only business). When still a young man, I 
began to hate communists, for they always taught me how to live and what 
to do. Nowadays it seems that the US are trying to do the same with all the 
world. Sorry for them, for I knew many fine Americans. 
 




It was an honest, and revealing, preface. The answers that followed similarly framed the 
development of BRICS as a reaction against Western hegemony within the international 
system. For Martynov, BRICS is a global governance hail Mary, whose goal is to salvage 
what it can from the current world order, and devise a positive agenda to reverse what 
will almost certainly be a further descent in “anarchy.”
106
 But what is perhaps most 
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salient about the answer is the assumption that in some ways, BRICS began with a 
profound disappointment in the United States. 
 
If Martynov’s answers suggest an almost wistful element to the anti-Westernism in 
Russia’s BRICS policies, others are somewhat more confrontational. An article about an 
interview on the news station Pravda with Vladimir Davydov, the Director of ILA RAN, 
ran under the headline “BRICS are the main geopolitical enemy of the USA.”
107
 He said 
that the BRICS need a common economic and information policy, because the United 
States is not only trying to undermine Russia; it has designs on all of the BRICS 
countries.
108
 During an interview in Moscow in September 2014, Davydov was less 
combative, but he was adamant that the United States is no better or smarter than Russia, 




This issue of Western encroachment on Russian interests, or potential for encroachment, 
brings the anti-Western rhetoric down to the realm of the practical, discussed in more 
detail in the preceding section. In essence, anti-Westernism exists on two levels in 
Russia’s approach to BRICS. The first is the fulminating anti-Westernism of Putin’s 
speeches on U.S. irresponsibility or Davydov’s framing of BRICS as a geopolitical foe of 
the United States. These are high profile, quotable, and likely intentionally 
inflammatory.
110
 The second, represented by Russia’s proposals during its BRICS 
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chairmanship, is anti-Westernism as functionalism. Here, Russia is attempting to make 
BRICS a bulwark against the West through slow, steady, and low-profile (for the layman) 
suggestions. Operating together, these two levels make Russia’s post-Ukraine approach 
to BRICS much more comprehensively anti-Western than it was before the crisis.  
 
(Russian) Anti-Westernism and the Rest of BRICS 
 
Russia does not execute its BRICS policies in a vacuum. The responses of the other 
partners are critical for Russia’s long-term success or failure to achieve its objectives in 
how it would see BRICS evolve. In the case of Russia’s increased foreign policy 
emphasis on the importance on anti-Westernism in the BRICS group, the main question 
is how supportive the other BRICS countries will be. This brings to the fore an issue with 
which the group has struggled since its inception: the role and degree of anti-Westernism 
in BRICS both as a motivator for cooperation and even sometimes a raison d’être.  
 
The role of anti-Westernism in BRICS is unresolved because of competing and 
contradictory interests within the group. On the one hand, as shown in chapter 3, all of 
the BRICS have more investment in their relations with Western countries than they do in 
relations with the other BRICS. Even though China is now the largest trading partner for 
both Brazil and South Africa, none of the BRICS countries features in China’s list of top 
five trading partners, and all continue to conduct significant trade with both the United 
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States and the European Union.
111
 These strong economic ties are one reason that BRICS 
documents are so careful to emphasize that the group is not directed at any third parties 




There are also political reasons to temper any perceived anti-Western motivations. 
BRICS’s overarching goal is to reshape global governance architecture such that the 
member countries have a larger voice in existing institutions. The non-Russian members 
are evolutionary rather than revolutionary in their approach to the current system.
113
 
What this means in practical terms is that BRICS will need Western acquiescence and 
cooperation in order to achieve its aims. From that perspective, overt or alienating anti-




On the other hand, there is something inherently anti-Western in the group’s initial 
coalescence. As discussed in previous chapters, the beginning of BRICS as a political 
idea is deeply entwined with the global discontent with the United States that began to 
emerge in the wake of the invasion of Iraq.
115
 While it was also a response to objective 
trends in the distribution of global economic power, those trends also fueled discontent 
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with U.S. and European intransigence on the reform of global economic governance. The 
BRICS countries’ recent silence on Crimea has also happened in the context of renewed 
anger over the revelations of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) spying programs 




Perhaps more importantly, though, there is also an intrinsic Pareto optimality problem 
with the BRICS demands.
117
 The BRICS desire a reorganization of votes in international 
organizations (most prominently the IMF but elsewhere as well) so that voting weights 
better represent the current global distribution of economic capacity.
118
 However, in 
demanding that reshuffling, the BRICS are by definition demanding that the shares of 
other countries, mainly in the EU, decrease. The BRICS hope to gain power through 
others’ loss of power. There is no solution to the demand wherein some EU member 





It is worth noting that in some ways the particular concerns about the governance 
structures of international financial institutions are more specifically anti-European than 
anti-American. While the BRICS countries may not like that the United States has 
effective veto power in the IMF, the bigger problem is that countries like the Netherlands 
and Belgium are overrepresented. As noted in the first chapter, several European 
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countries that properly received large voting shares when the IMF was created in 1944 
have been eclipsed in the intervening seventy years. For example, Indonesia has a larger 
economy and a larger population than Belgium, but the latter has more weight in the 
IMF.
120
 Some of the motivation for BRICS, therefore, is also about trying to address 
legitimate concerns about the existing economic order, especially with regard to 




Indeed, the IMF itself takes this view. In an October 2015 report, two IMF economists 
argued that the world is “on the cusp of an epochal change in terms of economic power, 
the type of which has not been witnessed in the past 200-250 years.”
122
 As a result of that 
coming shift, “changes in global economic governance will have to be more substantive 
than the current incremental changes envisaged.”
123
 The authors base their claim on 2015 
IMF projections that the BRICS share of global GDP will surpass that of the G7 by 
2017.
124
 They also argue that a revision of votes is ultimately in the interest of advanced 
economies because it will make global economic governance more stable.
125
 
Nevertheless, a radical restructure of the IMF Executive Board would require U.S. 
acquiescence meet the 85 percent threshold for change, and this is unlikely to be 
forthcoming.
126
 Since European states stand to lose the most votes, they also are unlikely 
to support revision in the near term. 
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The BRICS group therefore walks a very fine line with regard to its relationship with the 
West. It must be sufficiently oppositional in order to capitalize on the (latent) anti-
Western sentiment and dissatisfaction with the reigning system among developing 
countries that spurred its rise to prominence. However, it cannot become so oppositional 
that it torpedoes either the main goal of the BRICS group as identified in summit 
declarations (reform but not revolution in the international system) or the national 
(economic) interests of BRICS member countries. Further, the group has to make sure 
that the perception of the group as an anti-Western alliance does not override the image 
of the group as one whose goal is to fix real and acknowledged problems in global 
economic governance. 
 
The ongoing standoff between Russia and the West makes this balancing act more 
delicate, not least because of how it has affected Russia’s calculus for participation in the 
group. Other BRICS countries understand that the Western sanctions on Russia are not an 
attack on either the BRICS group or the other member countries individually.
127
 
However, if those sanctions push Russian anti-Westernism to further extremes, and if 
BRICS continues to grow in importance on the Russian foreign policy docket precisely 
because it is a grouping of non-Western states and Russia pushes for BRICS statements 
to reflect that change, it could exacerbate intra-group tensions and knock the equilibrium 
off balance.  
 
It is in some sense a question of degrees. As noted above, the BRICS (and others) have 
been happy to try to pick up the market share left by Western sanctions. This suggests 
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that there could be a certain amount of flexibility among the other BRICS partners in 
allowing Russia to make BRICS anti-Westernism more overt. However, if Russian 
rhetoric (beyond that intended for domestic consumption) goes too far, then it is likely 
that China, India, and Brazil will push back.
128
 These countries will not countenance 
BRICS becoming an explicitly anti-Western alliance. The open question, therefore, is 
what the long-term effects of the split between Russia and the West will be on Russia’s 
participation in the BRICS group and whether this crisis will prove the straw that finally 
breaks an already weak basis for cooperation, or instead will become the trial that brings 
five strong rising powers into closer accord. 
 
Nearly two years into the crisis, the answer seems to be the latter option, though caveats 
remain. Ironically, the primary reason for this may the West’s reaction to Russia’s 
activities. As the Brazilian academic and BRICS expert Oliver Stuenkel argues:  
 
The BRICS’s unwillingness to denounce and isolate Russia may have less 
to do with its opinion on Russia’s intervention in Crimea per se and more 
to do with its skepticism of the West’s belief that sanctions are an 




Stuenkel does not argue that Russia has won the BRICS’s silence (and therefore silent 
acquiescence) because the leaders of Brazil, India, China, and South Africa agree with 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Instead, it is because of the tool employed by the West to 
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express its disapproval. All of the BRICS countries have at one time or another been the 
targets of Western sanctions.
130




While the other BRICS may take issue with the specific stick employed to bring Russia 
back into line, however, that is not necessarily a sufficient explanation for the other 
BRICS countries’ silence. Instead, the roots of the silence likely lie in a deeper, and (from 
an American perspective), more worrying source. Stuenkel explains: 
 
Especially for voices more critical of the U.S., the West’s alarm over 
Crimea is merely proof that established powers still consider themselves to 
be the ultimate arbiters of international norms, unaware of their own 
hypocrisy. If asked which country was the greatest threat to international 
stability, most BRICS foreign policymakers and observers would not 




This is a damning statement. It may not be the raw anti-Western sentiment that courses 
through Vladimir Putin’s recent speeches, but it is the same idea and even the same 
phrase. In this analysis, the United States is not the world’s policeman. It has become 
instead a global bandit, and therefore its power must be constrained. As long as the 
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BRICS agree on this basic point, and there is no reason to think positions are shifting, 
anti-Westernism will serve as a useful and effective rallying point reinforcing group 
cohesion. 
 
Even as the past year has shown a certain amount of solidarity in BRICS, however, there 
are tensions over Russia’s anti-Westernism. At issue is what Marxism-Leninism called 
perekhod kachestvo v kolichestvo – a change from one of quantity to one of quality.
133
 
For Russia, politics have always been the dominant motivation for participation in 
BRICS; for the others, economics (or at most geoeconomics) is a stronger impetus.
134
 
After Ukraine, however, the Russian approach to BRICS, and especially the attendant 
anti-Westernism that has always been a strong component of that approach, has 
undergone a shift so large it has become a qualitative shift. That shift has the potential to 
create a rift between Russia and the other BRICS. 
 
Consider the example of the BRICS Parliamentary Forum. This new assembly is causing 
friction with the other BRICS partners.
135
 India in particular has come out against 
creating a permanent BRICS parliamentary assembly.
136
 The head of the Indian 
delegation cited the risk of excessive institutionalization as his reason for voting against 
creating a permanent BRICS parliamentary body. Since even Russian Foreign Minister 
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Sergei Lavrov is on record as opposing institutionalization, however, this reasoning may 




India and other BRICS may be more worried about how some Duma leaders have framed 
the forum in terms of analogous bodies elsewhere. Leonid Slutskii, the Chairman of the 
Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, said the following: 
 
The European Union has its European Parliament. And the Eurasian 
Union is considering establishing a Eurasian Parliamentary Assembly. 
Cooperation under BRICS auspices has reached a sufficient level, where it 





Comparing BRICS to the EU and the Eurasian Union presents a radically different vision 
for BRICS from what has been put forth thus far. It suggests not just a change in the level 
of institutionalization of the group, but a qualitative change in how cohesive the group is 
expected to be with regard to its interactions with the outside world. Slutskii is likely not 
expressing the direct views of the higher political elite on this issue; he is not a member 
of United Russia (Putin’s party), and does not serve on a committee very involved with 
BRICS. Nevertheless, Russia has fought hard for the parliamentary assembly. That it was 
unable to reach agreement on making it a permanent forum even when it holds the 
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BRICS chairmanship is indicative of the limits to which the other BRICS are willing to 




The conversation about the role of anti-Westernism in BRICS thus comes full circle. It is 
a balance between agreeing with the basic contention that the West should no longer be 
the main arbiter of global norms and not supporting anything so radical it would damage 
each individual BRICS member country’s relationship with Western countries. On the 
one hand, President Putin may understand those limits and not suggest anything so 
confrontational that it would fracture the group.
140
 On the other hand, as discussed above, 
some of what Russia has proposed under its chairmanship already seems to be pushing 
the boundaries of the acceptable.
141
 In addition, Russia has by necessity begun investing 
more in BRICS because under current circumstances there are fewer options available.
142
 
If this brings the conflict between Russia and the West to a boiling point, and BRICS gets 
caught in the crossfire, it is unlikely that Moscow would retain even the silent support of 




In 2006, Dmitri Trenin published an article in Foreign Affairs entitled “Russia Leaves the 
West,” in which he argued that, “Russia’s leaders have given up on becoming part of the 
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West and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system.”
143
 Since 2006 was 
the year BRIC held its first official meeting, Trenin would seem to have been prescient in 
his observation. However, a retrospective analysis suggests certain nuances. If in 2006 
Russia was beginning to build its own solar system, to use Trenin’s analogy, then this 
new system was at least adjacent to the Western one. Indeed, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, one of Moscow’s initial goals towards BRICS was to strengthen its own hand 
through strategic cooperation with both old and new power centers. 
 
This initial goal coincided with the goals of Russia’s other BRICS partners. Although the 
group has always been something of a Rorschach test for its members, with each country 
having its own goals and rationale for participating, all used it as a way of maximizing 
their voice in the international arena without directly challenging the reigning hegemon. 
Russia has historically been the most willing to paint BRICS with an anti-Western brush, 
but it has also been cognizant of the limits of that approach. In Russian elite political 
discourse, BRICS has been the symbol of an alternative to the West, but not more than 
that. This made managing conflicting views on anti-Westernism within the group easier.  
 
After the Ukraine crisis, however, that balance seems to have disappeared, at least from 
Russian official formulations (expert views are more nuanced). Instead of Russia as the 
cord that connects the BRICS and the traditional powers together, the new image is of 
shackles being broken.
144
 BRICS has become Russia’s battering ram against the old 
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system. For now, at least, it seems Russia really has left the West. It remains to be seen to 
what extent BRICS will become part of that exodus, and how much the increase in 
Russia’s anti-Westernism will affect the attitudes of the other BRICS countries towards 
participation and cooperation within the group in the long term.  
 
What is clear, however, is that the crisis in Ukraine and the collapse in relations with the 
West have forced Russia to take its BRICS diplomacy more seriously. Whereas before 
the crisis BRICS existed primarily as a rhetorical weapon, it is becoming an organ whose 
prospects Russia takes seriously beyond its use for imagery and optics. In part, this is 
because Russia now has fewer choices of international partners. It is also because BRICS 
has matured considerably and now has an agenda worth taking seriously. Nevertheless, 
the increased emphasis on BRICS as a viable focus for foreign policy and foreign 
economic policy represents a fundamental shift in Russia’s approach to the group and a 




Conclusions: Russia and BRICS in Broader Perspective 
 
In early July 2015, on the eve of the seventh BRICS summit in Ufa, Russia and in the 
midst of renewed fears over a “Grexit” (Greek exit) from the Eurozone, rumors began to 
circulate that Greece might seek alternative funding from the BRICS New Development 
Bank (NDB).
1
 The rumors were published in Western and BRICS news sources, and 
named Sergei Storchak, Russia’s Deputy Finance Minister, as one official in favor of the 
plan.
2
 At the time, the NDB had yet to be formalized; confirmation of leaders and 
location was on the agenda for the Ufa Summit, and BRICS leaders made clear that the 
NDB was unlikely to be operational before 2016. Unsurprisingly, the narrative in the 




The rumors about Greek participation in the NDB proved unfounded, and Moscow 
walked back what appeared to be its earlier support for the idea.
4
 In an interview with the 
Russian language service of the state-owned news organization Russia Today, 
presidential advisor Yurii Ushakov stated unequivocally that Greek membership in the 
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NDB was not under discussion at the time.
5
 Nevertheless, the emergence of those rumors 
was indicative of a broader truth. BRICS has come to symbolize more than just the 
activities of the group itself but also the wider phenomenon of an alternative to Western 
international structures and the general “rise of the rest.” In bringing BRICS together, 
Russia has altered the landscape of global governance and created what Ian Taylor terms 





In her article “Building the New World Order BRIC by BRIC,” Cynthia Roberts argues 
that the BRIC initiative was =not an instance of strategic vision on the part of the 
Kremlin, but rather one of successful opportunism.
7
 Indeed, for all the hype from some 
quarters about Vladimir Putin as a grandmaster chess player, many experts agree that one 
of Russia’s biggest foreign policy weaknesses is precisely its lack of a grand strategy.
8
 
What’s more, when the idea to bring BRIC together as political entity began percolating 
in Moscow, first with meetings at the Academy of Sciences in 2004, then at the level of 
deputy foreign minister in 2005, and finally with the first official sideline meeting at the 
2006 UNGA, both Russia and the general international context were profoundly different 
from what they are today. There was no financial crisis either globally or within Russia, 
and U.S.-Russian relations were cool but stable. Putin had already begun adjusting his 
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rhetoric to reflect the emphasis on Russia’s sovereignty and unique civilizational 
heritage, but these were the only harbingers of the changes to come. 
 
In some ways, therefore, Russia got incredibly lucky with its initial BRIC gambit. The 
Russian foreign policy establishment was able to capitalize on perceived global power 
shifts before they became commonly recognized. Russian leaders also played on 
international discontent with American adventures abroad without scaring the other BRIC 
partners, as Primakov had done with the original proposal for the Russia-India-China 
Strategic Triangle. When the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, BRIC, and Russia 
with it, was already there in the wings, ready to take its place in the spotlight. This was a 
case of exceptional timing. 
 
Yet the written record of BRICS suggests that even before the extent of the financial 
crisis was clear, the leaders, with Russia at the fore, were making plans to deepen 
cooperation within the group. The decision to hold a leaders’ summit was taken in July 
2008, before Lehman Brothers collapsed and the G20 began to replace the G8.
9
 The 
report of the first meeting of BRIC academic experts in Moscow in 2008 shows the seeds 
of ideas that would later emerge in fuller form in summit declarations and action plans.
10
 
While there was no guarantee that BRIC would not fizzle after its moment in the 
limelight during the acute phase of the financial crisis, there is evidence the group’s 
members were planning for a slow and steady build up before fate and collateralized debt 
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obligations intervened to make the group much more prominent much sooner than 
expected.  
 
The rise of BRICS, however, coincided with a dramatic improvement in U.S.-Russian 
relations. Therefore, while intra-BRICS cooperation increased in the years following the 
2008 financial crisis, Russian interest in the group did not expand at a corresponding rate. 
BRICS remained something Russian leaders referenced as an alternative to 
multilateralism according to Western norms, and as a method of balancing against 
American hegemony in the international system. The group did not become a significant 
element of Russian foreign policy, nor did the conceptualization of the role and prospects 
of the group expand at the elite political level. The ideas outlined in the slew of reports 
and books from Russian state universities and research institutions in the years following 
the financial crisis did not penetrate into official rhetoric. 
 
That changed after the onset of the crisis in Ukraine. Following the ouster of Yanukovych 
and Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea, the United States and the European 
Union put economic sanctions on Russia in an effort to isolate the country from the 
international system. Those sanctions increased in scope and intensity as fighting in 
Eastern Ukraine, aided by Russian involvement, continued unabated. Russia had been 





 Russia’s pretentions to acting as a bridge between old and new centers of power 
were over. 
 
In many ways, though, Russia benefited from another moment of exceptional timing in 
2014. The same day the G7 countries announced they were suspending Russian 
membership, the BRICS foreign ministers issued a statement condemning rumored 
efforts to bar Putin from the November 2015 G20 summit in Brisbane.
12
 One month after 
the aborted G8 summit in Sochi, the BRICS leaders met in Fortaleza and agreed to form 
and fund the group’s first institutions. Just as Russia needed BRICS to be more than a 
talking point, the group demonstrated its serious intentions to continue building a system 
somewhat outside the Western order. 
 
The BRICS did not plan that the agreement on the New Development Bank and the 
Contingency Reserve Arrangement would coincide with Russian political needs. 
Similarly, many of the new sub-groups and agreements that have emerged during 
Russia’s 2015 BRICS chairmanship have long been brewing on the BRICS agenda. 
Nevertheless, Russia’s BRICS presidency, the solidification of BRICS as an international 
group, and the unwillingness of the other BRICS leaders to join efforts to sanction or 
isolate Russia have all helped to catapult the group up Russia’s list of foreign policy 
priorities. In the aftermath of the fallout from the crisis in Ukraine, BRICS has moved 
from being an important rhetorical device in the Russian arsenal to being an association 
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in which the government finds economic and political value. It is no longer just words, 
but substance as well.  
 
The other BRICS have refused to join the West in condemnation of Russian actions, but 
not because they find those actions acceptable. Though popular opinion of Russia is less 
negative in BRICS countries and the developing world than it is in Europe and North 
America, it still on balance is not good.
13
 Instead, the collective reticence in BRICS to 
condemn Russia is indicative of concerns about deeper structural problems in the 
administration of global governance.  
 
BRICS summit declarations and experts from several BRICS countries maintain that the 
goal of the group is not to overturn the current system, but to give developing countries 
more say in its leadership.
14
 The United States is not making this easy. As the U.S. 
Congress continues to block IMF reform, it has “has only fueled perceptions that the 
United States is determined to keep down rising powers like the BRICS.”
15
 The risk 
remains that if Western leaders do not make room for BRICS in existing institutions, 
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It might seem easy to dismiss the threat as bluster. Indeed, the focus of this study has 
been almost exclusively on words rather than actions. Further, although rhetoric is an 
integral part of policy, it is not the same thing as a decision that has measurable impact. 
For each of the arguments put forth here, a theoretical counterargument exists. Russian 
rhetoric about its place vis-à-vis the West has unquestionably become more antagonistic 
over the past fifteen years, and especially since beginning of the crisis in Ukraine. That 
rhetoric, however, has not yet translated into firm alternative alignments. Similarly, the 
proposals Russia has put forward as part of its BRICS presidency show a marked increase 
in appreciation of how BRICS can advance Russian interests, as compared to the narrow 
rhetorical framing the topic received before the crisis. Nevertheless, these proposals 
remain mere pieces of paper at the moment; they have not yet been operationalized. 
Finally, while BRICS has persisted as a force on the global stage for longer than the 
skeptics predicted, their concrete achievements are few. 
 
The problem with these counterarguments is that they focus on what has not yet 
happened as opposed to how much of the rhetoric has borne fruit. President Putin’s 
careful redefinition of Russian national identity away from Europe and his repeated calls 
for respect of Russian interests and sovereignty are now no longer only words. In the 
ongoing crisis in Ukraine, Russia has taken action to show the steel behind those 
statements. The rhetorical approach to BRICS as an alternative to accommodation with 
Western norms and institutions is now being put to the test, as Russia seeks new partners 
in the wake of Western isolation. Economic downturns across the BRICS and other 
emerging markets, combined with weak commodity prices, make those new partnerships 
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less lucrative than Russian leaders hoped. Nevertheless, BRICS has proved itself 
operationally useful both politically and economically in ways the earlier rhetoric 
foretold. Finally, while it is too soon to judge the New Development Bank or the 
Contingency Reserve Arrangement as either successes or failures, their creation 
demonstrates that BRICS makes good on its promises. After repeatedly failing to 
convince advanced economies to adjust global economic governance so that voting 
weights reflect the current distribution of economic power, the BRICS have instead 
begun to create their own institutions. These developments are all indication of how 
rhetoric, under certain conditions, can become concrete political change. 
 
This analysis began with the assertion that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia 
has had a dual track approach to engagement with the international system. One track has 
been an effort to bolster the strength of international institutions where Russia already 
possesses a leading voice. The second has been a tactic of institutional creation, whereby 
Russia builds rhetorical alternatives to Western institutions in an effort to construct a 
system where Russia has a say in the legitimating rules and norms. BRICS is an example 
of the second track, but one that is particularly noteworthy because of the interest it 
attracted from other major global powers and the imbalance in global economic 
governance it sought to address. While the BRICS group developed in answer to global 
trends, however, the roots of the role of the group in Russian policy are in the rhetorical 
separation of Russian national identity and conception of sovereignty from the West. As a 
result, political rhetoric about BRICS in Russia developed in an inverse relationship to 
Russia’s relations with Western powers. Until the crisis in Ukraine, the Russian 
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leadership spoke about BRICS as a balance against U.S. hegemony in the international 
system. They did not take it seriously on its other merits. After Ukraine, however, 
rhetoric in Russia about BRICS has become more stridently anti-Western, but it has also 
begun display a greater depth of thinking about the group as a source of wide-ranging 
partnership. BRICS, moreover, is better prepared to take a larger role in Russian foreign 
policy. Working groups have proliferated, and the forum is on the verge of opening its 
first alternative institutions.  
 
The three main stories of this dissertation, therefore, have come together into a mutually 
supporting cycle. Increasing antagonism in Russian rhetoric about the West, and Western 
dominance of the international system, led to the rhetorical construction of BRICS as an 
alternative option. BRICS, meanwhile, continued to institutionalize because the original 
sin it sought to address – imbalance in organs of global economic governance – remained 
unaddressed. Russian rhetoric about the value of BRICS, therefore, has been supported 
by the group’s own development. The alternative option that Russia sought, where it 
would help shape the rules and norms, has manifested sufficiently to smooth the effects 
of Western censure in the aftermath of the crisis in Ukraine. 
 
The institutionalization of BRICS and the haven the group has provided for Russia have 
far wider implications than simply enabling Russia to bypass sanctions or upending 
global development financing. A key element of concern for Russia and all the BRICS is 
continued Western ideational control of global governance. In this respect, the crisis in 
Ukraine is the proverbial canary in the coalmine. Russia’s actions in Ukraine since the 
 
 246 
beginning of 2014 have violated core norms of the liberal international order. Russia has 
faced isolation, however, only from the United States and its allies. The silence of the 
BRICS is evidence that while the other four countries may not agree with Russian actions 
in Ukraine, they are not willing to stand behind the current system of norms and rules.  
 
The unwillingness of the BRICS nations to defend the principles underpinning the current 
system is a direct challenge to Western ideational control of legitimating norms of global 
governance. BRICS has not offered alternative norms beyond non-interference in 
domestic affairs, nor are they likely to do so. Even without advancing an affirmative 
normative agenda, however, the BRICS have managed to weaken the Western 
presumption of being the global norm-setter. BRICS, which began as a Russian tactical 
gambit of rhetorical balancing, has become an increasingly effective vehicle for 





Chronology of BRICS Development into an International 
Political Association 
 
1998 Russian Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov proposes triangular cooperation 
between Russia, India, and China, which continues and is dubbed RIC 
 
Nov 2001 Jim O’Neill publishes paper “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” 
in which he predicts that over the coming decade the global economic 
weight of Brazil, Russia, India, and (especially) China will grow such that 
overtake some of the G7, and this will require a revision of global 
economic governance  
 
Jan 2003 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva becomes President of Brazil, and enacts policies 
that make him very popular with those who are skeptical of globalization. 
He also pledges to increase Brazil’s trade ties with “similar” states, 
including the BRICs) 
 
Mar 2003 United States invades Iraq without UNSC authorization 
 
June 2003 India, Brazil, and South Africa agree to form the India-Brazil-South Africa 
Dialogue Forum (IBSA) 
 
Oct 2003 Goldman Sachs analysts Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman 
publish “Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050.” The paper predicts 
that by 2050 the list of the world’s ten richest countries will look very 
different, and that by 2025 BRICs may account for over half the size of 
the G6  
 
2005 At Russian initiative, Deputy Foreign Ministers of the BRIC countries 
meet 
 
July 2005 The G8 countries invite Mexico, China, South Africa, India, and Brazil to 
the G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, and the Outreach 5 is born 
 
Sept 2006 At Russian initiative, BRIC foreign ministers meet on the sidelines of the 
UNGA 
 
Feb 2007 Russian President Vladimir Putin gives a speech at the annual Munich 
Security Conference condemning the attempt by the United States to 
create a unipolar world order. Putin specifically mentions the growing 
economic power of the BRICs, and states “There is no reason to doubt that 
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the economic potential of the new centres of global economic growth will 
inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen 
multipolarity.”  
 
Mar 2008 Dmitri Medvedev is elected Russian president and inaugurated in May. 
Vladimir Putin becomes Prime Minister. 
 
May 2008 BRIC foreign ministers meet in Ekaterinburg, Russia and agree “that 
building a more democratic international system founded on the rule of 
law and multilateral diplomacy is an imperative of our time.” (Foreign 
Joint Communiqué, 2008) 
 
Aug 2008 Russia and Georgia fight a five-day war over Georgia’s secessionist 
territories South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia recognizes the 
independence of these statelets, but fails to win support for the move from 
any of its partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
including China 
 
Sept 2008 U.S. financial giant Lehman Brothers collapses after the U.S. government 
refuses to bail it out. Later that week, insurance giant American 
International Group (AIG) is bailed out.  
 
Sept 2008 The oil price falls below $100/barrel for the first time all year. The 
Russian stock market plunges, and trading on RTS and MICEX is 
suspended for several days  
 
Nov 2008 BRIC Finance Ministers hold their first formal meeting in Sao Paolo, 
Brazil on the sideline of the G20 summit. They discuss reforming 
international financial institutions (IFIs) and global financial architecture.  
 
2009-2010 Russia experiences the biggest economic contraction out of the whole 
G20.  
 
Jun 2009 BRIC heads of state hold their first formal summit in Ekaterinburg, Russia 
 
Mar 2010 BRIC Ministers of Agriculture meet for the first time in Moscow.  
 
Apr 2010 The BRIC leaders hold their second summit in Brasilia, Brazil. 
 
May 2010 BRIC health ministers meet for the first time in Geneva, Switzerland 
 
2011 Russia founds the National Committee on BRICS Research, housed at the 
Russkii Mir Center and formally part of MID 
 
Apr 2011 The BRICS leaders hold their third summit in Sanya, China. At this 




July 2011 BRICS Health Ministers meet in Beijing, China and agree to begin 
coordination and cooperation  
 
Dec 2011 BRICS Trade Ministers meet on the sideline of the 8
th
 WTO Ministerial in 
Geneva, Switzerland. They announce the creation of a contact group to 
increase economic cooperation between the countries. 
 
Mar 2012 The BRIC leaders hold their fourth summit in New Delhi, India. The 
declaration includes a proposal for a BRICS Development Bank  
 
Mar 2013 The BRIC leaders hold their fifth summit in Durban, South Africa. The 
declaration announces the agreement to form a BRICS Development 
Bank. The leaders also agree to establish the BRICS Think Tank Council 
and the BRICS Business Forum 
 
March 2014 BRICS leaders issue a statement condemning rumors that Australia will 
exclude Vladimir Putin from the G20 Summit in Brisbane because of 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
 
March 2014  Brazil, India, China, and South Africa all abstain in UN/264, the UN 
resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
 
July 2014 The BRICS leaders hold their sixth summit in Fortaleza, Brazil. The 
groups announces the creation of the New Development Bank and a 
BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement 
 
April 2015 Russia assumes the rotating BRICS presidency 
 
July 2015 Russia hosts a joint BRICS-SCO summit in Ufa. BRICS adopts a program 
on economic cooperation, names the officials who will run the new 
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